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Abstract
Rising levels of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and increasing water stress have been
in the focus of the scientific debate for some time. As a result of mounting concern
about the adverse consequences of these evolutions, some countries have already begun
to discuss and implement sets of mitigation options.
So far, pathways to address water scarcity or rising GHG emissions have been developed
independently from each other, and the assessment of interdependencies between the
water and greenhouse gases has only been conducted for specific technologies [1] [2], or
with regards to the overall impact of climate change on water resources [3].
This work aims to close this gap in research and assesses, at the example of China and
South Africa, the interdependencies of pathways to mitigate water stress and unsustainable
levels of GHG emissions that were developed independently from each other in earlier
research [4] [5]. An integration of all mitigation options in one model then allowed to
determine the benefits of an integrated approach to water availability and GHG emission
reduction.
The results show that water–GHG interdependencies are for the most part positive in
both countries, i.e., the implementation of the proposed set of measures to mitigate either
water scarcity or high GHG emission levels generates overall savings of the other resource.
It is furthermore shown that the majority of the investigated interlinkages are related to
the nexus between water and energy, whose magnitude is again determined by the water
intensity of that power generation mix that is replaced by or avoided primarily through
the promotion of energy efficiency and alternative power sources.
The optimization of all mitigation measures by means of a linear programing approach
shows that an integrated approach allows to better meet mitigation targets, in particular
with regards to local water availability, and reduces cost by up to 23% compared to
independent considerations.
Based on the study of China and South Africa, the hypothesis is brought forward that
such interdependencies are also observable in other geographies that are similarly water-
stressed and dependent on thermal power generation, while countries with little such
generation capacities will experience less or different interdependencies. A study of Egypt
supports this hypothesis, but also shows that an expansive agricultural sector might
provide opportunities for positive water–GHG interlinkages there.
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11. Introduction
Concerns about rising levels of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions and its conse-
quences on the global climate were first articulated on a broader basis in the 1980s, and
a multitude of publications has discussed this topic from different angles since then. The
four assessment reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), with
the latest from 2007, are only the most most prominent of these.
Water as a scarce resource, in contrast, has only been in the focus of a global debate
since more recently, likely triggered to part by the rise of water-scarce regions, such as
the Middle East or China, to greater economic importance and the associated increase in
water stress. The medial attention to conferences such as the annual World Water Week
in Stockholm speaks for the growing importance of this topic.
Little research, however, so far focused on the interdependencies of water and greenhouse
gas (GHG) emissions, and in particular on measures that aim at mitigating water scarcity
or unsustainably high levels of GHG emissions: seawater desalination increases water
availability, but adds to rising GHG emissions, to give only one example1.
This thesis exploits these interdependencies at the example of two countries, China
and South Africa. For this purpose, it builds on two reports that investigated sets of
mitigation options for increased water availability and reduced GHG emission levels
independently. It is structured as follows:
In Part I, chapter 2 introduces to water supply and demand and greenhouse gas
emissions. It discusses the current situation, and water demand and GHG emission
projections until 2030 as well as associated risks.
Chapter 3 focuses on water supply/demand and GHG emissions statistics for China
and South Africa. After a short country introduction, covering climatic conditions, land
area, population and economic indicators, the present state and forecasts until 2030 are
discussed for both countries.
Chapter 4 investigates sets mitigation options from all sectors of the economy that help
to close a looming water gap and achieve sustainable levels of GHG emissions in China
and South Africa. The cost and potentials of these mitigation options are debated at the
1If not powered to 100% by renewable energy sources.
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example of cost curves.
The first chapter of Part II, chapter 5 presents the research that has been conducted
so far on the interdependencies of water and GHG emissions. It shows that a good
understanding is obtained on large-scale consequences of climate change on local water
resources, and on the individual water (energy) intensities of technologies that provide
energy (water).
Chapter 6 explains why certain sources and terminologies were chosen in this work and
discusses the methodical approach towards an integration of water and GHG mitigation
measures.
Chapter 7 quantifies the cross-intensities of the considered water and GHG mitigation
options. It therefrom discusses the impact on water resources if all envisioned GHG
mitigation options were implemented, and vice versa, and presents this in the form of
intensity curves, a modified form of the original cost curves.
The results of a full integration of all options are given in chapter 8. The benefits
(and limits) of an integrated view of both resources are illustrated at the example of
several scenarios, the last set of which allow to construct investment functions that set
the required investments in relation to arbitrary increases in water availability and GHG
emission reductions.
Chapter 9 will then abstract from China and South Africa and address the question
to what extent the results from previous chapters are transferable to other regions. It
concludes with a case study of Egypt.
The conclusion, chapter 10, summarizes the key results and discusses first recommenda-
tions for policy makers therefrom, before it concludes with an outlook that prognosticates
that an integrated assessment of resources will become ever more important.
3Part I.
Water and Greenhouse Gases
42. Global water scarcity and the
greenhouse effect
This chapter introduces to water scarcity and greenhouse gas emissions. It discusses
these issues on global scale and comes to the conclusion that current policies and related
“Business-as-Usual” scenarios will most likely not be sufficient to stop the rise of global
mean temperatures, or close looming water gaps.
2.1. The importance of water and greenhouse gases
Water is probably the world’s most precious resource: there is no life without water.
The first agricultural societies developed along major rivers such as the Nile, Euphrat
and Tigris, Indus or the Yellow River, as these provided for a secure supply of water.
Since their beginning, these societies struggled with the level of water availability. The
well-being of Ancient Egypt for example depended on the Nile’s annual bursting of the
banks in summer, when the floods brought fertile silt to the fields – flood levels that were
too low or too high reduced crop yields [6]. Also today, unusual water levels are among
the most devastating catastrophes. In the lesser cases, such events lead to economic
losses: during Europe’s exceptionally dry summer of 2003, water levels in rivers fell to
such an extent that intake of cooling water in thermal power stations was curbed [7],
while Australia’s long drought between 1995 and 2009 led to reductions in agricultural
ouput, requiring the government to provide aids of 3.5 billion Australian Dollars between
2001 and 2007 [8].
Growing population levels, economic growth and behavioural changes have led to un-
sustainable levels of water abstraction in parts of the world such as the Midwest of the
United States [9] [10] or the North of China [11]. If no action is taken, the structural gap
between water availability and demand will not close, and likely lead to reduced welfare
and economic activity.
Unlike other resources, bulk water is in general a local resource, due its low ratio of
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economic value to cost1 – water scarcity in one region will therefore have only an indirect
impact on other regions.
In contrast to water, anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions of significant scale are a
matter of fact of only the last 250 years. From the last ice age until the 1750s, atmospheric
concentration of carbon dioxide (CO2) – the most important greenhouse gas – stayed at
about 280 part per million (ppm) [15]. They increase steadily since then, to 379 ppm in
2005 [16], driven mainly by increased exploitation and combustion of fossil fuels.
Also, in difference to water, greenhouse gas emissions are global: as they are emitted in
the earth’s atmosphere, one tonne has the same impact no matter where the emission
takes place.
The global warming potential of carbon dioxide was first shown by Svante Arrhenius in
1896 [17], but long ignored. In 1958, Charles Keeling started to measure atmospheric
CO2 concentrations over several years, demonstrating the influence of human activities
on concentration levels [18]. In the 1980s, the topic has become more widely known and
environmental organizations started to urge countries to reduce their emissions of carbon
dioxide and other greenhouse gases in order to avoid further damage to the environment.
The latest (2007) report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
mentions that if emissions are not reduced, best estimates for mean global temperature
predict a rise by between 1.8◦C and 4.0◦C over 1990 levels until the end of this century.
As only one consequence, sea levels might rise by up to 59 cm until then [19].
Despite major efforts in recent years, the strong economic growth particularly in developing
countries has led to ever further increasing levels of greenhouse gas emissions, which are
not expected to fall in the next twenty years in the current policy scheme [19] [20].
2.2. Global water demand and supply
Water cannot be easily created or destroyed – the earth’s total volume is therefore
constant at about 1.4 billion km3. However, only 35 million km3, or 2.5%, of this water
is freshwater, of which 68.9% (24 million km3) are locked in glaciers, permanent ice, or
snow cover. Groundwater – including deep groundwater, soil moisture, swamp water and
1Case studies conducted in different Asian, African and European countries found that the net value
of water for irrigation lies between 3.0 and 27.3 USD cents/m3 [12]. The value that was actually
charged is lower, between 0.04 and 5.0 USD cents/m3. In contrast, transport of one tonne (or the
equivalent, one cubic meter) of bulk good by ship for 1,000 kilometers costs 0.4 USD cents/tonne [13].
These values are in the same range - in contrast to most other goods, where transportation accounts
for about 1% of cost [14].
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water locked in permafrost soils – makes up further 30.8%, or about 11 million km3, of
freshwater. Only 0.3%, about 105.000 km3, of freshwater are found in lakes or rivers [21].
The freshwater that is available for ecosystems and human uses is estimated to be about
200.000 km3, only 0.6% of the total [21] [22]. This amount is furthermore unevenly
distributed: while a country such as Colombia has an annual freshwater supply of
2.132 km3 [23], similar-sized (and more densly populated) Egypt can dispose of only 58
km3 [24]2.
2.2.1. Global water withdrawals today
Global annual freshwater withdrawals3 were estimated at 3,788 km3 in 1995, and 3,973
km3 in 2000, according to UNESCO’s International Hydrological Programme (1999) [22].
Other sources give comparable numbers: a 2002 report by the International Food Policy
Research Institute (IFPRI) and International Water Management Institute (IWMI)
estimates 1995 withdrawals at 3,906 km3 [26], and a 2000 report by the University of
Kassel mentions 3,572 km3 [27] for 1995.
For 2010, UNESCO’s International Hydrological Programme estimated withdrawals at
4,430 km3 [22], while a report by the Water Resources Group (2009) mentioned global
withdrawals of 4,500 km3 (in 2010) [5] – of these, 69%, 3,100 km3, were accounted for as
agricultural use, mainly for irrigation, 13% (600 km3) in the municipal sector, and 18%
(800 km3) for industrial purposes [5].
Water withdrawals vary widely between countries and can range from less than 10 m3 per
capita and year to more than 2.000 m3 [28]. Table 2.1 gives overall data and a sectoral
split for four very different countries, Chad, Egypt, Switzerland, and the United States.
Domestic withdrawals are lowest in the dry and relatively poor Chad, but reach already
high per capita levels in Egypt, while industrial withdrawals, to little surprise, are lower
in those countries than in Switzerland or the United States.
A major agricultural producer in a desert climate, Egypt uses the bulk of its water, 83%,
or 799 m3 per capita and year, for agriculture (Egypt will be discussed in more detail
at the end of this work, see chapter 9.2 on page 172ff)4, while Chad, with comparable
2A complete list of renewable freshwater supply by country can be found in [25] (citing, amongst
other, [23] and [24], p.217 ff.).
3Withdrawals are the amount of water taken from water bodies. In contrast to consumed water,
which is lost to the local cycle for example through evaporation, withdrawn water can be returned,
albeit possibly at impaired quality: many municipal points of water use withdraw water, but do not
consume it, such as showers or washing machines. In 2000, consumptive uses accounted for 52% of
global withdrawals [22]. More on definitions in chapter 6.2, page 77ff.
4Egypt’s withdrawals in table 2.1 and its renewable supply (see page 5) do not match: part of the gap
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climate but without access to a large river, uses only 17 m3 per capita and year. In the
United States, irrigated agriculture dominates in the Midwest, the South West, Texas
and California – agricultural withdrawals account for 41% of total U.S. withdrawals [29].
In contrast, Switzerland’s temperate climate with high annual rainfall makes irrigation
superfluous in most cases, resulting in low agricultural water requirements5.
2010 Total Domestic Industry Agriculture
pop. withdrawals per capita withdrawals
Country million km3 m3
Chad 11 0.2 3 0 17
Egypt 81 72 113 16 799
Switzerland 8 2.5 80 245 6
United States 310 482 193 699 626
Table 2.1.: Annual water withdrawals for selected countries. Population data
from [30]. Water data except Egypt drawn from [25], p.223ff; original sources
and year of data: Chad [28] 2000; Switzerland [31], 2002; United States [29],
2005. Egypt [32], 2008.
2.2.2. The notion of water scarcity
Water stress or scarcity can be defined in multiple ways.
The Falkenmark indicator is a supply-side index, defined as the per capita annual water
runoff that is available for human use [33]: a region is considered water stressed if annual
runoffs are below below 1,700 m3, and water scarce if below 1,000 m3. According to this
definition, all of the Middle East and Northern Africa as well as many city states and
islands experience scarcity, whereas Eastern Africa, South Africa, India, but also South
Corea or Denmark are water-stressed (see [34], chapter 2). The Falkenmark indicator
however does not account for climatic and cultural differences [35], nor does it consider
environmental requirements.
The Water Stress Indicator (WSI) considers both the supply and demand side and
also takes environmental requirements into account [36]. It is defined as the ratio of
is closed through water reuse, part through exploitation of unsustainable sources. See also chapter
9.2.
5As withdrawals only refer to explicit human withdrawals from water bodies, the water provided to
crops by rainfall is typically not accounted for in these statistics.
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withdrawals to mean annual runoff (MAR), used as proxy for water availability6, less
environmental requirements (EWR),
WSI =
Withdrawals
MAR - EWR
(2.1)
According to this definition, a WSI>1 means overexploitation of the water resource;
however, dry regions with low MAR do not necessarily experience water scarcity. Fig.
2.1 depicts a world map with the WSI, indicating that the major river basins of Europe,
Northern Africa, the Middle East, South Africa, India, China, Central Asia, and the
United States are overexploited.
Figure 2.1.: From [37]: World map showing the Water Stress Indicator (WSI)
in the major river basins (see 2.1).
Interestingly, large parts of Europe and the Eastern United States, but also basins in
Japan that are normally not considered as water-scarce have a WSI>1, presumably due
to neglects of environmental requirements – if EWR was omitted in equation 2.1, these
regions would drop from the water scarcity map [38].
A definition of water scarcity that takes both suply and demand into account, and adds
the notion of economic water scarcity was provided by International Water Management
6Intrabasin return flows that are recycled are accounted for – MAR can thus be higher than the primary,
natural runoff. This already indicates that one way to mitigate water scarcity is to increase usable
return flows, e.g., through buildup of wastewater treatment facilities or the reduction of leaks in
municipal networks.
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Institute [39]. There, physical water scarcity means that more than 75% of available water
is withdrawn7, whereas economic water scarcity prevails if less than 25% of available
water is withdrawn, but lack of infrastructure impedes its put to use. In that definition,
much of South East Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa and parts of Central and Latin America
are considered economically (but not physically) water scarce8.
Further definitions of water scarcity exist – a review of the different indices can for
example be found in [35] or [38].
Water stress and scarcity are therefore not only a problem of arid regions. Depending on
the definition, Africa’s tropical belt can be considered water-scarce, as can be more humid
parts of Europe and North America. In all cases, however, the principle set of mitigation
options apply: a reduction of demand through more efficient uses, and infrastructure
improvements to increase supply.
2.2.3. Water withdrawals and supply until 2030
Drivers for increasing water withdrawals
Over the next decades, water demand is expected to increase as population levels rise,
economies grow and behavioural changes, driven by higher individual wealth, proceed.
The world population is expected to from 7.0 billion at the end of 2011 to 8.3 billion
in 2030, with the developing regions9 contributing most of this growth [30]. These are
also the regions that experience most of the water stress already today, as figure 2.1 has
shown.
Economic growth will put further stress on water resources:
Global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is expected to almost double between 2010 and
2030 [30] [40]. This will increase pressure on water resources as economic activity drives
water demand, either directly, as in agriculture, or more indirectly, e.g., for cooling of
power plants that produce electric power. The water intensity of GDP in the industrial
sector was assessed to be in the range of 0.01 m3 to 1 m3 per USD of GDP in [41]10. A
second source gives similar numbers, stating an water productivity in the United States
of about 15 USD per m3, i.e., about 0.07 m3 per USD [42]11.
7Again, return flows that are recycled and fit for reuse are accounted for.
8See [39] for a water scarcity map according to this definition.
9According to the UN [30], developing regions comprise all of Africa, Asia (excluding Japan), Latin
America and the Caribbean plus Melanesia, Micronesia and Polynesia.
10 [41] (1997) refers to 1990 USD numbers. Industrial water efficiency likely has improved since then,
but increased industrial activity will very likely still have an impact on water withdrawals.
11In 1996 U.S. Dollars.
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As much of the economic growth will happen in countries that are exposed to water
scarcity already today12, constraints on water resources will likely grow.
Furthermore, about 3 billion people will advance into the middle class between 2009
and 2030 [44], which will drive a growth in power demand – indirectly increasing water
demand again – and likely also lead to dietary changes: the average Chinese person eats
4 kg of beef per year today, compared to 15 kg for an average European [45]. As China’s
per capita beef consumption is expected to increase [46] and as 1 kg of beef requires
16,000 liters of water, more than any other food [47] [48], this will likely increase pressure
on water resources.
Global water withdrawals until 2030
Projections of global withdrawals can only be rough estimates, and depend on many
assumptions. Next to the growth of populations and economies, estimates on water
productivity gains and the future power mix need to be included13. Such projections
should therefore be considered as potential scenarios, i.e., possible pathways under the
given assumptions. Keeping this in mind, such scenarios can give a sense for the challenges
ahead, and help in identifying potential supply-demand gaps.
According to UNESCO’s International Hydrological Programme (1999) [22], 2025 global
water withdrawals are estimated at 5,253 km3. The other sources mentioned earlier give
lower forecasts for 2025: 4,772 km3 according to IFPRI and IWMI (2002) [26], 4,092 km3
according to the University of Kassel (2000).
The 2009 report by the Water Resources Group [5] is the most recent projection of future
water withdrawals to our knowledge. According to it, global withdrawals continue to grow
at 2% annually until 2030, the growth rate of recent years, if no future water productivity
gains are captured. Between 2010 and 2030, withdrawals would then increase from 4,500
km3 to 6,300 km3 in 2025, and 6,900 km3 in 2030 [5], which is at first sight higher than
projected in the other sources ( [22], [26], [27]); the difference mainly stems from the
exclusion of productivity improvements in [5]: if those were included at 1% per year in
agriculture and industry, the average rate of improvement between 1990 and 2004 [5],
2025 withdrawals would be about 5,000 km3, comparable to [22] and [26]14.
122010-2030 GDP growth in Africa, China and India’s is expected to be 134%, 314% and 375%,
respectively, wheras growth in the European Union will only be 46%, and United States 63% in the
U.S.( [30] [40] [43]).
13A power system dominated by thermal plants requires considerable amounts of water for cooling,
whereas a system based on photovoltaic and wind only needs a fraction of that amount. Also see
section 5.2.1, 67ff.
14Reasons for the comparatively low number of 4,092 km3 given in [27] are more conservative estimates
on economic growth – e.g., Chinese GDP growth 1995-2025 was assumed to be only 4.2% per year,
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Water stress and water gap in 2030
Figure 2.2 shows the projection for global water demand and suply according to [5]. It
gives the 2010 and 2030 demand on the left side and opposes it with the existing water
supply which is assumed to stay constant in the reference scenario. The water considered
as supply is subject to the following restrictions:
• Accessible. Freshwater that can be conveyed to a point of usage when needed with
the existing infrastructure. I.e., water locked in glaciers or inaccessible aquifers
etc. is not included, as is not snowmelt in excess of immediate needs and reservoir
storage capacity. The water must furthermore be of sufficient quality to be ready
for basic uses.
• Reliable. Water that can be supplied in 90% of the time. I.e., stormwater or
floodwater is not included.
• Sustainable. Water can only be extracted to such an extent that the annual fill
level of the water body stays constant over the years.
• Less environmental requirements. Freshwater less environment needs to sustain
ecosystems.
It can be seen that global withdrawals were by about 300 km3 higher than supply already
in 2010 if environmental needs are taken into account, which means that the world’s
Water Stress Indicator (WSI) is greater than 1 according to equation 2.1.
Until 2030, the gap between water withdrawals and supply is estimated to increase. As
some basins will still have higher supply than demand, summing up to 100 km3, the gap
in the basins with deficits is forecasted at 2,800 km3.
It has to be noted that figure 2.2 does not include potential consequences of climate
change. Water supply in many arid and semi-arid regions will likely decrease if greenhouse
gas emissions continue to rise, further aggravating water stress in these areas [19]15
Figure 2.3 shows how the global water gap distributes across countries. It can be seen
that the vast majority of the world population will live in water-stressed regions by 203016;
whereas actual annual 1995-2010 growth was 8.5% and is expected to be 7.9% between 2010 and 2025,
according to [43] – and the assumption that withdrawals for irrigation either stabilize or decrease
slightly, whereas this is expected to increase in all other sources ( [5], [22], [26]).
15This topic will be discussed in more detail in chapter 5.1, page 64ff.
16Underlying population estimates in [5] differ slightly from the latest UN figures cited above [30]: [5]
assumes a 2030 world population of 8.2 billion (versus 8.3 billion in [30]).
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Figure 2.2.: Global water demand and supply, 2005 and 2030. From [5], p. 44.;
footnotes: 1Based on the International Food Policy Reseach Institute (IFPRI);
2Based on frozen technology and no increase in water efficiency after 2010;
32030 accessible, sustainable supply at 90% reliability (4,866 billion m3) net of
minimal environmental requirements (666 billion m3).
only a small fraction of regions, amongst them for example Japan and Scandinavia, are
expected to still have a surplus by 2030.
As already suggested by the WSI map (page 8), which depicted water stress on a basin
level, the two insets in figure 2.3 demonstrate that a country view can give superficial
information, especially for countries as diverse as China or India: whereas China’s humid
and mountaineous South West and Song basin in the north are not expected to experience
water stress by 2030, all other basins are expected to do so, with a tendency of higher
stress in the drier north of the country (Hai and Huang basins) than in the more humid
south (Yangtze, Pearl).
Figure 2.2 does neither assume improvements in water productivity nor supply infrastruc-
ture, which might however be well realized: continuing water productivity improvements
at historic rates would reduce the 2030 water gap by about 20% [5], which includes
efforts towards more efficient use of water in all sectors – for example reduced leakage in
water networks, methods to reduce cooling water needs in power stations, or water-saving
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Figure 2.3.: From [5]. Water gap as percent of 2030 withdrawals per country.
A negative percentage means that projected water withdrawals exceed accessible,
reliable and sustainable supply after accounting for enviromental needs.
irrigation methods such as drip irrigation, and another 20% of the water gap could by
closed by increasing water supply at historic rates [5]. As these efforts will not suffice to
close the gap in most regions, further measures need to be implemented. The alternative,
that no additional action is undertaken, will, by definition, still lead to a balanced supply
and demand situation. Such a scenario would however lead to ecosystems that do not
receive their required share of water, hampered economic growth, or a lower standard of
living.
2.3. Global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions
Rising levels of greenhouse gases very likely have an impact on global climate. In most
regions, this will lead to higher average temperatures and an increased frequency of
weather extremes, including an increase in the likelihood of natural disasters [49] [50].
The following section first gives an overview of the most important anthopogenic green-
house gases. Afterwards, it discusses the historic evolution and present state of antho-
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pogenic GHG emissions, as will future scenarios for GHG emissions. The last part then
summarizes likely effects of high atmospheric GHG concentrations.
2.3.1. Greenhouse effect, radiative forcing and the types of
greenhouse gases
The earth is warmed by the sun, which radiates primarily in the visible and near-visible
sprectrum17. About one third of the incoming solar radiation of about 342 W/m2 is
reflected directly [51], but the remainder is absorbed by the earth and its atmosphere.
The warmed earth surface then re-emits radiation in the infrared spectrum (i.e., at lower
energy). While a small part of this radiation leaves the atmosphere, the larger part is
absorbed by substances in the atmosphere and re-emitted in all directions, also back to
the surface. This is commonly referred to as the Greenhouse Effect (see for example [52]).
The earth’s average temperature would be below 0◦C without this re-direction of radiation
back to earth, so this natural greenhouse effect is essential to our ecosystem.
The most abundant elements in the atmosphere, oxygen and nitrogen18, exert no green-
house effect [52]. Indeed, the strongest contributors to it are water vapour and carbon
dioxide (CO2), with other gases such as ozone, methane, nitrous oxide and halocarbons
conributing to a lesser extent [51].
The strength of the greenhouse effect is defined by the strength of the radiative forcing,
which in turn depends on the concentration levels of those substances that do exert a
greenhouse effect.
The radiative forcing, measured in W/m2, is the difference between the integrated outgoing
emission spectrum at the earth’s surface and at top-of-atmosphere. The difference is
related to the fact that part of the infrared radiation is absorbed on its way through the
atmosphere and re-emitted in all directions. The various substances thereby absorb at
specific wavelengths: CO2 has an absorption peak at λ=1400-1600 nm, water vapour at
wavelengths of 800-900 nm and again at 2000 nm [51] [52].
The higher the atmospheric concentration of these substances, the higher the radiative
forcing, and the higher the energy that is kept in the system. For 1990 concentration
levels, CO2 =353 ppm
19, CH4 =0.31 ppm and N2O =0.31 ppm, atmospheric radiative
forcing, corrected for cloud effects, was determined at 125 W/m2 [51] [53].
17The solar radiation spectrum starts in the ultraviolet part, at wavelengths of about 250 nm, rises
sharply to its maximum at λ≈ 500 nm, i.e. in the visible sprectrum, and has a long tail in the
infrared spectrum (see for example [51]).
1878% of the dry atmosphere are composed of nitrogen, 21% of oxygen [52].
19ppm: parts per million, a measure for the concentration of a gaseous substance in a volume.
2.3. GLOBAL GREENHOUSE GAS (GHG) EMISSIONS 15
Gas Formula Contribution
W/m2 %
Water vapour H2O 75 60
Carbon dioxide CO2 32 26
Ozone O3 10 8
Methane + nitrous oxide CH4 + N2O 8 6
Table 2.2.: From [51]. Contribution of the most important absorptive substances
to radiative forcing at clear sky, corrected for overlap effects.
Table 2.2 separates the main contributors to the radiative forcing: water vapour and
carbon dioxide account for a combined 86% of the greenhouse effect, and ozone, methane
and nitrous oxide for the remaining 14%. The impact of halocarbons20 is estimated to be
less than 1 W/m2.
While the direct influence of human activity on water vapour and atmospheric ozone
is negligible21, CO2, CH4, N2O and halocarbons are emitted by human activities at
meaningful scale:
• CO2 is primarily released through the burning of fossil fuels, e.g., for power and
heat generation or transportation.
• CH4 emissions stem from agriculture (e.g., from cattle or rice paddies) or the
extraction and distribution of natural gas.
• N2O is also emitted from burning of fossil fuels, or for example from fertilizer use.
• Halocarbons are used as refrigerants, cleaning agents or pesticides and can enter
the atmosphere for example if old household fridges are not properly disposed of.
The 2007 IPCC report estimates that between 1750 and 2005, radiative forcing has
increased by 1.66 W/m2 through increased atmospheric concentrations of CO2, and 0.98
W/m2 through increases in CH4, N2O and halocarbons concentrations.
Next to these greenhouse gases, increased emissions of aerosols, e.g. from mining or
burning of fossil fuels and biomass, had an in sum negative impact on radiative forcing
20Halocarbons are an umbrella term for organic compounds that contain halogens such as fluroine,
chloride or bromide. Subgroups are fluorocarbons (HFCs, PFCs), which contain only fluorine, and
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) that also contain chlorine. HFCs and PFCs started to replace CFCs
since the Montreal Protocol in 1987, which exert a negative effect on the ozone layer [54].
21Or, in fact, negative, as in the case of ozone.
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(about -1.2 W/m2) over the same period. Combined with smaller human and natural
effects, such as changes in water vapour22 or solar irradiance leave an overall change in
radiative forcing of about 1.6 W/m2 between 1750 and 2005 [55] [52].
The Global Warming Potential (GWP) allows to compare the greenhouse effect of a
given amount of different greenhouse gases. It is defined as the global mean radiative
forcing impact 1 kg of some compound has relative to 1 kg of CO2 over a given time
horizon [56]. It thus depends on a substance’s lifetime and its radiative forcing efficiency.
Table 2.3 gives an overview of the GWP for the most important greenhouse gases.
Methane for example has a GWP of 25 on the basis of a 100 year time span, i.e., 1 tonne
of methane has the same impact on radiative forcing as 25 tonnes of CO2
23.
Formula Lifetime GWP
Gas years 100 years
Carbon dioxide CO2 50-200 1
Methane CH4 12 25
Nitrous oxide N2O 114 298
CFC-12 CCl2F2 100 11
Table 2.3.: Adapted from [57]. Table of the most important anthropogenic green-
house gases, their chemical formula, atmospheric lifetime and Global Warming
Potential (GWP) on a 100 year time scale (see text for a definition of GWP).
2.3.2. Historic evolution and present state of GHG emissions
High concentration levels in itself are no novelty in earth history: levels of atmospheric
CO2 were several times higher over most of the last 500 million years [58] – the earth was
habitable during this time, and brought complex creatures such as the dinosaurs into
being. However, it is the rate of increase that is very likely unprecedented, and that can
have negative consequences for a densly populated planet.
The concentration of CO2 has climed from 280 ppm before the start of industrial revolution
to about 379 ppm in 2005 and 392 ppm in 2011. Other anthopogenic greenhouse gases
22An increasing mean temperature due to higher atmospheric energy content will ultimately increase
evaporation rates, thus leading to higher water vapour levels.
23Its molecular structure gives methane a higher radiative forcing efficiency than carbon dioxide (3.7·10−4
W/(m2 · ppb) versus 1.4·10−5 W/(m2 · ppb) [57]). However, its shorter lifetime results in a lower
GWP for a 100 year time span, decreasing further at longer time spans. Hence, 1 t CH4 = 25 t
CO2e, or CO2 equivalents.
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have increased as well: methane from about 700 ppb24 in 1800 to 1,774 ppb in 2005,
nitrous oxide from 260 ppb to 319 ppb over the same period [52] [59].
Figure 2.4.: Historic evolution of atmospheric CO2 concentrations 1744-2011.
Light blue data points (years 1744-1953) are taken from air bubbles trapped in
antarctic ice cores [60]. Dark blue data points (1959-2011) are taken from direct
measurements of atmospheric CO2 at Mauna Loa, Hawaii [61].
Figure 2.4 shows the evolution of CO2 concentrations levels between 1744 and 2011. It
can be seen that concentration levels started to grow since the early 1800s with the
beginning of industrialization and the resulting increase in fossil fuel burning. In the
1950s, the growth accelerated. Amongst other, this is likely correlated to a strong increase
in population levels: while world population grew from 0.8 billion to 2.5 billion in the
200 years between 1750 and 1950 [62], it grew by a further 4.5 billion to 7 billion in the
51 years until 2011 [30].
Various institutions track greenhouse gas emissions, but large differences in completeness
and actuality exist.
The International Energy Agency (IEA) for example publishes its yearly World Energy
Outlook with data on CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion (e.g., [20]).
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) reports
24ppb: parts per billion
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greenhouse gas emissions for the Annex I countries of the Convention25, but not for
non-Annex I countries [64], while the United Nations Statistics Division publishes holistic
greenhouse gas emission data for all countries26, but the most recent year reported can
however be as far back as 1994 for some smaller countries [65].
Other sources report emissions on global scale, but are often restricted to CO2 only,
neglecting CH4, N2O and halocarbons, or specific sectors: the U.S. Energy Information
Administration for example saw energy-related CO2 emissions in 2005 and 2008 at 28
Gt and 30 Gt, respectively [66], whereas the World Energy Outlooks 2007 and 2010
estimated 2005 and 2008 emissions at 27 Gt and 29 Gt, respectively [67] [20].
Lastly, a 2006 EPA27 report on non-CO2 greenhouse gases estimated 2005 emissions of
these to be 10 Gt CO2e [68].
A database that gives numbers on all greenhouse gas emissions and that is based on a
broad set of well-recognized databases is the Climate Analysis Indicator Tool (CAIT)
provided by the World Resources Institute [69]28.
According to it, total GHG emissions for the latest year with data for all important
greenhouse gases – 2005 – were 43 Gigatons of CO2e; figure 2.5 shows how these emissions
split between world regions, sectors and greenhouse gases, and how the regional split has
changed between 1990 and 2005:
• Types of greenhouse gases. In 2005, CO2 emissions accounted with 76%, or 33 Gt
CO2e, for the major share of global GHG emissions, followed by methane with 15%
(6 Gt CO2e), and nitrous oxide with 8% (3 Gt CO2e). Halocarbons accounted for a
further percent (0.5 Gt CO2e) [69].
• Sectoral split. As CO2 emissions arise mostly from the burning of fossil fuels for the
production of energy (electrictiy, heat) and for transportation, it is not surprising
to see the energy and transportation sectors accounting for 53% (23 Gt CO2e)
29
25Annex I countries are essentially all OECD countries, plus Russia, the Baltic states and several other
Central and Eastern European countries. For a complete list see [63].
26Based on UNFCCC and UN Population Division data.
27EPA: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
28The CAIT tool builds on data from the U.S. Department of Energy [70] [71], the Emission Database
for Global Atmospheric Research (EDGAR) by the European Commission and the Netherlands
Environmental Assessment Agency [72], the International Energy Agency [73], the U.S. Energy
Information Administration (EIA) [74], the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) [68] and
the World Bank [75].
29This accounts for all energy-related emissions from power (and heat) stations, industry and households.
For instance, a part of industrial emissions will be emitted by power stations, while another part is
directly emitted from industrial complexes, e.g., for the production of process heat.
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Figure 2.5.: Split of greenhouse gas emissions by type of greenhouse gas, geogra-
phy, and sector (2005), and 1990 for the geographic split.
and 12% (5 Gt CO2e)
30 of 2005 GHG emissions, respectively. Other industrial
processes account for 4% (2 Gt CO2e)
31, agriculture and forestry including land-use
changes for 14% (6 Gt CO2e) and 12% (5 Gt CO2e), respectively, and waste for 3%
(1 Gt CO2e)
32.
• Regional split I. Asia (without the Middle East) and Oceania accounted for 39% or
17 Gt CO2e of total emissions in 2005, with China being the single largest emitter
(7 Gt CO2e or 17%). The remainder of emissions is relatively evenly distributed
among the other world regions: Europe and North America 18% (8 Gt CO2e each),
Latin America 13% (5 Gt CO2e), Middle East and Africa 12% (5 Gt CO2e) and
the remaining countries one further percent (0.52 Gt CO2e).
However, it needs to be said that the list of main emitters looks differently on a
per capita base, as table 2.4 suggests: Middle-Eastern Qatar leads the world with
75 t CO2e per head. The average Australian still accounted for 28 t CO2e, and a
30Includes private and commercial transport by road, rail, sea, air.
31For example, CH4 and N2O emissions in chemical plants.
32Mainly methane emissions from landfills.
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citizen of the European Union for 10 t CO2e, whereas China had emissions of 6 t
CO2e per capita.
• Regional split II. In 1990, overall emissions were 17 % lower than in 2005. Further-
more, the regional distribution looked different: Europe and North America then
accounted for 45% (or 16 Gt CO2e) of global emissions of 36 Gt CO2e, and Asia
(without the Middle East) and Oceania for 31% (or 11 Gt CO2e). In particular,
China’s emissions were only 11% or about 4 Gt CO2e, 52% of the 2005 level. The
other world regions (Latin America, Middle East, Africa) roughly maintained their
share.
While emissions in Europe have actually decreased since 1990, emissions in the
fast-growing economies of Asia and the Middle East have increased sharply.
GHG emissions World
Country t CO2e p.p. rank
Qatar 75 1
Australia 28 7
USA 23 10
EU 27 10 n/a
China 6 94
Chad 2 144
India 2 152
Table 2.4.: From [69]. Per capita greenhouse gas emissions for selected countries
(and the European Union).
Another source that gives holistic data on greenhouse gas emissions is the 2009 report
Pathways to a low-carbon economy by McKinsey & Company [4], and its updates [76],
[77]33. This source is of particular interest for our later purpose, as it gives both projections
for GHG emissions until 2030, and mitigation options towards more sustainable emission
levels. Similar to the CAIT tool, data on greenhouse gas emissions are based on a range
of established sources, namely IEA’s World Energy Outlook 2009 [78], but also data from
UNFCCC [64] and the IPCC [79].
33Albeit published by a private institution, [4] was created with the involvement of an academic review
panel and further external experts. See [4], p.139-140 for references. The report is accessible free of
charge.
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According to it, global GHG emissions in 2005 were 45 Gt of CO2e. To check the
consistency of this data set with other publications, figure 2.6 shows how emissions data
from [4] split by region and sector, and how they compare to the CAIT numbers34.
Reassuringly, the differences between the two sources are small, with the largest deltas in
the Asia-Pacifc region and the forestry sector. Regarding the first, this is likely due to
the fact that a part of the countries summed in the block other in the CAIT are indeed
smaller Asian countries, while the delta in the forestry sector is more difficult to explain
and likely driven by different assumptions on land-use change.
Sectoral split
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Figure 2.6.: Comparison of global GHG emissions in 2005 from the World Re-
source Institute’s CAIT tool [69] and the publication Pathways to a low-carbon
economy [4] [77].
34Please note that emissions in the McKinsey report for transportation and energy (more precisly,
domestic emissions) were corrected downwards, by 0.5 Gt CO2e each, in the 2010 update to the full
report [4] ( [76]) and [77]. Thus, regional numbers in this graph differ slightly with respect to [4], p.
25.
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2.3.3. Projections on GHG emissions
As world population, standards of living and economic wealth grow, greenhouse gas
emissions will grow in parallel in the current policy scheme [79] [20]. The following
paragraphs will discuss how greenhouse gas emissions are likely to develop in such a
“Business-as-Usual” scenario.
The Climate Analysis Indicator Tool [69] cites 2030 projections for global CO2 emissions
from energy of 39–44 Gt CO2, depending on the scenario
35.
Comparable numbers can be found in the latest issues of the IEA’s36 World Energy
Outlooks (WEO): according to the 2010 (2009) issues [78] [20], energy-related CO2
emissions are expected to rise to 40 Gt CO2 globally by 2030 under the current climate
policy scheme, while the implementation of new environmental policies that are in
discussion today would lead to reduced emissions, of 35 Gt CO2 [20] (see table 2.5).
Non-CO2 greenhouse gas emissions are expected to reach about 13 Gt CO2e by 2020,
according to the U.S. EPA37 (no 2030 projection available); simply assuming constant
annual growth for a first estimate would yield 2030 emission levels of about 15 Gt CO2e.
This data, summarized in table 2.5, allows a first estimate of overall 2030 greenhouse gas
emissions in the current policy regime, which should rise by about 40–50% between 2005
and 2030. Assuming 45 %, it could be estimated that GHG emissions reach 65 Gt CO2e
by 2030, up from 45 Gt CO2e in 2005 [76].
GHG emission projections depend on multiple asssumption, with two of the most im-
portant being population and economic growth. The EIA reference case assumes that
global population will grow by 0.9 %, from 6.5 to 8.2 billion, and the world economy
will expand by an average 3.7% (in terms of GDP at purchasing power parity (PPP))
between 2005 and 2030 [80]. The WEO assumes similar trajectories for population, but
lower economic growth rates: according to the 2009 edition [78], population growth is at
1.0 % between 2007 and 2030, and GDP growth at PPP 3.1% over the same period38.
The IPCC39 Fourth Assessment Report on Climate Change (2007) [79] includes multiple
scenarios on global 2030 GHG emissions that cover the solution space in terms of economic
and population growth, technological change and convergence of the world community
(the level of global interaction), but assume no further climate initiatives beyond current
35Based on data from the EIA, U.S. Energy Information Administration
36IEA: International Energy Agency
37EPA: (U.S.) Environmental Protection Agency
38See [78], p. 57 and 62. The 2010 edition includes a projected population growth of 0.9 % and a GDP
growth of 3.2 % between 2008 and 2035 (no specific 2030 data available). See [20], p. 65 and 68.
39IPCC: International Panel on Climate Change
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Organization Source 2005 emissions 2030 emissions Growth
Mt CO2(e) Mt CO2(e) %
CAIT: EIA - reference [69] 28.2 40.6 44
CAIT: EIA - low [69] 28.2 38.5 37
CAIT: EIA - high [69] 28.2 44.4 57
WEO 2007+2009 [67], [78] 26.6 40.2 51
WEO 2007+2010 [67], [20] 26.6 40.0 50
WEO 2007+2010 [67], [20] 26.6 35.1 32
EPA: non-CO2 gases [68] 10.2 15.3 50
Table 2.5.: 2005 and 2030 projections on global CO2 emissions from various
sources for the energy sector (EIA, IEA World Energy Outlooks (WEO) 2007,
2009, 2010) and non-CO2 greenhouse gases (EPA, 2030 numbers own calculation
based on 2020 EPA projections).
policies [81].
According to it, global GHG emissions in 2030 will be in the range of 50–77 Gt CO2e [82],
in accordance with our estimate above40. IPCC assumptions on population and GDP
growth are comparable to IEA [78] [20] and EIA [80] reports: for 2030, the median of
population projections lies at 8 billion [83], and GDP growth projections range from 0.9%
to 3.3% [83]41.
Being the only sources that gives a holistic picture for 2030, the updated version of the
report Pathways to a low-carbon economy [76] [77] estimates global GHG emissions in
a “Business-as-Usual” scenario at 66 Gt CO2e, an increase of 45 % over 2005 levels – a
number in line with the range spanned by the IPCC and in well acordance with our
estimate based on the EIA and IEA data from table 2.5. Figure 2.7 shows how the 2030
emissions split by region and sector:
• Regional split. The trend of rising emissions in Asia is epxected to persist: by
40While the high end of this range represents scenarios that involve rapid economic growth powered
by fossil fuels, or a less-globalized world with strong population but lower economic development,
the low end links to scenarios that see the world move quickly to a global society focused on
services, sustainability and clean energy, or towards a world of again high population growth and less
globalization, but locally environment-concious communities (see [81] for a detailed description).
41However, IPCC GDP growth rates are at market exchange rates, not corrected for purchasing power
parity, which tends to understate economic activity in developing countries where the same amount
of a given currency buys more goods than in developed economies. Compare for example pages 160
and 161 in [80]: at market exchange rates, world GDP growth falls from 3.4% to 2.8%.
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Figure 2.7.: From [76]. Projections on global GHG emissions 2005 – 2030, and
2030 regional and sectoral split.
2030, the Asian-Pacific region (without China and the Middle East) is projected to
account for 24% (up from 22% in 2005, see figure 2.5), and China for 25% (17% in
2005) of total emissions. All other world regions are expected to have a lower share
of global emissions, albeit total levels might still rise.
• Sectoral split. Energy and the industrial sectors account for most of emissions in
2030, with 60% (up from 58% in 2005), followed by transportation, agriculture,
forestry and waste, which rise in line with global emission levls.
Underlying this data are GDP growth and energy price assumptions from the 2009 edition
of the World Energy Outlook [78] (on average 3.1% GDP growth 2005–2030, oil price of
115 USD per barrel ( [76], p.7)) and a world population that is expected to grow by 0.9%
between 2005 and 2030 from the WEO 2007 [67]42.
To summarize, global GHG emissions are expected to rise in all major sources if no action
beyond current policy efforts is undertaken. By 2030, GHG emission levels are estimated
to be about 45% higher than 2005, at around 66 Gt CO2e. This will very likely lead to
higher atmospheric concentrations of these gases and increase radiative forcing. Unlike
water scarcity, which is a local phenomenon, increasing GHG emissions will have global
implications.
42The 1997 data differs only slightly from the 2009 and 2010 edition which assume average growth rates
of 1.0% and 0.9%, respectively.
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2.3.4. Risks and threats of rising GHG emissions
Section 2.3.1 and figure 2.4 (p. 17) showed that atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse
gases are rising – CO2 emissions for example have risen from about 280 ppm to 392 ppm
between 1750 and 2011. This is expected to have an influence on global climate, of which
global mean temperature is one main parameter. Figure 2.8 shows how it has evolved
since 1880: overlying the yearly fluctuations, a move towards higher temperatures is
observable [84].
Figure 2.8.: From [84]. Development of global the mean land-ocean temperature
index 1880–2010. The blue line represents the annual mean, the red line the
5-year running mean data.
Although it cannot be excluded with full certainty that parts or all of the additional
GHG emissions will be absorbed in natural processes and emissions levels stabilize, it is
assumed more likely that temperatures will continue to rise: according to the IPCC they
are estimated to rise by about 0.2◦C per decade over the next two decades, based on an
assessment of temperature changes over the last half-century [85]. Due to the decade-long
atmospheric lifetimes of the most relevant greenhouse gases (see table 2.3), this increase
is relatively insensitive to future emission pathways: even if emissions had been kept at
2000 levels, temperature would still rise by 0.1 ◦C per decade over the next decades [86].
Beyond 2030, the increase in global mean temperature however depends on the chosen
pathway. The IPCC high case assumes emissions of 130 Gt CO2e in 2100, in which case
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global mean temperatures are expected to increase by 2.0–6.4◦C, with 3.4–4.0◦C being
the likely range.
In contrast, the temperature could be kept at between 1.8 ◦C and 2.4 ◦C if emissions
peak by 2030 and decline thereafter [87].
Next to the obvious consequences, rising average temperatures can lead to secondary
effects with mostly adverse impacts, such as43
• Rising sea levels. Melting of glaciers and ice on the (ant-)arctic landmasses, and the
expansion of ocean water due to higher mean temperatures will virtually certainly
lead to increasing sea levels. This will lead to the inundiation of islands, coastal
regions, aggravate damages from floods and reduce water availability through
salinization of aquifers. Until 2100, the IPCC scenarios predict a sea level rise of
between 0.2 m and 0.6 m, if no corrective climate action is taken [86].
• Increased frequency of heat waves. The number of very hot days will very likely
increase, reducing quality of life, increasing death risk for older, sick and young
persons and leading to reduced agricultural output for some crops due to heat
stress.
• Changing precipitation patterns. The frequency of heavy rain is very likely to
increase over most of the landmass, going along with soil erosion, higher flood risk,
decreases in groundwater quality, and increased risk of damages to infrastructure.
• More and stronger natural disasters. Both the risk of tropical cyclones and drought
are likely to increase, leading, amongst other, to increasing damages to infrastructure,
crops, an increased risk of death and injuries and of power outages, an increased risk
of food and water scarcity, land degradation and higher migration of populations.
• Losses in biodiversity. About 20%–30% of animal and plant species likely face an
increased risk of extinction if temperatures increase by 1.5–2.5◦C. Beyond 3.5 ◦C,
ecosystems are expected to face major changes with mostly negative consequences on
biodiversity: modeling results suggest that 40–70% of species could face extinction
under such circumstances.
As mentioned earlier, CO2 concentration levels and average temperatures have already
been much higher than today during the last 500 million years, while the earth stayed
habitable [58]. However, these changes occured very slowly compared tp today, leaving
43See [49] and [50] for a good overview.
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ecosystems time to adapt. Temperature increases of several degree in less than a century
most likely never happened before.
Global mean temperatures should not rise by more than 2◦C in order to keep the
consequences in check, as uncontrollable backcoupling effects might start beyond this
threshold [88]: for example, it is expected that the mass balance of the Greenland ice
shield becomes negative at a temperature increase greater than 1.9–4.6◦C; if that increase
persists over longer time spans, the ice shield would disappear, leading to a sea-level
rise of about 7 m [87]. Similarly, temperature increases of more than 1–3◦C in water
temperature will likely lead to bleaching of corals and significant losses in coral reef
biodiversity [88].
To keep temperature increases below 2◦C, atmospheric CO2 concentations need to stabilize
in the long run at 400 ppm – given that concentrations in 2011 were already 392 ppm
(see the graph on page 17), emissions would need to peak before 2015 and subsequently
decline. By 2030, CO2 emissions would then need to be about 20 Gt CO2 instead of the
40 Gt CO2 projected in the various “Business-as-Usual” scenarios of table 2.5 [89].
Otherwise, mean temperature increases will be higher: if CO2 emissions indeed rose to 40
Gt in 2030 and peaked at about 45 Gt in 2050, CO2 concentration levels would stabilize
at 570–660 ppm, likely inducing temperature increases in the range of 4.9–6.1◦C [89].
Effors to reduce global GHG emission levels require the concerted action of all nations.
While it would certainly not be easy to curb emission levels, chapter 4 will sketch out
that sustainable pathways are in principle feasible and overall not more expensive than
maintaining conventional patterns.
Before that, however, the following chapter will focus on China and South Africa, the
two focus countries of this work, and the projected development of water availability and
GHG emissions there.
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3. Water and GHG in China and South
Africa
After having discussed current and future water availability, water demand and greenhouse
gas emissions on a global scale, this chapter aims to give an overview over the specific
situation in China and South Africa. Both countries are economies that are expected to
experience strong growth over the coming decades. Furthermore, both are major emitters
of greenhouse gas emissions, with South Africa being the second-largest African emitter1
with annual per capita emissions of 9.0 t CO2e (2005), in the same order as the European
Union, and China being the world’s largest emitter [4] [69]. On top of this, both already
experience water stress today in many of their regions. Thus, the two countries were
chosen as case studies as they represent a type of country that faces both challenges in
the near future, rising greenhouse gas emissions and increasing risk of water scarcity, and
promise to reveal interesting interdependencies.
3.1. Introduction to China
3.1.1. Short country profile
China has the world’s largest population with 1.35 billion inhabitants in 2010 [30], and a
land area of 9.6 million km2, the world’s fourth-largest [91]. It is divided into 33 provinces,
with the largest having populations of more than 100 million – more than any European
country except Russia [30].
Due to its size, the Chinese landmass comprises four different climatic zones [92]:
• The South and South-Western parts of the country reaching north to the Yangtze.
The mountaineous South-West has a tropical climate in the lowlands and subtropical
climate in the highlands and a colder climate on the Tibetean plateau. An almost
tropical climate is dominant in the Pearl river basin (comprising cities such as Hong
1After Nigeria, which however only has a third of South Africa’s per capita emissions (3.2 t CO2e per
capita and year [69]).
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Figure 3.1.: From [90]. Physical and road map of China.
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Kong, Shenzhen and Guangzhou) and the smaller river basins of the South-Eastern
coastal region, which are both influenced by monsoon winds. Crossing over to the
Yangtze basin, the climate becomes subtropic.
Including the full Yangtze basin, this area includes more than half of China’s
population [93].
• A large semi-humid zone that stretches north from the Yangtze over the North
China plain to the Russian border. It covers a broad band along the East China
Sea and the border to North Korea. The climate gradually becomes colder to the
North.
• The upper and middle reaches of the Yellow river belong to a semi-arid zone that
stretches far into North-Western China.
• The arid western part of China is comprised of the deserts and inland river basins
north of the Tibetean plateau.
With respect to its economy, China’s real GDP was 3.5 USD trillion in 2010 [43]2, making
it the world’s third-largest economy [69]3. GDP growth averaged 9.5% between 2000 and
2010. This strong growth led to an ever-increasing demand for energy: China consumed
2,131 Mt of oil equivalents in 2008, 17% of the world’s total [20]4.
Figure 3.2 summarizes population, GDP and energy demand for 2010 and 2030. It is
estimated that Chinese population will grow only slightly until 2030, by 0.2% annually, or
about 4% in total [30]. In contrast, economic growth is estimated to lead to a more than
four-fold increase of real GDP between 2010 and 2030 [43], to 14.5 trillion USD, while
energy consumption is seen to increase as well, by 83 % between 2008 and 2030 [20]5.
3.1.2. Water availability in China
China’s total renewable water resources are 2,840 km3 6, well below the global average of
7,000 m3 [95] according to FAO-AQUASTAT data7 [93].
2In 2005 USD
3In terms of purchasing power parity, China’s GDP was 10.1 USD trillion (2010), second only to the
United States [94].
4See [20], p. 618.
5“Current Policies Scenario” of the WEO 2010, i.e., assuming no further (environmental) policies beyond
current ones that could lead to reduced energy demand.
6Or 2,105 m3 per capita (2010), using the United Nations population statistics cited above [30].
7FAO: Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations: AQUASTAT is FAO’s information
database on water and agriculture.
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Figure 3.2.: Projected growth of Chinese population, Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) and energy consumption 2005/2008–2030. (See text for sources.)
Assuming that all this water was available for human use and equally distributed, China
would not experience water stress per se according to the Falkenmark index (see Chapter
2.2.1, p. 6), which sees water stress occuring at per capita per year water availabilities of
less than 1,700 m3 [33].
Water availability however varies widely given China’s geographic and climatic hetero-
geneity: while coastal regions in the South receive more than 2,000 mm of precipitation
annually, and the areas south of the Yangtze basin still more than 1,000 mm, rainfall is
between 400–900 mm in most of the semi-humid zone north of the Yangtze. In the West,
precipitation falls below 400 mm per year8 [93].
As a consequence, river basins in the southern part of the country, including the Pearl and
Yangtze and South-Eastern coastal rivers and the Tibetean plateau command internal
renewable surface water resources of 2,176 km3, whereas the basins north of the Yangtze
only dispose of 535 km3 according to the FAO [93]9 10. Dividing these resources by the
respective population (south: 53.6 %, north: 46.4 % of total [93]) allows to estimate per
8For comparison, average precipitation in Germany is 700 mm per year [96].
9The sum of China’s surface water resource, 2,711 km3 is lower than the total renewable water resources,
which also accounts for groundwater, for which, unfortunately, no basin split was available in the
studied sources.
10It has to be noted that this data is larger than the 2,376 km3 of total surface water resources
communicated for 2007 in the annual report of the Chinese Ministry of Water Resources [97] which
however does not provide more detailed data splits.
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capita water availabilities for the two parts of the country, which are 3,010 m3 in the
south and 855 m3 in the north11.
2005 and 2030 water supply and demand
Table 3.1 summarizes current and projected data on water withdrawals and renewable
water sources for China.
In 2005, it withdrew 554 km3 of water for human uses according to FAO-AQUASTAT.
Of these, 358 km3 were for agricultural purposes, 68 km3 for domestic and 129 km3 for
industrial purposes [93]. Other sources give comparable numbers. The Chinese Ministry
of Water cites 2007 withdrawals of 579 km3 in its 2008 report on water resources [97], and
an older source, UNESCO’s International Hydrological Programme (1999) determined
1995 withdrawals at 526 km3 [22].
Measure Value, km3 Institution Year
Water resources 2.840 FAO-AQUASTAT [93] 2010
W. 1995 526 UNESCO IHP [22] 1999
W. 2005 554 FAO-Aquastat [93] 2010
W. 2005 555 Water Resources Group [5] 2009
W. 2007 579 Chinese Water Ministry [97] 2008
W. 2025 764 UNESCO IHP [22] 1999
W. 2025 527–740 IWMI [98] 1998
W. 2030 818 WRG [5] 2009
Potential S. 873 IWMI [99], [95] 2001
S. 2030 619 WRG [5] 2009
Table 3.1.: China’s renewable water resources, withdrawals (W) and supply (S)
between 1995 and 2030 according to various sources, and year of publication.
The 2009 report by the Water Resources Group estimates 2005 water withdrawals at
555 km3 [5] (p. 57). This report will be of special importance for our purposes: next to
projecting China’s withdrawals until 2030, aggregated from more detailed data sets of
China’s ten major river basins, it quantifies the incremental water availability potential
and cost of a whole set of options to increase water availability.
Chinese water withdrawals will increase by 1.6% annually and reach 818 km3 in 2030
according to this report. Of these, 420 km3 will be used in the agricultural, 265 km3 in
11Please note that these numbers neglect renewable underground water supplies and should thus only
be considered as order-of-magnitude estimates.
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the industrial, and 133 km3 in the domestic sector12.
Forecasts from other sources for comparison are difficult to find. UNESCO’s International
Hydrological Programme [22] (1999) estimated 2025 withdrawals of 764 km3, while a
1998 report by the International Water Management Institute (IWMI) projected 2025
withdrawals of between 527 km3 and 740 km3 [98] (p. 33), lower than the other sources.
However, industrial and domestic withdrawals were assumed to be 128 km3 combined in
2025, a value already achieved in 2005 according to [5], [93].
The left part of figure 3.3 follows the same logic as the global water supply-demand graph
(figure 2.2, page 12) and contrasts projected withdrawals for 2005 and 2030 from [5] with
the sustainable, renewable and accessible water supply for 2030.
It can be seen that a national water gap of 201 km3 opens until 2030, with eight out of
ten basins running a deficit (see right part in fig. 3.3); the relative size of the gap varies
in dependence of the local value of the climatic and social drivers described above: the
gap is estimated to be largest in the dry but densely populated Hai basin around Beijing,
the Yellow river (Huang) basin, the Yangtze basin, and along the south-eastern coast,
wheras the humid South-West and the cold Song basin are not expected to experience
water gaps by 2030.
In addition to the looming gap in the supply of bulk water, China faces water quality
issues. The 2008 report of the Ministry of Water on the state of domestic water resources
acknowledged that 40% of rivers, 51% of lakes and 63% of the monitored groundwater
wells were not fit for drinking even after treatment [97]. Furthermore, 11% of the
population did not have access to safe drinking water, and 45% could not use improved
sanitation facilities in 200813 [25]. The low levels of water quality and availability are
furthermore threatened through environmental accidents. In 2011 alone, Circle of Blue,
an international network of water journalists and researchers, counted 11 reports on
water pollution events large enough to receive international attention [100]. Amongst
these were cases of water contamination from chemical plants and textile mills, or rice
poisoned with heavy metals from mining and industrial sewage14.
12Underlying this projection is a population increase from 1.28 billion in 2005 to 1.46 billion in 2030,
which lies between the 2030 UN medium case projection of 1.40 billion and its high case estimate of
1.48 billion [30]. GDP is estimated to grow to 13.8 USD trillion, slightly less than 14.5 USD trillion
cited in figure 3.2.
13Access to safe drinking water is defined as a protected water supply, e.g., a household connection,
protected spring or well (see [25], p. 230). Improved sanitation requires the connection to a public
sewer or septic system, or at least a simple pit latrine (see [25], p. 241).
14Reports on incidents can also be found in [101].
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Figure 3.3.: From [5]. Left part: Chinese water demand-supply in a Business-
as-Usual scenario for 2030. Right side: Chinese map showing the ten basins
differentiated in [5] along with their relative gap (ratio of unsatisfied demand to
total demand in 2030).
3.1.3. Evolution of greenhouse gas emissions
2005 emissions
In 2008, China still needed more than five times as much energy per unit of GDP than the
United States, and about ten times more than Japan15 [69] – given that China received
83% of its energy from from coal and oil in 2008, compared to 61% for the United States
and 52% for the European Union [20], it is not surprising that it became the world’s
largest emitter of greenhouse gases in 2005 [69].
According to data assembled by the World Resources Institute [69], China emitted 7.2
Gt of CO2e in 2005
16, 17% of the global total (see figure 2.5, page 19). Similar numbers
are provided by the 2010 update of the report Pathways to a low Carbon Economy [4],
15Tonnes of CO2 emissions per 1 million of GDP.
16As already discussed in section 2.3, 2005 is to our knowledge the latest year of publicly data available
for holistic data covering all greenhouse gases and sectors.
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according to which 2005 emissions reached 7.5 Gt CO2e [76].
Figure 3.4 compares the two sources and gives a sectoral split which shows that numbers
are in good accordance: total emissions for example differ by only 4%. Compared to
the global average, energy and industry account for a larger share of emissions (78%/5.6
Gt CO2e [69] and 76%/5.7 CO2e [76], respectively, versus 58% globally), followed by
agriculture. Transportation in contrast accounts for less than half the share of global
emissions (5% in China, vs. 12–13% globally), whereas the waste sector is only slightly
smaller than in the global case. Emissions from forestry and land-use change only play a
negligible role in China (versus 16% on global scale [76]) – according to [69], emissions
from this sector are in fact negative in China, very likely driven by afforestation programs
that act as a carbon sink [102] [103].
15
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Figure 3.4.: 2005 Chinese GHG emissions by sector based on two sources [69],
[76].
Other sources confirm these numbers. For example, energy-related emissions in 2005 were
5.1 Gt CO2, according to the 2007 World Energy Outlook [67], 5.5 Gt CO2 according to
the EIA’s International Energy Statistics [66], and 5.9 Gt according to a recent study by
the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory [104].
2030 emissions
The estimates for China’s 2030 energy demand in figure 3.2 already indicate that GHG
emissions can be expected to rise if no corrective action is undertaken. Indeed, the
2010 World Energy Outlook estimates energy-related CO2 emissions of 11.7 Gt CO2
36 CHAPTER 3. WATER AND GHG IN CHINA AND SOUTH AFRICA
by 2030e [20]17, up from 5.1 Gt CO2 in 2005 in its Current Policies scenario
18, while
the EPA report on anthropogenic non-CO2 Greenhouse Gas Emissions 1990-2020 [68]
projects 1.6 Gt in 2005 and 2.0 Gt CO2e in 2020 for China
19 – extrapolating this number
under the assumption of constant growth rates would yield 2.3 Gt CO2e for 2030.
This data allows to give a first back-of-the-envelope estimate of China’s 2030 GHG
emissions for a Business-as-Usual scenario:
At about 12 Gt CO2 of energy-related emissions, about 2 Gt CO2e of non-CO2 emissions,
and one additional Gigaton of CO2 emissions from non-energy sources
20, China’s 2030
GHG emissions should be in the order of 15 Gt CO2e
21.
The 2010 update of the report Pathways to a low-carbon economy projects 2030 GHG
emissions for China, in a Business-as-Usual scenario, of 16.7 Gt CO2e [76]
22 – an increase
of 122% over 2005 levels. Figure 3.5 shows how emissions develop for the different sectors:
by 2030, the energy and industrial sector still account for the largest share, with 13.1 Gt
CO2e (or 79%), followed by the transportation sector (11%), agriculture (9%) and waste
(1%). Again, emissions from forestry and land-use changes are projected to be negligible.
Figure 3.5 also shows that transportation is the fastest-growing sector, followed by
energy. This seems plausible given China has the potential for a lot of catching up:
passenger car density was only 27 per 1,000 inhabitants in 2008, compared to 451 for
the United States [105]. Similarly, per capita power consumption was only 2.6 MWh in
2009, versus 12.9 MWh in the United States23 [106]. Given China’s high growth rates,
these differences can be expected to become smaller over the next two decades, leading
to increased emissions from these sectors.
To conclude, it seems likely that China will have cemented its position as the world’s
17See pages 672-673.
18The 2005 number is from the WEO 2007, as not reported in the 2010 edition. 2030 numbers assuming
an annual average GDP growth of 5.7%, and a population growth of 0.3% between 2008 and 2030 for
China [20] (See page 65).
19Assuming a GDP growth of 7.0% 2001–2020 [68], p. 7-29, or 1.4 % annually.
20IEA and EPA neglect non-energy CO2 emissions, which were 485 Mt CO2e in 2005 [69]; extrapolating
these in proportion to energy-related CO2 emissions 2005–2030 based on the [20] yields 1.1 Gt CO2.
21One of the main drivers are of course the underlying assumptions on economic growth: given that
Chinese GDP has grown by 9.5% between 2000 and 2010, and is projected in some sources to grow
by 7.4 % until 2030 [43] (see figure 3.2, page 31), a 5.7% growth rate as used in the WEO might
be regarded as conservative. An alternative high-growth (7.5 % annual GDP increase 2005–2030)
emission scenario is given in the 2007 edition of the WEO, estimating energy-related CO2 emissions
of 14.5 Gt in 2030 (instead of 11.7 Gt) [67].
22 [76] uses the slightly higher annual GDP growth rate of 5.9% from the 2009 World Energy Outlook [78].
23Including also industrial uses.
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Figure 3.5.: From [76]. 2005 and projected 2030 GHG emissions for China by
sector.
leading producer of greenhouse gases by 2030. A stabilization of atmosheric concentrations
of greenhouse gases at levels low enough to avoid an increase in global mean temperature
beyond 2◦C will then be difficult to achieve without China’s participation.
On the other hand, substantial efforts and investment will be needed to improve China’s
water quality and to close the water gap.
Reassuringly, enough solutions to address these issues already exist today. After a
discussion of South Africa on the following pages, which will show that this country faces
the same challenges as China, Chapter 4 will show that increased water availability and
lower GHG emissions can indeed be achieved at controllable cost.
3.2. Introduction to South Africa
3.2.1. Short country profile
South Africa’s modern history is influenced by the concurrence of its indigenous population
and European settlers from mainly Dutch and English background from the late 1600s
on. With formal independence from the United Kingdom in 1948, a system of Apartheid
was successively implemented that aimed at separating ethnic groups, and that lasted
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Figure 3.6.: From [90]. Physical and road map of South Africa.
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until 1994.
South Africa is the southermost and with 1.2 million km2 the eigth-largest country on
the African continent [91]. In 2010, it had a population of about 50 million [30]. The
largest share of the land area is covered by a high plateau with heights of 2,400 m in
the east, and dropping to 600 m in the Kalahari desert in the west. The southern end
of this plateau is marked by a mountain ridge that reaches heights of more than 3,300
m and runs from the border with Mozambique in south-westward (and later westward)
direction, leaving only a narrow coastal plain along the Indian Ocean [107]. Based on
this topography, South Africa can be divided into three climatic zones [107]:
• The eastern part of the country on the plateau. Annual precipitation reaches 500
mm and more, and vegetation ranges from grassland in the higher reaches to forest
at altitudes.
• The dry western parts of the plateau. Here, precipitation levels are 100–500 mm
annually, and vegetation is dominated by meager grassland or short shrubs.
• The coastal region around the Cape and along the Indian Ocean coast, with a
Mediterranean climate and annual rainfalls of 300–900 mm.
Due to the low rainfall levels, 65% of the land can only be used as grazing land or need
irrigation for growing crops.
About half of the land area and most of the country’s central parts are drained by the
Orange river, which joins the Atlantic Ocean on the border to Namibia. Amongst its
tributaries is the Vaal river system, which drains parts of the densely populated region
around Johannesburg. The Limpopo system drains the northern part of the country (14
% of land area) to the Indian Ocean, and smaller rivers that join the Indian and Atlantic
Ocean on direct path from the mountain ridge drain further 38% of the country [107].
South Africa is the largest economy in Africa, with a GDP of 279 USD billion in
201024 [108] and one of the world’s largest mining nations [109]. Partly because these
industries require large amounts of energy, South Africa has one of the highest per-capita
energy and GHG intensities of Africa – per-capita GHG emissions were 9.2 t CO2e in
2005, in the same order as in France or Italy [69].
Figure 3.7 summarizes 2010 data on population [30], real GDP [108] and energy demand
[110], and contrasts it with projections for 2030 (from the same sources): while population
levels will increase only slightly, both GDP and energy demand are expected to more
24At market exchange rates and in 2005 dollars.
40 CHAPTER 3. WATER AND GHG IN CHINA AND SOUTH AFRICA
54.7 +9%
20302010
50.1Population,
million
Real GDP,
USD billion
(real 2005)
Energy 
demand,
Mtoe
711
279 +155%
20302010
139
68 +103%
20302010
Figure 3.7.: Projected growth of South African population, real Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) and energy consumption 2010–2030. (See text for sources of
data.)
than double. For the latter, a Business-as-Usual scenario without major policy changes
is again taken as basis25.
3.2.2. Water availability in South Africa
South Africa has annual renewable water resources of 50 km3 according to FAO-
AQUASTAT [111] – at a population of 50 million, this gives 1,000 m3 per capita and
year, at the border to physical water scarcity according to the Falkenmark index [33],
and well below the global average of 7,000 m3 [95].
2005 water supply and demand
About 5 km3 of the 50 km3 are groundwater, and 45 km3 surface water; FAO estimates
that the majority of these resources is lost to human uses through evaporation and flood
spillage, and that 10 km3 are required for environmental needs – all in all, only 13.9 km3
are estimated to be available for human use [111], of which 13.3 km3 were indeed used in
2000 across the different sectors.
25Termed Current Development Plans in the 2007 report on South Africa’s long term mitigation potential
in GHG emissions for the Department of the Environment [110]. This report is still South Africa’s
most comprehensive and accepted data source in climate/energy research.
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Comparable numbers come from the 2004 National Water Resources Strategy published
by the Department of Water Affairs [112], which gives a water demand for 2000 of 12.9
km3 26, while the Water Resources Group report [5] estimates 2005 water withdrawals at
13.4 km3.
Table 3.2 gives the sectoral split of water requirements for all three sources, which shows
that the data are in good accordance.
Source FAO [111] DWAF [112] WRG [5]
Year of data/report 2000/2012 2000/2004 2005/2009
Irrigation 7.8 7.9 7.9
Municipal 3.9 3.5 3.5
Power gen. + industry 1.1 1.1 1.5
Afforestation 0.5 0.4 0.5
Total 13.3 12.9 13.4
Table 3.2.: All data in km3. 2000 and 2005 water withdrawals for South Africa by
sector from three sources. Municipal includes water requirements in commercial
buildings and non-bulk industry, e.g., manufacturing, in [111] and [112].
2030 water supply and demand
Two sources provide estimates on future water withdrawals for South Africa.
UNESCO’s International Hydrological Programme [22] gives 2025 withdrawals of 18.6
km3, but already dates back to 1998. The Water Resources Group report [5] projects
2030 withdrawals to reach 17.7 km3. As in the case of China, [5] estimates demand
for a hypothetic Business-as-Usual scenario under the assumption that adequate water
resources are available for unconstrained growth (of GDP, population, standards of living),
and contrasts this number with an estimate of the accessible, reliable and sustainable
supply (less environmental requirements) for 2030, which is estimated at 15.0 km3, slightly
higher than the 13.9 km3 mentioned in [107]. Therefore, a national water gap can be
expected to open over the coming two decades, similar to the China case27.
The water gap will again not be distributed evenly across the country, as the right part of
figure 3.8 indicates: albeit its higher precipitation levels, the eastern part of the country
26Unfortunately, no newer data is available in the established literature. E.g., [25] (2011) also cites the
FAO 2000 number, as does the World Bank, which states that 2009 withdrawals remained unchanged
at 12.5 km3 [113].
27Looking back at equation (2.1) (page 8), this means that South Africa will have a Water Stress
Indicator > 1 in 2030.
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and the Cape region is expected to experience higher levels of water stress than other
regions. One reason is the higher population density in the agglomerations of Cape Town
(situated in the Berg area in figure 3.8), Durban (Thukela) and Johannesburg (Olifants
and Upper Vaal) compared to the rest of the country. Moreover, the majority of South
Africa’s power plants and industrial sites is located in these regions, driving up water
demand further28.
Compared to China, which is subdivided into the ten river basins (see figure 3.3), South
Africa is divided more granuarly into 19 Water Management Areas (WMAs) shown on
the right side of figure 3.8. These were established by the government in 1999 in order to
simplify the management of the national water resources [114]. The Water Resources
Group report [5] and this work follow this division.
28See figure 7.14, 137, which gives a map of South Africa, showing the distribution of industrial activities.
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3.2.3. Evolution of greenhouse gas emissions
As mentioned above, South Africa is Africa’s leading economy and one of the world’s
largest mining nations: it is world leader in platinum mining, hosts the world’s largest
gold reserves [115] and is the 7th largest coal miner29; however, it exports only 27% of
that coal, using the remainder for its own market. It is thus not surprising that South
Africa receives 77% of its energy from coal [74].
2005 emissions
Energy-related CO2 emissions were 331 Mt in 2005, and 337 Mt in 2008, according to
the World Resources Institute [69]. As in China, the energy sector accounts for the
majority of South Africa’s overall greenhouse gas emissions, as figure 3.4 shows: according
to both the World Resources Institute [69] and the report Pathways to a low-carbon
economy [76], it was responsible for about three quarters of emissions, followed by
transportation and agriculture with roughly a tenth of total emissions each, and the
waste sector with 5% – total 2005 GHG emissions are given at 423 Mt CO2e [69] and
416 Mt CO2e [76] respectively. South Africa’s Energy Research Centre on Long-Term
Mitigation Scenarios [110] confirms this order, and gives GHG emissions of 450 Mt CO2e
for 2005.
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Figure 3.9.: Comparison of 2005 South African GHG emissions from [69] and
[76].
29With a production of 280 million tons in 2009 [74].
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While the share of energy-related emissions is roughly the same as in China, differences
arise for example in the transport sector, which was notably smaller in China (5 % in
2005, see figure 3.4, p. 35). This is not surprising, given a passenger car density of 98
vehicles per 1,000 people in South Africa’s versus 15 in China (2005) [105].
2030 emissions
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Figure 3.10.: 2005 and projected 2030 GHG emissions for South Africa by sector.
Regarding overall GHG emissions, figure 3.7 (page 40) indicated that South Africa’s
energy demand is expected to double between 2010 and 2030, which is expected to lead
to an almost doubling of energy-related GHG emissions, from 330 Mt CO2 in 2005 to
640 Mt CO2e in 2030 according to a report by the Stockholm Institute [116].
South Africa’s Energy Research Centre Long Term Mitigation Scenario (LTMS) report
provides two Business-as-Usual scenarios: one, which assumes unconstrained growth
(Growth Without Constraints), gives 2030 emissions of about 950 Mt CO2e [110] (p. 49
f), whereas a regulation according to current policies (Current Development Plan) leads
to emissions of 885 Mt CO2e in 2030 [110] (p. 53 f)
30.
Based on these sources, the report Pathways to a low-carbon economy [76] and further
data points [117], this thesis estimates 2030 GHG emissions of 789 Mt CO2e, an increase
30Underlying this estimate is an average GDP growth of about 5% (see p. 25 of the report [110]).
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of 89% over 2005 levels (or 2.6 % annually)31. Appendix B gives a full derivation for these
emissions. To summarize shortly the reasons and adjustments: [76] gives notably lower
2030 emission levels for the Business-as-Usual scenarios than the LTMS report [110]. In
particular, emission data for the power and industry sector seemed too low compared to
other sources [110], [117] and were adjusted upwards.
Figure 3.10 shows how emissions split up between sectors: energy and industrial emissions
are expected to grow strongest, to 666 Mt CO2e or 84% of the 2030 total. Transportation
is estimated to overtake agriculture as the second-largest emitter, accounting for 53 Mt
CO2e (7% of total), while emissions from the waste sector are projected to decrease over
the next two decades.
All of the consulted sources estimate that South Africa’s GHG emissions will increase
steeply in the current policy regime, with most of the increase expected to come from
the burning of fossil fuels in power generation, industry and transportation. However,
such a correlation does not need to be imperative: the examples of Japan or Switzerland
show that high GDP levels can also be achieved (and sustained) with significantly lower
emissions, as both countries have a GDP emissions intensity which is only one tenth
South Africa’s [69].
South Africa therefore faces similar challenges as China: it needs to close a water gap
and – ideally – reduce its relative GHG emissions simultaneously. Options to address
both problems without a loss of wealth exist, and are often even profitable from indivdual
standpoints. The following chapter focuses on these mitigation options.
31Of the major sources used, [76] and [117] assumes a growth rate of 3.7 %, whereas [110] estimate a
rate of about 5% annually.
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4. Towards increased water availability
and reduced greenhouse gas
emissions
The preceding two chapters described how water demand and greenhouse gas emissions
are likely to evolve in so-called Business-as-usual scenarios, i.e. under the assumption
that current policies rest in place and no additional efforts are undertaken. In this case,
both water demand and GHG emissions are very likely to grow over the next decades on
a global scale as well as in our two focus countries China and South Africa.
While a water gap will have an immediate impact only on the affected region, rising
concentrations of greenhouse gases are a problem of global scale. Their consequences,
such as rising sea levels or an increased frequency of natural disasters, materialize over
time spans of several decades and will eventually affect most of the world’s regions.
It is likely that both China and South Africa will be among the countries that experience
both the consequences of increasing water scarcity and climate change. The two countries
should thus start to implement strategies that mitigate both problems.
This chapter will discuss options for both increased water availability and reduced GHG
emissions. As will be seen, solutions exist and range across all sectors, from the accelerated
implementation of high-technology options as well as changes in agronomy practices, and
from ones with a net economic benefit to relatively expensive solutions.
4.1. Mitigating water stress
The water gaps discussed in the last chapter took as a basis on the one hand that demand
developed at historic rates, without additional efficiency improvements, and on the other
hand that supply stayed at current levels. This is of course a hypothetical picture: water
stress will ultimately lead to more efficient water uses, more water re-use, and increasing
supply infrastructure.
Efforts to secure water availability are already under way. The Three Gorges Dam on the
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upper reaches of the Yangtze river in China not only produces electricity with its 18 GW
installed capacity, but also regulates water levels and availability downstream [118]. In
the arid north, companies that want to tap into water resources are required to become as
water-efficient as possible, and procure remaining needs through a water trading program
that frees water resources from agriculture through increased irrigation efficiency [119].
Such efficiency increases indeed led to reduced per capita water withdrawals in China,
which fell from 490 m3 in 1960 to 433 m3 in 1960 [22] [5]. In parallel, China participated –
and continues to do so – in extending supply: between 1950 and 2000, half of the world’s
large dams1 have been built in China [48]. Other major infrastructure projects include
the North-South transfer scheme, which, upon full completion (by 2050), will pipe almost
45 km3 of water per year in three branches from the Yangtze to the Yellow and Hai river
basins [92]2.
For South Africa, the Food and Agricultural Organization of the UN estimates that
supply from surface water could be increased by 5.6 km3, from 13.9 km3 today3 [107].
By this, the country’s dam capacity would likely grow beyond the 30.5 km3 installed
today [107], already more than twice 2005 withdrawals4. In contrast, 1.0 km3, or 7 %
of withdrawals, were lost in 2005 due to leakage [5] – fixing these could increase water
availability in a presumably cheaper and environmentally less invasive way than new
dams.
Other means to increase water availability are under exploration, such as mine water
treatment in the Olifants basin [121] [122] or desalination of industrial wastewater for use
in power stations [123]. Furthermore, Eskom, South Africa’s state-owned power utility,
only plans with dry-cooled coal power stations for the future [117]. These require only a
fraction of the water of wet-cooled units5
The options to close a water supply–demand gap can generally be arranged in four groups:
• Increase supply. Infrastructure that either increases accessible supply in absolute
terms, or makes it more predictable. Includes for example dams, water transfer
schemes, pumping stations, desalination.
1With dam heights exceeding 15 m.
2The question remains, though, whether the transfer scheme will solve the water availability problem
and not only move water from one water-scarce basin to another: figure 3.3 (page 34) showed that
both the Yangtze, Hai and Yellow river basins are expected to experience a substantial water gap by
2030.
3Note that [5] cites a accessible, renewable and environmentally sustainable supply of 15.0 km 3.
4Which is above the global average: in 2010, the world’s dam capacity was about 6,000 km3 [120],
versus withdrawals of 4,500 km3 [5]
5See also section 5.2.1, page 68ff.
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• Reduce demand. Technologies, appliances or solutions in industry or the municipal
space that reduce water demand for a given task. This includes, for example
showers that are equipped with water-saving spray nozzles or power plants that are
cooled with air instead of water. In agriculture, drip irrigation reduces water needs
while preserving crop output.
• Increase yield (in agriculture). Higher crop yields with the same amount of water.
For example, planting of sorts of rice that give the same yield per area with less
water.
• Reduce losses. Infrastructure improvements that avoid loss of water on its way from
source to consumer such as the repair of leaks in water networks or the revetting of
irrigation channels with a watertight material to reduce seepage.
In both China and South Africa efforts were made to recommend actions and develop
priority lists towards the mitigation of water stress: the Chinese Ministry of Water
Resources published its perspective on the current and projected water situation and
development priorities in its latest Annual Report (2007-2008) [97]. In South Africa, the
National Water Resources Strategy from 2004 [112] provided a comprehensive picture on
the country’s water situation and asked for specific sectoral strategies.
Reports that quantify all options with respect to their cost and potential (to increase water
availability) are however scarce. The only contribution on this topic to our knowledge
was provided by the Water Resources Group report of 2009 [5] already referred to in the
preceding chapter.
Given the unfavourable weight to price ratio of water, an approach to mitigate water
scarcity has to be a local one6. For this reason, the Water Resources Group report
provideed individual water availability cost curves for several focus countries, amongst
them China and South Africa. Its purpose is to give a potential set of solutions to close
the water demand-supply gap in 2030, and the respective cost.
In short, the approach was such that, based on the water gaps on basin/WMA7 level (see
figure 3.3, p. 34 and fig. 3.8, p. 42), locally applicable solutions along the four dimensions
sketched out above (increase supply, reduce demand, increase yield, reduce waste) were
defined and their potential to increase water availability above the Business-as-usual case,
6International water transfers are still a rare case – one recent example is the planned shipping of about
11 million m3 of freshwater from an Alaskan reservoir to India [124].
7WMA: South Africa’s (19) Water Management Areas.
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plus associated net cost8 were determined.
Then, all solutions were added from the cheapest to the most expensive (in terms of cost
per incremental cubic meter of water availability), producing a Water Availability Cost
Curve on basin level. The sum of the basin cost curves give the national cost curve that
represents the mix of mitigation options with lowest full cost in 2030.
The following aspects were considered for determining the potential of a solution:
• Availability. Only technologies should be considered which are commercially avail-
able today, or will become so with high certainty soon.
• Local potential. Very few solution have unlimited potential. For example, new dams
can only be built to the extent suitable terrain is available. Savings from more
efficient irrigation for example are limited by the maximal level of applicability to
the local agricultural sector.
• Penetration rate. It is unlikely that a solution will gain 100% market share over a
short time span. Historic market share evolution of comparable technologies can
give a hint on how a new solution might spread until 2030.
4.1.1. The water availability cost curve for China
Figure 4.1 gives the national water cost curve for China. More than 50 individual solutions
were combined to “close” the supply-demand gap of about 201 km3 (see figure 3.3, p. 34).
The solutions become more expensive in terms of full cost per incremental cubic meter of
water. The full cost for a solution are defined as
Full cost =
Full cost of mitigation option−Full cost of Business-as-Usual
Incremental water availability of option
, (4.1)
where the full cost of in one year are the sum of depreciated investments9 and the
operational cost/savings. The full cost can be considered as the (shadow) cost of water
that would be required so that the implementation makes economic sense.
The colour coding in figure 4.1 highlights the fact that water availability solutions stretch
across all sectors, i.e., industry, municipalities, agriculture and supply:
8The cost and potentials for individual solutions were determined by local researchers on the basis of
literature reviews, case studies, and interviews with individuals working in the respective areas.
9I.e., the annuity from the depreciation of the investments over the lifetime of a mitigation option with
a given cost of capital.
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Figure 4.1.: From [5]. Aggregated water availability cost curve for China. Each
option to increase water availability is represented by a rectangle. Its width
gives the national potential to increase water availability over the Business-as-
usual scenario (in km3); its height gives the full cost per m3 of increased water
availability in 2030.
• Industry. Increasing water efficiency in industry makes up a large share of the
cost-negative solutions10. Approaches involve on-site re-use of water or a switch to
less water-intensive (or even water-free) processes, such as dry dedusting of exhaust
fumes. Such measures often also save energy, sometimes reducing operational
expenses to the extent that they exceed the initial investments.
• Municipal sector. Includes leakage reduction in water networks and improved
sanitary facilities such as less water-intensive showerheads or toilets. Little savings
other than water, plus high investment make especially the latter options relatively
costly. A further large option is the increased penetration of wastewater treatment11.
10Cost negativity means that the new solution is chapter than the Business-as-Usual alternative in
terms of full cost.
11Although wastewater treatment does not increase the amount of available water, it does increase the
availability of reusable water, i.e., water that is fit for further withdrawals.
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• Agriculture. As mentioned, the agricultural sector includes (i) solutions that allow
the same crop yield with less water, e.g., through introduction of drip irrigation, and
(ii) such solutions that increase crop yield at a given amount of water, e.g., through
planting of less water-demanding species12. These solutions generally require low
investments, but also enable only low operational savings.
• Supply. Supply-side options are found mostly on the right part of the curve, such
as new dams or desalination facilities. Requiring high investments and sometimes
high operational expenditures, they come at a relatively high net cost.
A detailed list of all mitigation options can be found in appendix C and in [5], p. 147 ff.
It can be seen that closing the water gap in the least-cost configuration as sketched out
in figure 4.1 comes at cost that seem low with respect to municipal water fees: the last
(and most expensive) option in this solution mix that just closes the gap costs 0.3 USD
per m3. On average, cost are - 0.11 USD per m3 13, which means that the least-cost
solutions mix comes at a net economic benefit: integrating the curve until the water gap
closes gives annual full cost of -21.7 USD billion in 203014.
Closing the water gap can thus save money, but this depends on the right allocation
mechanisms, sufficient levels of financing, and committment of all stakeholders.
Cost curves differ between basins. Not only are the water gaps of different size, but so
are the solutions: industry and the municipal sector will have more weight in densely
populated than in rural basins, where increased agricultural efficiency solutions might
dominate. Figure 4.2 shows the cost curves for China’s South Eastern coastal river basins
and the Northwestern inland region.
The industrial and municipal sector dominate in the densly populated and industrialized
South East as expected: increased penetration of wastewater treatment for example lifts
water availability by more than 4 km3 annually, while this option accounts for less than
1 km3 of incremental water availability in the Northwestern basin. The humid climate
furthermore allows for an extension of dam infrastructure in the South East, while this is
again of lesser importance in the Northwest.
12This does however not assume a change in the crop mix, i.e., substitution of water-intensive crops for
less-water intensive alternatives.
13Weighted average of the full cost of all solutions that are required to close the gap in the least-cost
aproach, and their respective potentials.
14However, it has to be noted that this cost figure depreciates investments over the lifetime of the assets,
and that total expenditures on increased water availability can thus be higher in some years.
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The rural and arid North Western parts of the country will in contrast mostly need to rely
on efficiency improvements in agriculture, with industrial and municipal solutions being
of little importance. Low precipitation levels leave only small potentials for new dam
constructions, and the inland location (obviously) makes seawater desalination obsolete,
while operational improvements in (irrigated) agriculture, such as reduced/no tillage15,
are more important than in the South East16.
4.1.2. The water availability cost curve for South Africa
A similar picture can be drawn for South Africa. Figure 4.3 shows its aggregated cost
curve, which reveals the same overall structure as its Chinese counterpart: while industrial
15Reduced tillage means that the soil on the fields is ploughed less extensively or not at all, and crop
residues cover the fields, preserving soil moisture. See also section 7.2.3, page 126.
16In relative terms, due to the lack of mitigation options from other sectors, but also in absolute terms,
as irrigated approaches matter more in the arid North West, where most agricultural activity is
based on it, than in the South East, where a higher share of agriculture is rainfed.
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solutions dominate the cost-negative part and agricultural solutions the middle, supply-
side options are found more towards the high-cost end. Cost per incremental cubic meter
are again to the most part in the range of -1 to 0.3 USD/m3, with the weighted average
being - 0.05 USD/m3 – integrated full cost for 2030 are therefore again negative on
average, at -150 million USD.
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Figure 4.3.: From [5]. Aggregated water availability cost curve for South Africa.
The water availability curves so far represented the solution mix with the lowest full
cost in 2030 and included solutions from all sectors. In designing a holistic country road
map, other key factors would however need to be assessed for each option: among them
would probably be scalability, the number of stakeholders involved, the time needed for
implementation, risk of failure, organizational requirements, and the impacts on local
communities, other critical resources, or ecosystems.
Considering these, solutions that were labelled as low-cost can prove to be much more
difficult to implement than a presumably higher-cost alternative. This is also the reason
why the past has seen – on average – a stronger focus on increased supply versus
agricultural efficiency: building a desalination plant presumably comes faster and involves
less stakeholders than convincing thousands of farmers to change from one plant species
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to its less water-demanding relative.
Table 4.1 shows three water curve scenarios at the example of South Africa: while the
first is the least-cost option already seen in figure 4.3, and the second shows what can
be achieved with supply-side options only – presumably among the easier options to get
initiated – the third option focuses on agricultural efficiency only.
Full cost 2030 % of
Solution mix USD million gap closed
Least-cost, mixed approach -150 100 %
Supply-side approach 545 84 %
Agricultural approach 249 46 %
Table 4.1.: Adapted from [5]. The least-cost approach and alternatitve pathways
for South Africa.
According to the underlying data, neither of the alternative pathways can close the
national water gap. Furthermore, both are more expensive than the least-cost solution
mix, with the supply-side options costing almost USD 700 million more per year, about
0.1% of the GDP projected for 203017.
4.2. Efforts in mitigating greenhouse gas emissions
Chapter 3 showed that GHG emissions will rise over the next two decades, and global
emissions could reach 66 Gt CO2e by 2030 in a Business-as-Usual scenario
18. If this
trajectory is followed, global mean temperatures will likely rise, by between 3.4–4.0 ◦C
until 2100, according to the IPCC [89]. In order to limit this rise to below 2◦C, GHG
emissions will need to start falling soon: by 2030, CO2 emissions of only 20 Gt CO2e by
2030 would be required [89], instead of the 40 Gt CO2e projected as the Business-as-Usual
scenario19 in various publications .
4.2.1. Mitigation of global GHG emissions
Given that one tonne of greenhouse gas has the same long-term effect, independent of the
emitter’s location, mitigation options can be developed and implemented on global scale:
as the saving a ton of methane emissions from South-East Asian rice paddies might be
17See figure 3.7, p. 40
18See section 2.3.3, p. 22 f.
19See section 2.3.4, p. 25f and section 2.3.3, p. 22.
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cheaper and/or easier to realize than saving 25 tonnes of CO2 emissions from a European
power plant20, this approach would also make sense from a cost perspective.
In order to define a technically feasible solution mix for mitigating GHG emissions, it is of
importance to consider the same constraints that were applied for the water availability
options, availability, the size of local potential, and realistic penetration rates for each
option.
The IPCC Fourth Assessment on Climate Change (2007) includes a report on the
Mitigation of Climate Change that gives a detailed picture of technical mitigation
options [125] [126] – overall, it sees the potential to curb global GHG emissions with
respect to the Business-as-Usual scenario by 31 Gt CO2e by only considering solutions
that have a full cost of less than 100 USD per t CO2e saved.
A major part of the report Pathways to a low-carbon economy [4] [76] deals with the
determination of a 2030 mitigation potential. There, the mitgation potential of a specific
solution is first determined on regional level; the sum of all regional potentials then
define the global potential. Sorting all options – as was done in constructing the water
availability cost curve – from cheapest to most expensive21 yields a GHG abatement cost
curve. Overall, an integrated mitigation potential of 38 Gt CO2e was assessed in [4]
and [76], based on global Business-as-Usual emissions of 66 Gt CO2e and sustainable
emissions levels of 28 Gt CO2e in 2030 (see section 2.3.3, page 22f).
Figure 4.4 shows the 2010 update of the Global Greenhouse Gas Abatement Cost
Curve [76]. Given the high share of the energy sector in global business-as-usual emissions,
it seems plausible that the majority of options either reduce energy demand through
increased efficiency in the transport, domestic or industrial sectors – accounting for 40%
of all abatement opportunities – or aims at less GHG-intensive energy provision through
alternative power sources, which are responsible for further 27% of the potential.
Agriculture, forestry and land-use changes account for a third of global abatement
potential – proportionally higher than their projected share of 2030 BAU emissions of
together 23% (see figure 2.7, p. 24)22.
Table 4.2 gives the split of the 2030 BAU emissions by world region23 and contrasts it
20Given that methane has 25 times the GWP of CO2 (see table 2.3, page 16), the two volumes have the
same climatic impact.
21In terms of full cost per mitigates tonne of CO2e. The full cost are defined again according to equation
(4.1) as the difference betweeen the mitigation option and its Business-as-Usual alternative.
22A detailed comparison of these numbers with the IPCC data (from [125]) is given in the appendix
of [4], pages 150 – 153.
23From figure 2.7, page 2.7.
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Figure 4.4.: From [76] and [77]. Global greenhouse gas abatement cost curve
2030.
with the respective abatement potential: it can be seen that all regions would need to
cut emissions roughly in proportion to their 2030 BAU emissions in order to come to
sustainable emission levels.
As was the case for the water availability curves, integration of the full cost curve in
figure 4.4 would in fact lead to savings, of USD 333 billion annually in 2030 in this
case. However, this only applies if resources are allocated efficiently, sufficient capital is
available for financing investments, and savings from cost-negative solutions are used to
finance those with a net cost.
Although greenhouse gases emissions are a global issue, implementation of the most
effective solutions mix has to be supported by national policy schemes. For this reason,
national curves – in essence subsets of the global curve – are of interest, as they can give
a quantitative guideline for the design of such policy schemes.
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BAU Abatement
Region Gt CO2e % of total Gt CO2e % of total
Asia-Pacific 16,002 25 9,950 27
China 16,666 26 9,143 24
Europe 9,787 15 5,111 14
North America 8,189 13 4,566 12
Latin America 6,517 10 4,547 12
Africa and Middle East 6,580 10 4,035 11
Table 4.2.: Regional split of Business-as-Usual (BAU) emissions and abatement
potential according to [76] and [77].
4.2.2. GHG abatement cost curve for China
The left-hand column of figure 4.5 shows the 2030 Business-as-Usual emissions for China24
– according to it, Chinese GHG enmissions reach 16.7 Gt CO2e in 2030. To the right of
it, figure 4.5 shows what can be referred to as Abatement case emissions from several
sources – i.e., the emissions China could achieve if it contributed to a pathway towards a
long-term stabilization of atmospheric GHG concentrations such that the temperature
rise is likely kept below 2◦C.
Some projections focus on energy-related emissions only: according to the International
Energy Agency25 and the Stockholm Institute [116], energy-related emissions in an
Abatement Case would be 5.2 Gt CO2e and 6.0 Gt CO2e, respectively. In comparison, [4]
and [77] projected energy-related emissions including transportation, at 6.3 Gt CO2e,
slightly more conservative than the Stockholm Institute. A local GHG abatement cost
curve report specifically designed for China [127], which sees overall abatement case
emissions at 7.8 Gt CO2e.
The difference between the Business-as-Usual and the Abatement Case emissions yield
China’s contribution to the global mitigation potential of 38 Gt CO2e, 9.1 Gt CO2e.
Looked at from the other end, the sum of all China’s abatement options sums up to 9.1
Gt CO2e. If sorted from cheapest to most expensive, these can be represented again in
the form of a cost curve, shown in figure 4.626.
Compared to the global curve, mitigation options from the energy sector play a larger
24Data consistent with figure 3.5, page 37.
25450 ppm scenario in the World Energy Outlook 2010 [20].
26For better readability, not all mitigation options are labelled. See appendix D for a list of all GHG
abatement options.
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role in China – not surprisingly, given that energy is also expected to account for a
higher share of emissions than in the global average (76% versus 60%, respectively27):
energy-efficiency options from the the transport, industry and domestic sector account for
44% of China’s mitigation potential, while increased use of clean power sources accounts
for further 47%. Agriculture and forestry make up the remaining 9%, less than the global
number of 33%.
In terms of cost, achieving an abatement of 9 Gt CO2e will produce net cost of USD 62
billion in 2030, or USD 7 per ton of CO2e in China.
4.2.3. GHG abatement cost curve for South Africa
Figure 4.7 gives South Africa’s 2030 BAU emissions28 and contrasts it with Abatement
Case projections from various sources, amongst them the Long Term Mitigation Scenario
(LTMS) report [110], the Stockholm Institute report [116] and the South African part of
the global abatement potential from Pathways to a low-carbon economy [76].
The LTMS report reports that 2030 emissions levels of about 430 Mt CO2e are “required
27See figure 2.7, page 24, and figure 3.5, page 37.
28From figure 3.10, p. 44. Please note that 2030 BAU emissions for South Africa were adjusted based
on a comparison of [76] with various other sources (namely, [110], [116], [117]). See also appendix B.
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Figure 4.6.: From [77]. China’s GHG abatement cost curve for the year 2030.
by [climate] science”, i.e., at this level South Africa would contribute its share to stabilizing
CO2 emissions at 435–490 ppm (see [110], p. 115). The report also describes mitigation
options, their expected mitigation potential and integrated cost in detail29.
The Stockholm review [116], already consulted as reference in the China case, also gives
an abatement case for South Africa, albeit based on the LTMS scenarios. Given its focus
on energy-related emissions, it might be interesting to compare this specific number
nevertheless: according to it, emissions could be reduced from Business-as-Usual levels of
640 Mt CO2e to 295 Mt CO2e by 2030.
Our estimate for Business-as-Usual emissions of 789 Mt CO2e can be reduced by 341 Mt
CO2e – taken as such from the report Pathways to a low-carbon economy [76] and slightly
more conservative than [116]30 – to 448 Mt CO2e, consistent wih the Required by Science
scenario in [110] (which gives about 430 Mt CO2e). Energy-related emissions in our
abatement case would contain 234 Mt CO2e directly related to the power sector, which
is in good accordance with the most ambitious projections from Eskom, South Africa’s
state-owned utility, that projects emissions of 220 Mt CO2e for that scenario [117].
29See [110], p. 39 ff.
30The energy and transportation sector mitigation potential in [116] is given at 345 Mt CO2e, versus
290 Mt CO2e (out of 341 Mt CO2e in our case).
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Figure 4.8 shows the South African subset of the global GHG abatement cost curve31.
Similar to the China curve, all sectors contribute to the mitigation potential: given
its fossil-dominated power sector in the Business-as-Usual case, a shift to nuclear and
renewable power sources accounts for 61% of it, while the transport, domestic and
industrial sectors (again dominated by efficiency improvements) contribute further 26%,
and agriculture, forestry and land-use change the remaining 13%.
Integration of the curve gives a total cost of USD 3 billion in 2030, with an average cost
of carbon of 8 USD per t CO2e. This is certainly more than in the global curve, which
had overall negative cost, but would still be less than 0.5% of the projected 2030 GDP.
The water availability and GHG abatement cost curves in this chapter show that enough
mitigation options exist to close the water gaps and reduce GHG emissions to more
sustainable levels in both China and South Africa. Morever, such pathways would come
at manageable cost, if implemented in the least-cost way.
The two dimensions – water and GHG emissions – were however still studied separatedly
so far, but a look at the mitigation options already suggests that interdependencies
between the two curves should exist: a new desalination unit for example will increase
31See again appendix D for a list of all GHG abatement options.
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power demand, thereby increasing GHG emissions.
The second part of this work will now investigate these dependencies in detail at the
example of China and South Africa.
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5. Interdependencies of water and
greenhouse gas emissions so far
Part I introduced to the issues of water scarcity and rising greenhouse gas emissions
and approaches to mitigate both. The cost curves showed that a concerted effort across
sectors and regions is required in order to come to a sustainable state.
Water scarcity and greenhouse gas emissions were however still considered as two seperate
problems in the discussed mitigation pathways, although these two are interlinked on
two dimensions.
• The high-level interlinkage. One very likely consequence of climate change is a
change in precipitation patterns1, which will influence the available water supply
and thus change the size of water supply-demand gaps.
• Many small interlinkage. Most of the water or GHG mitigation options discussed
in the previous chapter have in fact an impact on the other “resource”. For example,
building a wind farm not only reduces GHG emissions by making a fossil-fired power
station obsolete, but it thereby also reduces water demand, as wind power requires
negligible amounts of water – in contrast to thermal power plants. Following the
same logic, all energy efficiency measures save water in addition to reducing GHG
emissions2. In agriculture, reduced tillage does not only preserve soil moisture, but
also keeps bound CO2 in the ground.
It is therefore not intuitively clear whether the water gap could be closed under these
circumstances even if all mitigation options were deployed, or from a more optimistic
standpoint, whether for example the most expensive solutions to increase water availability
are after all needed, as enough water might have already been made available as a side
effect of the implementation of GHG mititgation options.
1See also chapter 2.3.4, page 25ff.
2Except of course for the case that all power is generated in power plants that do not require water.
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This Chapter will discuss the current state of research on interdependencies. Section 5.1
focuses on how climate change is likely to influence water availability overall. Section 5.2
then looks at interlinkages on a technology and sector level.
5.1. Impact of climate change on water resources
Rising sea levels and changing precipitation patterns were mentioned quite generally as
one of the risks and threats of climate change in the 2007 IPCC fourth assessment report
on Climate Change [79]3, but not further specified therein. A separate IPCC report
however specifically dealt with Climate Change and Water (2008) [3].
Therein, it is said that rising average mean temperatures in the past have increased the
amount of water vapour in the atmoshpere, reduced snow cover and the size of glaciers,
and changed soil moisture. Climate modeling suggests that these trends will continue.
Figure 5.1.: From [34]. Percent change in overall water availability between 1961-
1990 average and 2050, based on IPCC scenario A1. For scenario definition
see [16], chapter 10.
As a consequence, heavy precipitation events will likely occur more regularly, leading to
higher flood risk and river runoffs with stronger seasonal fluctuations.
3See also section 2.3.4, p. 25.
5.1. IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON WATER RESOURCES 65
Overall, precipitation is expected to increase in high latitude and some tropical regions,
leading to a likely increase in water availability in these regions. In contrast, semi-arid
and arid regions at mid-latitudes, regions that are vulnerable to water stress and scarcity
already today, will likely experience a decrease in water availability. Furthermore, the
reduced snowcover will imperil water supply during the summer in basins that are fed by
snowmelt and glaciers – already today, over 1 billion people live in such basins, and the
next decades will see populations grow there in particular4.
Figure 5.1 shows how water availability is expected to develop until 20505. It can be
seen that large areas of Europe, Africa, the Middle East, South America, Australia and
the United States could experience a serious decrease by the middle of the 21st century,
amongst them regions that already experience water stress today, as a comparison with
figure 2.1 (p. 8, the world map showing the Water Stress Indicator today) shows. On top
of such changes in precipitation patterns, rising sea levels will lead to saltwater intrusion
in coastal areas, contaminating groundwater sources, reducing water availability further.
This trend can however turn out differently on a regional level:
Impact of climate change on China’s water resources
Figure 5.1 indicates that average water availability is expected to increase in China.
According to local modeling results [128], increases in river runoff are expected to be
strong in the South East and the westernmost regions, and smaller to negligible in the
Yellow river, Hai and Song basins. A further source [129] argues that the overall impact
of climate change on Chinese water resources cannot be clearly assessed yet, which is
however partly due to opposing trends within the country: while for example the Yangtze
basin saw an increase in average runoff over the last decades, the Yellow river basin saw
a decrease.
Impact of climate change on South Africa’s water resources
Figure 5.1 suggests that South Africa will see a decrease in water availability over the
coming decades. This picture is confirmed by the short chapter dedicated to climate
change in the National Water Resources Strategy [130]: according to it, stream flows
in the western part of the country could decrease by up to 10% already by 2015, and
4For example, much of Northern India, Pakistan and Bangladesh rely to a sizeable part on snowmelt
water from the Himalayas.
5The trends shown in this map are overall consistent with the map shown in the IPCC report on water
and climate change [3] (page 30), which shows the modeled change in annual runoff for the periods
2090-2099 versus 1980-1999; assuming the data behind the two maps is the same, an increase in
annual water availability does not yet say that more water is also available in a given month – regions
experiencing an increase can still have more droughts, as heavy precipitation events can concentrate
the (surplus) runoffs in a short period.
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this effect could then move eastwards to the Mozambiquan border until 2060. Modeling
results also suggest a reduction in average precipitation of 5–10%, while increases in
heavy precipitation events need to be expected as well.
The IPCC report [79] sums up that the adverse consequences of climate change on water
resources will likely outweigh benefits. It also states that the current approach to water
management might not be sufficient to secure water availability under the additional
pressure of climate change in the coming decades, and advocates for the implementation
of suitable adaption and mitigation options.
The report also gives an overview over a range of climate change mitigation measures
and their impact on water quantity and quality6, albeit on a rather qualitative level: it
for example argues that reduced tillage in agriculture and wastewater treatment can
benefit water resources, while hydro dams have both positive and negative impacts, as
they produce CO2-free electricity and can increase water availability, but can also lead to
increased methane emissions from algae in the water body and disruptions of local water
systems.
5.2. Water impact of GHG measures, GHG impact of
water measures
As just indicated, mitigation options related to GHG emissions or water availability can
have an impact on the other resource. As energy usage is one of the main sources of
greenhouse gases7, a large part of the these interlinkages are essentially water–energy
interlinkages.
And these are not small: in the United States, GHG emissions related to water use were
estimated at 290 Mt CO2e, or about 4–5% of 2005 emissions [131]
8, which originate from
power consumption of 521 TWh, 13% of the national total that can be attributed to
the power sector [131]9. In India, where high amounts of water withdrawals are used
in irrigation, 6% of national GHG emissions are estimated to come from groundwater
6See [34], chapter 6.
7See figures 2.5, 2.7, 3.5, 3.10: energy accounts for about 60% of global emissions, and around three
quarters in China and South Africa.
8The percentage range comes from differeing values for total U.S. GHG emissions: using [76], the value
is 4%, and 5% when using the same number as in [131].
9It has to be noted that these numbers do not only include the energy requirements for water provision,
i.e., abstraction, purification, distribution, wastewater treatment, but also for end-use, i.e., water
heating, washing etc.
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pumping [132].
Inversely, GHG emitting sources also use large volumes of water: thermal power plants
in the U.S., most of them fossil-fueled, required 49% of total water withdrawals (in
2005)10, while mining activities, of which a high proportion is mining of oil, gas and coal,
accounted for a further percent [133]. Numbers in China were lower, but (thermal) power
generation nevertheless accounted for 41% of 2005 industrial withdrawals, according to
the Water Resources Group [5].
Interlinkages also exist in agriculture, which makes up for two thirds of water withdrawals
and one seventh of China’s 2005 GHG emissions11: for example, the flooding of rice
fields requires water, but also leads to the production of large amounts of methane from
bacteria that prosper in the swampy environment.
5.2.1. The water–GHG nexus in energy, industry and agriculture
Most of the literature on water–GHG interlinkages focuses on the water–energy part,
often referred to as the water–energy nexus. The size of these interdependencies is well
assessed.
Water for energy extraction
Coal mining and processing.12 Underground mining of coal requires water mostly
for dust suppression and avoiding of friction-induced ignition of coal seams; 3–20 m3 of
water is consumed per Terajoule of mined coal.
In surface mining, water is mostly required for dust suppression, and potentially for
landscape re-vegatation after mine the mine is depleted (2–5 m3/TJ).
Benefication of coal, e.g. washing to extract impurities, requires on average further 5
m3/TJ.
Oil and gas exploration and refining. Oil exploration is estimated to require about
2–5 m3/TJ, mainly for the drilling process and initial treatment.
One of the methods to increase oil field yields is the injection steam in the reservoir
to push fuel to the surface. Depending on the depletation state, exact process and
geological conditions, this Enhanced Oil Recovery requires between 100 and 9,000 m3/TJ.
Oil production from tar sands is similarly water-intensive, requiring an average of 180
m3/TJ. Lastly, oil refinieries have a water footprint that is related to their need of process
10Fossil-fueled power plants accounted for 72% of U.S. power generation in 2005 [20].
11See figures 3.3 (p. 34) and 3.4 (p. 3.4).
12All numbers in this section are from [1], except for biofuels (from [2]).
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steam, consuming 25–65 m3/TJ, but withdrawing considerably higher amounts, in the
order of 325 m3/TJ.
Conventional gas exploration in contrast requires negligible amounts of water.
Uranium mining and processing. Depending on the mining method, water require-
ments in uranium extraction vary between 0.2 m3/ TJ for underground and up to 20
m3/ TJ for surface mining. The whole fuel processing cycle, including milling, conversion
and enrichment of the raw uranium can require up to about 40 m3/TJ, depending mostly
on the enrichment method13.
Biofuels and biomass. Processing of corn to ethanol for example requires 47 – 530
m3/TJ [134], while biodiesel refining is less water-intensive, requiring about 16 m3/TJ.
The water-intensity of biofuels is however mainly driven by the water-intensity of the
crop cultivation. While rain-fed does not require water-withdrawals in the conventional
sense14, irrigation does so and enhances the water footprint: based on U.S. numbers,
corn irrigation requires between 9,000 m3/TJ and 90,000 m3/TJ; water withdrawals for
soy production (for biodiesel) are even higher, 50,000–270,000 m3/TJ [134]15.
The water footprint becomes smaller if the crop is used for heat or power generation:
refining or processing can be omitted, and the energy content of the whole biomass can
be used, instead of only using the fruits or oil extracts.
Water for electricity
Thermal power plants.16 All fossil-powered, as well as nuclear, biomass, solar thermal
and geothermal power plants operate according to the same principle: combustion of a
fuel in a boiler produces steam that is expanded over a steam turbine. Before returing to
the boiler (closing the primary water cycle), the steam has to be cooled down as much as
possible, as the overall plant efficiency depends on the temperature difference before and
after the boiler. Three principle systems can be employed for cooling, which different
amounts of water:
13Centrifugation is less water-intensive than gaseous diffusion.
14I.e., withdrawals that could not be put to other uses.
15Irrigation needs vary of course with climatic conditions, and the crop used as feedstock. A detailed
perspective on water requirements for ten relevant crops and regional variability can for example be
found in [134].
16All water requirements for electricity (not only thermal power plants) from [135]. The water re-
quirements mentioned here referred to a coal-fired power plant with an efficiency of 35%. Athough
state-of-the art coal power plants achieve efficiencies of up to 45%, the global average of installed
capacity lies around 35% [136] (p. 58-59).
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Figure 5.2.: Schematic sketch of the three principle thermal power plant cooling
technologies.
Open-cycle cooling withdraws water from a nearby river, lake, or the sea and uses it
to cool the steam. The water takes up energy from the steam, and is returned to the
river/lake/sea at higher temperature. This technology consumes negligible amounts of
water, but requires withdrawals in the range of 76–189 m3/MWh. Open-cycle cooling is
especially used in older power plants that are located in proximity of large water bodies.
Wet cooling tower sytems. A secondary water cycle takes up heat from the steam and
releases it through evaporative cooling in a cooling tower: in most cases, the water is
sprayed down and parts of it evaporate and cool the remaining water that is collected and
re-used. This technology typically withdraws less than 4.0 m3/MWh, but also “consumes”
most of it through evaporation.
Dry cooling further reduces water requirements by avoiding the evaporative losses in
the cooling tower. Instead, water remains in pipes and is conductively cooled by the
circulating air in the cooling tower. This reduces withdrawals to typically less than 0.2
m3/MWh. However, as the water can only be cooled down to ambient temperature
instead of the lower dew point of water, dry cooling efficiencies are lower, and the more
so, the drier and warmer the climate17: it is estimated that plant output can decrease by
up to 25% under hot and dry conditions [137].
17Ambient temperature and the dew point are the same when relative humidity reaches 100%, and
diverge in drier climates.
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The water intensities per MWh mentioned here can be translated into water–GHG
intensities by applying a carbon intensity, which typically lies at 1,000 kg/MWh [136] for
an average coal-fired power plant with 35% efficiency.
Power plants that are fueled by other sources typically operate at lower temperatures,
and thus have lower efficiencies and higher water requirements per MWh of output: water
withdrawals in a wet-cooled nuclear power plant for example are given at 4.4 m3/MWh,
about 10% higher than for coal-fired units [135].
Combined-cycle gas turbine (CCGT) plants. About two-thirds of the electricity
in these plants is produced by burning gas and expanding it directly over a gas turbine.
The residual heat is used to produce steam that powers a steam turbine, providing the
remaining third of electricity. As only the steam cycle requires exterior cooling, water
withdrawals generally are about two thirds lower, 0.9 m3/MWh.
Hydro power. Power production with water does not consume water directly. Run-of-
river installations also have withdrawals which are effectively zero: they use the water
in the river and return it seconds later unchanged. Dams in contrast often store large
volumes of water – depending on the climate, a measurable part of it can get lost through
evaporation, which can reach more than 200 m3/MWh18.
Photovoltaics and wind require negligible amount of water. At most, water is needed
to wash the solar panels or wind blades occasionally.
Energy for water
The provision of water inversely requires energy19.
Water supply. Water abstraction from nearby surface water sources such as lakes or
rivers requires negligible amounts of energy. Pumping of groundwater in contrast requires
energy in dependence on the pumping depth: merely overcoming gravitation requires 0.27
kWh of energy per 100 m3 of water per meter of height difference. Measured numbers are
around 0.5 kWh/m3 for depths of 120m20. If water needs to be desalinated, energy needs
increase, but exact numbers differ depending on the technology: for reverse osmosis,
about 4.5 kWh/m3 are required, while thermal distillation methods use less electric
energy, around 2 kWh/m3, but require larger amounts of thermal energy, in the order of
50–75 kWh/m3 21.
18Numbers for California from [135]. Section 7.1.4, page 118 estimates evaporation rates for China and
South Africa based on this data.
19All data in this paragraph from [2] if not otherwise stated.
20I.e., the efficiencies are rather 61 % in this (Californian) case example.
21See the Master thesis from Stefanos Angelousis on cost and potentials of different desalination
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Water treatment and distribution. Depending on the quality of supplied water,
treatment to drinking water standards can require up to 0.4 kWh/m3, and distribution
through local networks 0.2 – 0.3 kWh/m3. These numbers apply to an average system:
depending on geographic conditions and the condition of the network (e.g., leakage rates),
this number can vary widely.
Wastewater treatment. Cleaning the used water such that it can be discharged safely
to the environment typically requires about 0.7 kWh/m3, which are used for aeration, to
operate sewers and filters, and for drying of the sludge. Section 7.2.1 (p. 122) will give
more detail, and also discuss how wastewater treatment can actually be turned into a
net energy source.
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Figure 5.3.: Water intensity of various fuel and power production processes, and
electrictiy intensity along the water provision chain. From [1] (fuel production),
[135] (power generation), [2] (water supply and treatment incl. desalination).
technologies, prepared in the context of this thesis, for further details and reference [138]. Section
7.2.2, p. 124 gives a brief summary of it.
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Figure 5.3 summarizes most of the cross-intensities discussed22.
To put these numbers again into perspective: given a per-capita power consumption of
2.6 MWh (2009) [106], and given a power mix dominated by coal, every Chinese citizen
requires about 10 m3 of water withdrawals for power generation alone23 – a number that
is not negligible compared to average domestic per capita withdrawals of 52 m3 [25]. The
provision of water for domestic purposes on the other hand requires on average 1.4 kWh
per m3, according to figure 5.3, summing up to 73 kWh per person and year. Taking into
account water requirements for industry and agriculture (together 365 m3 per capita)
increases this number to almost 400 kWh, producing 32 kg of CO2
24.
These estimates still assume conventional power production and water provision processes.
However, more extreme cases exist, also on large scale: Southern California for example
is supplied with water through an aqueduct from the northern parts of the state. Due to
geographic barriers, the water has an electricity footprint of 4.2 kWh per m3 when it
reaches the south [2]. At a population of 9.8 million [139], water supply to the county of
Los Angeles therefore requires the year-round operation of a large coal or nuclear power
station25.
Similar electricity (and by this GHG) footprints of water provision could be discussed for
the Middle East, where a sizeable portion of water is supplied through desalination plants,
which partly explains why for example Qatar ranks as the country with the highest per
capita GHG emissions globally26.
Industrial processes. The chemical and steel sector for example accounted for 16% of
China’s 2005 GHG emissions [77] and 1% of total water withdrawals [5]. In the chemical
industry, a lot of these emissions and the largest share of water requirements [140] come
from the production of process steam. In the iron and steel industry, the smelting of
iron ore in furnaces emits large volumes of greenhouse gases; scrubbing of the furnace
exhausts fumes is conventionally done by washing, which requires 3.0–3.7 m3 per ton of
molten iron [140].
The petroleum industry – accounting for 1.5% of China’s 2005 GHG emissions – was
already mentioned with respect to water needs for oil refining in figure 5.3. Indeed, about
22The sources used here and for figure 5.3 ( [1], [135], [2]) provide further information on the various
technologies and on further (sub-)technologies.
23If only powered by coal plants (wet cooling tower). As China receives 86% of its energy from this
source [20], the truth it not so far behind this number.
24At average Chinese carbon intensity of power generation of 790 gCO2 per kWh [69]
25Assuming: 9.8 million · 4.2 kWh/m3· 193 m3/capita = 7.9 TWh, the electricity a 1 GW power plant
produces if it runs during 90% of the year.
26See table 2.4, page 20.
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half of the water requirements of a refinery are needed as make-up water for the cooling
system [140] – again closely linked to production of heat and (process) steam and energy
consumption.
Interdependencies of water and greenhouse gas emissions in agriculture are less intense
and more indirect in most cases. In 2005, agriculture accounted for about 70% of global
withdrawals27, but for only 14% of global GHG emissions28 and 2% of energy needs
( [141] (p. 36)). A review of the available literature on energy-use in agriculture was
provided by Rothausen et al. [142]: according to it, agricultural energy consumption is in
the order of 1,000–20,000 MJ per hectar. Water intensities per hectar vary and depend
on crop and geographic conditions; the average water duty for Egypt for example is given
at 8,400 m3/ha (see section 9.2, p. 172ff.), which would yield water–energy (and by this
water–GHG) intensities in the order of 1–10 m3/MJ.
The production of energy – or industrial goods – does not only require large quantities of
water, but also has an impact on water quality. A by-product of oil extraction is in fact
impaired water, which can be saline or contain high concentrations of heavy metals and
thus pose a risk to nearby reservoirs or aquifers if not properly treated. To give another
example, the warm backflow from open cycle power stations can have adverse impacts
on aquatic ecosystems29.
5.2.2. Towards integrated abatement options
This chapter has shown that water and GHG emissions are indeed interconnected.
Looking back at the mitigation pathways discussed in chapter 4, it seems clear that many
GHG mitigation and water availability options will have a cross-intensity with the other
“resource”. These can be divided into three types:
• Win-win: reducing GHG emissions and increasing water availability. All
thermal power-generating technologies use water. Thus, installation of solar PV
and wind power not only abates GHG emissions, but also saves water. All solutions
that increase energy efficiency therefore increase water availability according to the
same logic30. In agriculture, reduced tillage not only preserves soil moisture, but
also carbon in the ground, reducing both water requirements and CO2 emissions.
27See figure 2.2, page 12.
28See figure 2.5, page 19.
29A detailed and systematic discussion of such water quality impairements from energy production can
for example be found in [25], page 73 ff.
30Unless all power is produced in “zero-water” generation units (wind and photovoltaic).
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• Win-lose I: reducing GHG emissions but decreasing water availability.
Biofuels can require huge amounts of water if crops need irrigation, but reduce
GHG emissions in transportation and increase energy security in oil-scarce regions.
Another technology in this category is Carbon Capute and Sequestration (CCS),
i.e., the segregation and subsequent underground storage of CO2 from fossil power
plant exhaust fumes: CCS reduces GHG emissions to the atmosphere, but requires
substantial amounts of energy, increasing in turn the amount of water needed
to maintain constant electric output. Similarly, solar thermal plants avoid GHG
emissions but typically have higher water needs than coal-fired units due to lower
operating temperatures.
• Win-lose II: increasing GHG emissions and water availability. Desalina-
tion plants increase water availability, but require energy, which in almost all regions
has a non-zero carbon footprint. Another example is dry cooling, where water
savings are traded for reduced plant efficiency.
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6. Methodology of an integrated
assessment
The last chapter discussed the current state of research on interdependencies between
water and greenhouse gas emissions. It showed that there exist both a high-level
interconnection – climate change will likely alter overall and seasonal water availability –,
and many small interlinkages or cross-dependencies between certain technologies, which
can be synergetic or can have adverse impacts. It is thus not intuitively clear whether
the water availability or GHG abatement cost curves discussed in chapter 4 will have an
overall positive or negative impact on the other “resource”.
One approach to answer this question is to first assess the cross-dependencies of all
water/GHG mitigation options. The mitigation options can then be integrated with
their respective cost, mitigation potentials and cross-dependencies into one model which
allows to find optimal solution mixes under multiple constraints: it could for example
assess the least-cost solution under the boundary conditions of a closed water gap and
achieved GHG abatement goals. Determining these cross-dependencies and building of
such a model were the main tasks of this thesis.
This chapter will discuss what data sets were used (and why), how the cross-dependencies
for the specific mitigation options were assessed, what the boundaries of the model are,
and how the integrated model was set up.
6.1. Notes on the main data sources used
This work builds mainly on two sources that were already discussed in Part I: for water
availability options, it uses the data underlying the report Chartering Our Water Future -
Economic frameworks to inform decision making by the Water Resources Group (2009) [5].
For greenhouse gas abatement solutions, it refers to the data sets developed in the context
of the report ”Pathways to a low carbon economy - Version 2 of the global greenhouse
gas abatement cost curve” (2009) [4] and its 2010 update [76]1.
1The underlying data is available online in the tool Climate Desk [77].
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Although being (partly) the work of a private institution, both reports are publicly
available and the underlying data is thus, at least on an aggregated level, shareable.
Furthermore, a scientific or expert panel supervised both working groups2 in a similar
way than comparable non-governmental reports are supported.
Several reasons commend that this work draws its data from these two sources [5] [4]:
• Completeness. Both reports have a holistic perspective on a Business-as-Usual
development and mitigation options in the given geographies. In both cases, they
include all sectors and, in the case of [4], all major greenhouse gases.
• Data quality. Part I discussed the data and underlying assumptions from the two
sources and compared them to data sets from institutions such as the IPCC, Inter-
national Energy Agency or the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization.
In general, the overlap of data was good, and differences could be attributed clearly
to different (but explainable) assumptions. Adjustments to the basic data set were
only carried out in the case of South Africa’s projected Business-as-Usual GHG
emissions for 2030 (discussed in detail in appendix B).
• Granularity. Both reports quantify mitigation potentials and associated cost for
each mitigation options separatedly. While the Water Resources Group report [5]
typically includes a set of around 50 solutions for each focus country, the GHG
abatement cost curve [4] includes up to 160. Although some of these quantifications
might only be informed estimates, they still provide one of the more detailed
assessments of mititgation potentials to our knowledge.
• Methodical consistency. Both reports follow the same approach: they define a 2030
Business-as-Usual case and a sustainable alternative. The “gap” between both is
bridged with a solution mix considered as technically feasible3
• Temporal consistency. Both reports use the year 2010 as reference year4 and
study mitigation options until 2030. Moreover, both were compiled in 2009/10 –
yielding comparatively novel data sets5; the small time lapse also left little room for
changes in the public or scientific debate, presumably leading to similarly ambitious
calculations of mitigation potentials.
2See p. 139–140 in [4] and p. 176–184 in [5] for a list of persons involved in these expert panels.
3Please note that this does not yet take socio-economic or regulatory boundary conditions into
consideration.
4I.e., for 2010, projected GHG emissions or water availability does not differ between Business-as-Usual
and the alternative scenario.
5E.g., the last IPCC report on climate change dates back to 2007 [79].
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• Geographic overlap. Given that water is a local resource, [5] quantifies water
availability options only for three countries and one region (India, China, South
Africa, and the state of Sao Paulo, Brazil). For all three countries, [4] and [77] can
provide national GHG abatement cost curves (based on the global curve). This
is particularly important, as otherwise an integration into one model would be
become very difficult.
None of the two reports provides information on the overall impact, or the impact of
specific mitigation options, on the other “resource”. The contribution of this thesis there-
fore started with the determination of all relevant interlinkages, i.e., the determination
of the water itensities of the GHG abatement options, and the GHG intensities of the
water availability measures6, and continued with the setup of an integrated model that
included all mitigation options, and the development, run and interpretation of integrated
scenarios.
6.2. Notes on water and greenhouse gas definitions
Water
A differentiation is made between blue and green water7. Blue water is the water from
river runoff, aquifers and groundwater and by this the water that can be accessed by
humans and diverted to consumptive uses. Water from unconventional sources, such as
treated wastewater or desalinated seawater can be added to this8. Green water refers to
the water from precipitation that is consumed by natural systems, e.g., forests, pastures,
lakes. Beyond maintaining ecosystems, it only links to human use insofar as that it
includes the water used in rainfed agriculture.
It is the blue water cycle that is studied in [5] and that will be referred to in the
remainder of this thesis. This however means that the impact of certain mitigation
options on the overall hydrological cycle were not further considered in this work. As
an example, one option to reduce GHG emissions is to afforest fallow land. If this
happens at sufficient scale, it will likely have an impact on local groundwater levels,
evapotranspiration and river runoffs. Quantifying this effect however requires distinct
climatic modeling knowledge, beyond the scope this work.
6Detailed information on the assessment of the interlinkages will be presented in section 6.4 of this
chapter.
7See for example [143] (from the FAO) as reference for a definition of blue and green water
8Occassionally, the concept of gray water is heard. This is blue water of impaired quality after
anthopogenic uses. Wastewater treatment converts grey water again to blue water.
78 CHAPTER 6. METHODOLOGY OF AN INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT
Within the blue water cycle, the focus here is on the availability of raw water for
consumptive anthropogenic uses. This means that water management efforts that either
do not change the amount of available raw water such as flood control, navigation and
recreation, or efforts that increase water quality beyond basic quality requirements,
e.g., treatment to drinking water standards, are not further investigated9. This does of
course not imply that these efforts are of lesser importance; however, sufficient raw water
availability is a prerequisite for fulfilling the other goals.
Numbers regarding water demand in this work consider water withdrawals as opposed
to water consumption. After brought to use, withdrawn water can be returned to the
water body, either unchanged or at impaired quality. The accessible supply in this work
therefore includes these return flows – the longer a river, the higher this corrective factor.
Withdrawals are the metric of choice in this work (and in [5], plus in most other sources),
as they are a more complete measure of water demand: an open cycle power plant does
not consume any water, but withdraws large quantities, as seen in the last chapter.
Looking at consumption would conceal that these plants might need to be shut down at
low supply levels.
Greenhouse gases
All anthropogenic greenhouse gases discussed in section 2.3.1 (p. 14 f.), i.e. carbon
dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O) and halocarbons, are considered.
For this reason, all GHG-related potential is given in CO2 equivalents (CO2e) which
takes into account the different lifetimes and warming potentials.
Furthermore, GHG emissions are accounted for in the region where they are emitted, even
if finished products which result from these emissions are installed, used or consumed
in another region. This also means that emissions from the burning of fossil fuels are
attributed to the country where they are used, and not to the country where they are
mined. This approach however overemphasizes emissions from regions that export large
quantities of finished goods and should be considered when studying the results of this
work.
Both water availability and greenhouse gases abatement potentials are only considered
so far as they are related to the operations of a particular solution – i.e., water availabil-
ity/emissions from the manufacturing of this solutions are not accounted for. Potentials
thus do not follow a life cycle assessment (LCA) approach.
9However, wastewater treatment to levels that the water can be recharged at a similar quality at which
it was withdrawn is included as an option to effectively increase water availability.
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6.3. Notes on timelines
This work considers the time span between 2010 and 2030 and assesses the cost and
potential of mitigation options that could technically be implemented within this span.
Most of the GHG and water availability data cited from [4] and [5] referred to the
year 2005, as this is the last year of which real data were available at the time of print
of [4] and [5]; it is also the last year of which holistic data on GHG emissions or water
availability were available from other sources (such as [69]). Still, the gap between the
Business-as-Usual and Abatement Case only opens up after 2010 in both [4] and [5]10.
Although both reports only discuss the total mitigation potential between BAU and
Abatement Cases in 2030, the underlying data in both cases contains information for
each five-year period between 2010 and 2030. This allowed to evaluate a mid-point, the
year 2020, in this work, which required the split of all measures from [4] and [5] in two, a
2010–2020 and a 2020–2030 branch, with a respective cost and potential for each. The
potential mentioned in [4] and [5] is then the sum of the two decade potentials. The
mitigation cost for the two decades are the same only if no cost degression was assumed
in [4] and [5]; otherwise, they might differ.
6.4. Assessment of cross-dependencies
The first step towards an integrated assessment is to determine the cross-dependencies of
the respective options, i.e. the greenhouse gas impact of the water availability options
and the water impact of the greenhouse gas mitigtation options.
As mentioned above, this work focuses on cross-dependencies that can be attributed to
the operation of a mitigation option and therefore ignores cross-dependencies related to
the manufacturing of a specific solution. The following two sections sketch out how the
cross-dependencies were determined in principle.
6.4.1. GHG impact of water availability options
Water availability options can be subdivided into a group that has a direct impact on
GHG emissions and those that indirectly influence GHG emissions.
If a water availability option has a direct GHG impact and that impact is quantified
in [5], no further work is required. If it impacts energy requirements, these are translated
into GHG emissions depending on the source of energy: for coal, gas, oil, respective
10To describe the evolution between 2005 and 2010, it is for example assumed in [5] that infrastructure
projects planned to be finidhed by 2010 are indeed finished by then.
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CO2-intensities are employed; for electricity, the GHG-intensity of the same power mix
that is used in determining the water impact of electricity efficiency options is employed
(see section 6.4.2 below).
Measures that have no explicit energy/GHG impact in the data from [5] can still be
assessed: for example, drip irrigation saves water and thereby reduces energy demand
as less water needs to be pumped from deep wells. Similarly, water-efficient toilets
reduce domestic water demand and thereby lead to reduced electricity demand for water
provision and treatment. These cross-intensities were calculated based on the sources
discussed in section 5.2 and, if necessary, further literature search. Appendix C contains
a list of all water measures, a short description of the type of the cross-dependency, and
a source based on which it was quantified.
6.4.2. Water impact of GHG mitigation options
Most GHG mititgation options, and in particular those from the power, industry, transport
or domestic sectors derive their mitigation potential either directly from a reduction
in fossil fuel combustion or indirectly through reduced power consumption. The saved
quantity of fossil fuels (or electric power) and their respective water intensities, discussed
in the last chapter, then allow to determine the water intensity of a mitigation option.
Options that immediately reduce GHG emissions are mainly found in the agriculture,
forestry and waste sectors11.
Methodical differences exist between options that impact GHG emissions directly, those
that influence them through changes in fossil fuel use, and those options that influence
them through reduced electric power consumption.
Measures with a direct impact on GHG emissions
The impact on water resources of those measures was mainly determined from specific
literature. In a few cases, an option was part of both the water availability and the
low-GHG cost curve, in which case the water intensity of the GHG abatement option (or
the GHG intensity of the water availability option) was determined by “merging” the
two. A literature search was however still required to check whether the two measures
are really based on the same principles12. One example is reduced tillage: in South
11A list of all GHG mitigation measures can be found in appendix D.
12This is also important to know for the determination of cost: these can only be averaged if the water
availability and GHG abatement option require (almost) indentical implementation steps.
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Africa, its GHG mitigation potential is estimated at 2.2 Mt (according to [77]13), and
its incremental water availability potential 943 million cubic meters (according to [5]).
The farmland changed to no-till, a main driver in determining the water availability or
GHG potential, was comparable in both data sources, and the two mitigation options
were therefore integrated into one.
Measures with an indirect impact on GHG emissions: reduction of fossil fuel use
The water impact in that case is related to reduced water requirements for fossil fuel
extraction, and can be assessed based on the data and literature mentioned in section 5.2
– coal mining for example requires 2–20 m3/TJ – a GHG abatement option that reduces
coal demand by 1 TJ would therefore increase water availability by 2–20 m3.
In order to assess the water impact properly, it is important to determine the employed
mining method, and the import-export balance for the respective fossil fuel, as reducing
the demand of a good that is imported will not change the local water balance.
Import-export balances for coal, gas and oil between 2010 and 2030 were determined
based on the IEA’s World Energy Outlooks 2007–2010 for China14 and databases on local
coal mine capacities and locations for South Africa [145], coal [146] and oil production
and refining [147]. In contrast to coal and gas, which are readily useable after basic
cleaning steps, oil requires refining before it is fit for use – therefore the balance of refining
capacities required equal assessment.
To give an example, more efficient cars reduce gasoline, and therefore also oil demand.
Given that South Africa’s refining capacity is estimated to be roughly equal to its oil
consumption until 2030 [147], but it is projected to import virtually all of its crude
oil [67], it can be assumed that reduced gasoline demand through more fuel-efficient
cars will impact water resources from refining only, decreasing water withdrawals by on
average 33m3 per TJ15.
Measures with an indirect impact on GHG emissions: change of electric power
consumption
Measures that reduce electricity demand increase water availability if the saved electricity
would otherwise be produced in power plants that require water for cooling.
13This number is also consistent with the mitigation potential in the LTMS scenario, 2.1 Mt CO2e
( [110] p. 95).
14See [20], [67], [78], [144].
15This value is taken from [5], but nevertheless lies well within the range of 25–65 m3/TJ given by other
reports (e.g., [1], see section 5.2).
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In our case, the water impact is calculated based on the power plant mix that is avoided
through such efficiency options16. The water intensity of the avoided power mix depends
on the types of power plants and the cooling technologies within the various types.
In China and South Africa, 72% and 93%, respectively, of the power generation that
is avoided if all energy efficiency options from the GHG abatement cost curve were
implemented is coal-based17. The water intensity for these coal power plants was
calculated based on the projected 2030 water intensity of all coal power plants, which
again was determined from the existing power plant fleet, the plants under construction
and those in planning: Platt’s power plant database contains a list of virtually all of
China’s and South Africa’s power plants, including location and – in about half the cases
– information about the cooling type. For China, the list comprises 6,624 operating units
with a total capacity of 888 GW, and for South Africa, 311 operating units and 45.4
GW. Given that the IEA estimates China’s 2008 generation capacity at 780 GW [20]
and Eskom sees South Africa’s at 45.5 GW [117], Platt’s seems to give an holistic list;
the overshoot in China is probably due to smaller industrial on-site or municipal plants
not comprised in the IEA data. Including plants under construction, in planning, retired,
in revision or on standby, the databases include 8,894 units with 1,498 GW for China,
and 533 units with 845 GW in South Africa. Figure 6.1 gives a snaphsot for China.
In order to determine the likely cooling technology for plants where this information was
not further specified, an estimate was performed on the basis of the plant’s location: if
the power plant is located in close proximity to the sea, it was assumed to be cooled
in an open cycle with sea water; if it is located close to a river and clearly has cooling
towers, it was assumed to be cooled in a closed-cycle wet cooling configuration. The
power plants were furthermore allocated to the different basins/WMAs based on their
location – this allowed to determine the water intensity not only on national level, but
16This approach is consistent with the logic employed in [4] and [77] for the assessment of the GHG
abatement potential of such efficiency options.
Another approach would be to calculate the water intensity of the existing power generation mix for
each year and take this as the relevant water intensity. In this case, the marginal utility of energy
efficiency measures with regard to water would decrease with increased penetration of low-water
power sources such as wind or photovoltaics, in contrast to the approach sketched out above, where
the marginal utility stays constant between 2010 and 2030. Both approaches have their justification:
while the “fixed” approach allows to properly assess a “what-if” scenario (“Taking the Business-as-
Usual case as the starting point, what would be the impact on water availability of an efficiency
measure”), the dynamic aproach allows to determine the water availability impact of an efficiency
option at the time of its implementation.
17With the remainder being gas, in the case of South Africa, and a mixture of biomass, gas, small hydro
and small local generation units summarized as “other” in the case of China (in [4]).
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Figure 6.1.: Snaphot of the Platt’s power plant database for China, used to
determine the water intensity of the conventional power mix.
also for each river basin/WMA individually, which is important for the localization of
the water impact of (national) GHG mititgation options.
The water intensities of generation technologies other than coal in the avoided power mix,
accounting for 28% (China) and 7% (South Africa), are taken from the values discussed
in section 5.2, and the split by basin or WMA was assumed to follow the distribution of
the coal-fired power plants.
Table 6.1 gives an overview of the water intensities used for the calculation of the BAU
power mix (in this work).
Cooling technology m3/MWh Source
Subcritical, wet cooling tower 2.1 [2], [148]
Supercritical, wet cooling tower 1.8 [149]
Once-through cooling freshwater 133 [148], [150]
Once-through cooling seawater 1.1 [135], [148]
Dry cooling 0.2 [135]
CCGT (wet cooling) 0.9 [135], [148]
Dedicated biomass (wet cooling) 2.5 [135], [148]
Table 6.1.: Water intensities (withdrawals) of fossil-thermal power plants. These
values were used to determine the average water intensity of the power mix that
is avoided through energy efficiency measures or alternative power sources.
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Measures with an indirect impact on GHG emissions: alternative power sources
The water intensities of alternative power sources such as nuclear, solar, wind, biomass,
geothermal and carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) – which make up 40% of China’s
and 56% of South Africa’s GHG mitigation potential – differ, and the respective impact
on water availability can be positive or negative. Section 5.2 discussed that thermal power
plants that operate at lower temperatures than coal-fired units require more withdrawals
per MWh, all other things being equal. Of the alternative sources, nuclear, solar thermal,
geothermal and biomass, but also coal plants equiped with CCS belong into this category,
while wind and photovoltaic power require negligible water amounts.
The reference water intensity for alternative power sources is that part of the Business-as-
Usual power mix that is avoided through the increased penetration of alternative power
sources18. The water intensity of this mix was determined based on the same logic and
sources as sketched out in the preceding section.
The delta between the water intensity of the avoided mix and the water intensity of the
alternative power source give the net water impact per mitigation option, whereby the
latter was determined based on the literature values discussed in section 5.2.
One exception is nuclear power, for which a similar approach was followed as for coal-fired
power plants in China: based on single-site data from the Platts power plant database,
the cooling type of each existing, contructed and planned power plant was determined.
From this, a weighted average nuclear (fresh-)water intensity could be determined. In
South Africa, the site (and cooling technology) of a potential nuclear power station are
under discussion – therefore, not only the cooling type, but also the regional water impact
of this GHG mitigation option could be assessed with relative precision.
Table 6.2 shows the values used for the water intensities of alternative power sources.
Lastly, the water intensity of gas CCS was simply calculated based on an assumed
efficiency penalty of 20%. Coal CCS water intensity values were – for new builds –
put in relation to the water intensities of the coal power plants in planning and under
construction. For retrofits, they were set in relation to the water intensity of the existing
coal power plant fleet.
18Again consistent with the logic followed in [4] and [77] for calculating the GHG abatement potential
of the alternative power sources. This mix differs from slightly the Business-as-Usual power mix that
is avoided through the increased penetration of energy efficiency options as mentioned above, with
the share of coal-fired generation being slightly higher (97% in China, 93% in South Africa).
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Technology m3/MWh Source
Coal CCS, new built 1.2/1.5 [2], [135], [148]
Coal CCS, new built 12.7/1.7 [2], [135], [148]
Gas CCS, new built 1.0 [2], [135], [148]
Gas CCS, retrofit 1.1 [2], [135], [148]
Geothermal 5.3 [2]
Hydro 0.04-0.18 [135]
Nuclear 2.0/0.4 [2], [135], [148]
Solar thermal 3.0 [135]
Photovoltaics 0.1 [135]
Wind 0 [135]
Table 6.2.: Water intensities (withdrawals) of alternative power sources. If two
values are separated by a slash, the first value stands for China, the second for
South Africa.
Regionalization
As it makes no difference for the overall balance where greenhouse gases are emitted
within a country, the national subdivision is the most granular data available in the GHG
abatement curve report [4] [77]. Water in contrast is a local resource, and it well makes
a difference where availability is increased.
To get a meaningful picture, GHG mitigation options and their impact on water availability
therefore needed to be broken down to the 10 Chinese river basins or 19 South African
Water Management Areas.
The suitable metric for this breakdown depends on the respective GHG mititgation
option: for options with a direct impact on water availability, the regionalization should
correlate with the distribution of respective activities. Water requirements for biofuels
for example should be accounted for in those basins/WMAs that plant relevant energy
crops.
Mitigation options with an indirect impact on water availability need to be assessed
differently. In this case, it is not necessarily the location of the mitigation option that is
important:
• Measures that reduce GHG emissions through reduced use of fossil fuels save water
in those basins where the fuel is mined, extracted or refined19. As three quarters
19After taking account for the respective import-export balance.
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of China’s coal is mined in the Song, Huang (Yellow) and Hai river basins, saving
one TJ of coal somewhere increases water availability mostly in those basins – on
average by 1.1 m3 in the Song, 1.9 m3 in the Hai, and 3.9 m3 in the Huang/Yellow
river basin (see page 102).
• Measures that reduce electricity demand in one of China’s basins are assumed
to impact water availability also in this basin, under the the assumption that its
not yet fully interlinked national transmission grids will remain at least partially
decoupled until 203020.
The regional distribution of electricity efficiency measures from industry was ob-
tained from [5]21. Road transport, commercial and residential sector measures were
allocated to basins based on the basin population split.
The impact on water availability of energy-efficiency measures in South Africa was
allocated to Water Management Areas based on their share of the avoided power
mix, which are not necessarily those where the measures are implemented. This
approach seemed valid, as a single transmission grid spans the whole country. The
allocation of measures that impact fossil fuel use followed the same logic as for
China.
• For solar and wind power, solar irradiation and wind speed maps as well as national
buildup plans were consulted in order to determine the distribution of capacities
(given in [4] [77]) across basins/WMAs. For China, it was then assumed that power
plants were cut off first in proximity to the new power sources and thus reduce
water withdrawals in the respective basin, assuming again independent transmission
grids22. In South Africa, wind and photovoltaics were assumed to reduce water
demand by the (national) average water intensity of the avoided power mix23.
• If no clear regional prefernces could be derived for an alternative power sources
20Recent information on the state of the Chinese transmission network are rather difficult to find. Of
the information available, [151], an official site, and [152] date back several years and argue that
China consists of six more or less independent power grids.
21The underlying data of the Water Resources Group report [5] includes data on per-basin water
withdrawals of the major branches of industry, which were used also as a proxy for the per-basin
breakdown of these industries.
22In the case that solar and wind installations outstripped thermal power capacity in a basin, it was
assumed that it substituted generation capacity in neighboring basins.
23First, wind and photovoltaics require no water themselves and therefore do not change demand in the
WMA where they are installed. Second, the national transmission grid was assumed to allow a feed
of the produced power no matter where it is produced – wind and photovoltaics therefore increase
water availability by the national average water intensity of the avoided power mix.
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(e.g., biomass), the local distribution was kept in check with the current distribution
for power generation capacities. The local distribution of nuclear power stations
followed the single-site assessment based on Platt’s power plant database that was
discussed in the preceding section.
To be complete, it needs to be noted that all GHG mitigation options that reduce the
output of fossil-fired power plants also reduce coal, gas and oil demand – the water savings
associated with the thereby reduced mining, refining and extraction were accounted for
as sketched out above, i.e., in the basins with respective mining or production capacities.
6.5. Notes on cost
A key metric to assess in our context are cost (or savings) that result from the imple-
mentation of a specific set mitigation options. After all, it is not so much the question
whether a water gap can be closed or GHG emissions can be reduced in principle – most
problems of this sort can be resolved if money was not the limiting factor – but what
the financial consequences of an envisioned solution mix are. For this reason, cost curves
were at the core of both reports [4] and [5]. The following sections give an overview of
the various cost terms used.
6.5.1. Investment, operational, societal cost and the cost of capital
The cost depicted in the cost curves of chapter 4 show the incremental full cost in
2030 relative to the Business-as-Usual (or reference) case for each measure. As given in
equation (4.1), they are defined as
Mitigation cost=
Cost of mitigation−Cost of reference
GHG emissions of reference−GHG emissions of mitigation .
24 (6.1)
I.e., all cost are put in perspective to the reference, or Business-as-Usual, case.
Equation (6.1) gives what is termed full cost, which are composed of investment cost and
operational cost, and depend on the assumed cost of capital.
24Adapted from [4], p. 147. For the case of GHG mitigation options; for options increasing water
availability, the denominator simply includes the delta of water availability between the reference
and the mitigation options instead of GHG emissions.
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Investments and cost of capital
The investments required for each measure (and its reference case equivalent) were
determined in [4] and [5]. Investments for a mitigation option can be higher or smaller
than in the reference scenario.
To make different years comparable, the investments were annualized over the lifetime
of the mitigation option assuming a certain cost of capital, which is equivalent to
the standpoint that the investments are financed by a credit at certain interest. The
annualized investments then represent the annuity (principal plus interest) that the
debtor pays over the lifetime of the asset.
Let C be an investment, n the asset lifetime in years and i the cost of capital. The
annualized investment c is then given by
c = C i
(1 + i)n
(1 + i)n − 1 . (6.2)
The cost of capital i depend on how the investment is considered. A private houshold
would likely have an interest rate in the order of 4–6%, reflecting the average interest
a private person would need to accept to receive money from a bank, or – equivalently
– reflecting the opportunity cost of capital he/she has for investing the money and not
putting it in a bank account.
For corporations, i could be even higher, if it is considered from the standpoint of a
required profit margin for a planned investment.
For countries, i could be linked to a the long-term government bond rate which should
be in the order of 2–6%.
Pathways to a low carbon economy [4] used a 4% rate for all mitigation options, whereas
Chartering Our Water Future [5] assumed different cost of capital for the different sectors.
For this work, i was set at 4% for all options to reflect government bond rates, for two
reasons:
• Many mitigation options indeed require governmental involvement or support.
Especially large-scale infrastructure projects such as new hydro dams or large power
stations are often built directly by the government, or by an entity that is backed
by the government. If mitigation options are of smaller scale and implemented by
private persons (or corporations), such as energy-efficient building, many examples
exist of a government providing for low-interest loans that have an i closer to its
cost of capital than to what private households would receive otherwise.
• Using one interest rate judges all measures by their economic cost only, making a
comparison easier from a societal standpoint. It has to be noted, however, that
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this approach likely underestimates the real cost of a mitigation pathway, as profits
margins for businesses, who will need to play a big role in the tranformation, are
not yet factored in.
Operational cost
Most mitigation options incur different operational cost for labor, electricity, fossil fuels, or
other input factors, than the Business-as-Usual alternative. As an example, consider the
switching from incandescent lamps to light-emitting diodes (LEDs) of equal luminosity:
LEDs require less electricity than incandescent lamps; the operational cost delta between
the mitigation option (LED) and the Business-as-Usual solution (incandescent light bulbs)
can then be determined for a given electricity price. Finally, knowing the GHG-footprint
of the saved electricity25 allows to express the operational cost difference expressed in
terms of USD per tCO2e.
Adding the difference of the annualized investments to the operational cost difference
gives the full cost.
6.5.2. Integrated cost 2010–2030
The full cost, which were at the core of our reference reports [4] and [5], give the cost for
a specific year. However, it seems equally important to evaluate the integrated cost of a
certain GHG abatement or water availability mitigation option mix between 2010 and
2030, as such a transformative effort, which involves large-scale investments in all sectors
and spans two decades, will certainly require a solid long-term financial planning.
In order to properly acccount for the cost of capital and make installations in different
years comparable, a useful approach seems to be to discount all investment and operational
costs26 to one common year – 2030 – and then add them up.
The mitigation options need to be differentiated based on implementation date and asset
lifetime in order to properly determine integrated cost:
• Implementation date. Measures that are implemented before 2020 require invest-
ments and operational cost (or savings) already in the first decade. These options
are then assumed to stay put for the second decade (2020–2030), resulting in
ongoing operational cost/savings. In contrast, measures that are implemented after
2020 only incur cost during the second decade.
25Which depends – as described in the preceding section on cross-dependencies – on the power mix that
is avoided through increased energy efficiency.
26Again, considered relative to the reference case.
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• Lifetime. Measures with a lifetime l greater than 20 years do not require replacement
investments before 2030, and neither do measures with l>10 years if implemented
after 2020. All other measures need to be replaced at least partly between 2010
and 2030 for the combined potential of all measures to unfold in 2030.
This makes the early implementation of a measure with net-positive cost unattractive
and pushes them back as far as possible – something which could not be investigated
by only studying the full cost in 2030. In contrast, measures where operational
savings exceed investments will be implemented as early as possible.
Given this, five cases of distinction for the integrated cost can be made:
1. l > 20, implementation 2010–2020. No replacement investments necessary. The
measure is gradually implemented between 2010 and 202027.
2. l > 10, implementation 2020–2030. Similar to the preceding case. No replacement
investments necessary; implementation is spread between 2020 and 2030.
3. l < 10, implementation 2020–2030. No replacements necessary, assumed that
implementation is started l years before 203028.
4. l < 10, implementation 2010–2020. Under the assumption that implementation is
started l years before 2020, the first decade is the same as in the preceding case.
However, replacement investments are required over the course of the second decade
– for each year, 1/l.
5. 10 < l < 20, implementation 2010–2020. Similar to the last case, with the
differentiation that replacement investments are only required over part of the
decade 2020–2030. Initial implementation of the measure takes place between 2010
and 2030, with equal parts implemented each year.
The integrated cost are composed of investments and operational cost/savings; the fol-
lowing sketches out the formula for the first of the above cases.
Discounted investments
Let i again be the cost of capital and C the investment for a given mitigation option
relative to the reference. As l > 10 years, it is assumed that the implementation of the
27It is assumed that the measures can be implmented gradually and that cost incur proportionally:
in year 1, a tenth of the investment and operational cost incur. In year 2, a further tenth of the
investments incur, whereas the operational cost/savings increase to two tenths, and so forth.
28It is assumed that a share of 1/l is implemented each year.
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solution is spread evenly over the ten years between 2010 and 2020. The 2020 (future)
value of the investment is then given by
FVC(2020)=
C
10
10∑
k=1
(1 + i)k =
i=4%
1.25 C (6.3)
As no replacement investments are necessary between 2020 and 2030 (l > 20), this value
just needs to be discounted to 2030 in order to receive the final future value:
FVC(2030)=FVC(2020) (1 + i)
10 =
i=4%
1.48 FVC(2020) . (6.4)
Discounted operational cost
Let O be the operational cost/savings per year for the mitigation option relative to the
reference. The integrated operational cost/savings that are incurred between 2010 and
2020, discounted to 2020, are then
FVO(2020) =
O
10
(1 + i)10+
2 ·O
10
(1 + i)9+. . .+
10 ·O
10
(1 + i)
=
O
10
10∑
k=1
(11− k)(1 + i)k =
i=4%
6.46O , (6.5)
with the term 2O
10
(1 + i)9 for example meaning that the operational cost/savings of year 2
(=2021) are double the amount of the first year, as already two tenths of the option are
implemented.
The future value of the operational cost/savings in 2030 is now composed of two parts:
the term FVO(2020) discounted to 2030 (FVO1(2030)), and the sum of all operational
cost/savings between 2020 and 2030, discounted to 2030 (FVO2(2030)):
FVO1(2030) = (1 + i)
10FVO(2020) (6.6)
FVO2(2030) = O
(
(1 + i)10 + (1 + i)9 + . . .+ (1 + i)
)
(6.7)
FVO(2030) = FVO1(2030) + FVO2(2030)
=
O
10
(
(1 + i)10
10∑
k=1
(11− k)(1 + i)k
)
+O
10∑
k=1
(1 + i)k . (6.8)
The sum of FVO(2030) and FVC(2030) gives the integrated cost of the measure (again
relative to the reference), discounted to 2030. It needs to be noted that this cost term
neglects operational cost/savings after 2030, which should incur for some time even if no
replacement investments were made.
Appendix E contains the formulas for the other four cases.
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6.6. Modeling of integrated water–GHG pathways
So far, we discussed how cross-intensities for water and GHG mitigation options can be
determined and what cost parameters can be considered.
The goal of an integrated modeling of all options now is to determine the optimal set of
water/GHG mitigation options, given one objective function and a number of contraints,
such as a water availability and a GHG reduction goal. The Simplex method, a specific
numerical approach to the general linear programming problem, can perform this task.
6.6.1. Linear programming
A linear programming problem can generally be described as the task of finding the
maximum (or minimum) of a linear function subject to a set of linear constraints.
A linear problem can be small enough that the solution can be found by hand. However,
most problems – including the ones discussed in this thesis – include many more variables
and constraints and are therefore best solved with a dedicated calculation routine.
The standard maximum and minimum problem
Consider the following example: Find the combination of x1 and x2 (x1, x2 ∈ R), that
maximize x1 + x2, subject to x1 ≥ 0, x2 ≥ 0, and
5x1 + 3x2 ≤ 9
−3x1 + x2 ≤ 1
5x1 + x2 ≤ 5 (6.9)
This problem contains two variables (x1 , x2), a linear objective function that is to be
maximized (x1+x2) and five linear contraints that are all inequalities: the three equations
in (6.9), plus the two nonnegativity constraints x1 ≥ 0, x2 ≥ 0.
Given that the problem contains only two variables, it can be solved graphically. Starting
from the unbounded x1x2-plane, each inequality restricts possible combinations of x1 and
x2 to a half plane. The area that lies within all five possible half planes defines the set of
feasible solutions.
The shaded area in figure 6.2 shows all feasible combinations for the constraints given
above. The objective function x1 + x2 can be represented by a line with slope −1. The
value of the objective increases by progressing away from the origin, in top-right direction
in figure 6.2. The maximal value of the problem will thus be reached at that corner
of the shaded plane that is the furthest to the top right for a line with slope −1. In
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Figure 6.2.: Grahpical illustration of the linear problem of equation (6.9).
our case, this is the intersection of the lines 5x1 + 3x2 ≤ 9 and −3x1 + x2 ≤ 1, yielding
x1 = 3/7, x2 = 16/7 and x1 + x2 = 19/7.
More generally, a linear programming problem is defined as follows:
Find an n-dimensional vector ~x = (x1, . . . , xn) to maximize
~c T ~x ,
where ~c is also n-dimensional. The problem shall be subject to the contraints
a11x1 + a12x2 + . . .+ a1nxn ≤ b1
a21x1 + a22x2 + . . .+ a2nxn ≤ b2
...
am1x1 + am2x2 + . . .+ amnxn ≤ bm (6.10)
and
x1 ≥ 0, x2 ≥ 0, . . . , xn ≥ 0 .
The terms in (6.10) can be expressed in matrix form, with A an m× n-matrix,
a11 a12 . . . a1n
a21 a22 . . . a2n
...
...
. . .
...
am1 am2 . . . amn

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The linear programming problem can then be reformulated to the following:
Maximize ~c T ~x , subject to
A ~x ≤ ~b and
~x ≥ ~0 . (6.11)
This problem is called the Standard Maximum Problem. Conversely, the Standard
Minimum Problem is defined as the search for an m-dimensional vector ~y that minimizes
~y T~b = y1b1 + . . .+ ymbm ,
subject to the contraints
~y TA ≥ ~c T
~y ≥ 0 . (6.12)
Equations (6.11) and (6.12) show that the main constraints of the standard maximum
(minimum) problem are “≤” (“≥”). It can be shown that all linear programming problems
can be converted to the standard form. For example, if an unrestricted variable xi exists,
it can be replaced by the difference of two restricted variables, xi = wi − zi, wi, zi ≥ 0,
adding one new variable and to new contraints to the problem.
A linear programming problem is feasible if a solution vector ~x or ~y exists that satisfies
the constraints. Otherwise, the problem is called infeasible. It is bounded if the objective
function can only obtain finitely large values and is otherwise said to be unbounded.
The Simplex method
The preceding section described the general form of a linear programming problem,
and how a two-dimensional example can be solved graphically. Larger problems with a
multitude of variables and constraints require specific algorithms – one widely spread is
the Simplex method.
Technically, it is easier to solve a problem that contains only equalities. For this, a
slack variable ~s T is included in the term ~y TA ≥ ~c T of the standard minimum problem:
~s T = ~y TA− ~c T . The problem thus becomes:
Find vectors ~y and ~s to minimize ~y T~b, subject to ~y TA− ~c T = ~s T , and ~s, ~y ≥ 0.
The problem can now be re-written in a Simplex tableau, where the first and last columns
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represent the vectors of the objective function that need to be minimized,
s1 s2 . . . sn
y1 a11 a12 . . . a1n b1
y2 a21 a22 . . . a2n b2
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
ym am1 am2 . . . amn bm
1 −c1 −c2 . . . −cn 0
(6.13)
If −~c ≥ 0 and ~b ≥ 0, a solution is ~y = 0, ~s = −~c and ~y T~b = 029.
The solution for this minimization problem could be read from the Simplex tableau.
But the method also holds true for the general case – the task of finding the minimum
therefore is to transform a problem with initially negative entries in ~−c and ~b into such
a form that the lowest row and rightmost column of the Simplex tableau only contain
nonnegative numbers.
Successive pivot operations perform this task. Pivoting about one entry aij of the
constraints matrix A means that a yi of the left column of (6.13) is expressed in terms of
the other yj and sj. Taking for example a11 gives the following Simplex tableau
y1 s2 . . . sn
s1 aˆ11 aˆ12 . . . aˆ1n bˆ1
y2 aˆ21 aˆ22 . . . aˆ2n bˆ2
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
ym aˆm1 aˆm2 . . . aˆmn bˆm
1 −cˆ1 −cˆ2 . . . −cˆn kˆ
(6.14)
If the vectors in the upper row are now termed ~u = (y1, s2, . . . , sn) and in the left column
~w = (s1, y2, . . . , ym), the minimization problem can be restated as the task to find vectors
~y and ~s that minimize ~u T
~ˆ
b, subject to ~u T Aˆ− ~ˆc T = ~w T and ~ˆs, ~ˆy ≥ 0. The solution to
this problem is then ~w = 0 and ~u = −~ˆc given that −~ˆc, ~ˆb ≥ 0.
The lower-right corner of the simplex tableau that contained the value of ~y T~b, is
transformed accordingly by replacing y1,
m∑
i=1
yibi =
b1
a11
s1 +
(
b2 − a21b1
a11
)
+ . . .+
(
bm − am1b1
a11
)
+
c1b1
a11
= ~w T
~ˆ
b+ kˆ ,
29This is feasible, as the conditions ~y TA− ~c T = ~s T and ~s, ~y ≥ 0 are fulfilled, but ~y T~b cannot made
smaller, given that ~s, ~y ≥ 0.
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where kˆ is the minimum value of the objective function.
The solution to an arbitrary minimization problem can now be found by randomly
pivoting about entries aˆij until −~ˆc, ~ˆb ≥ 0. In larger problems, this approach would
however require huge computational power. The Simplex method therefore introduces
some rules on what elements aˆij to choose for pivoting: for example, if entries in ~b are
negative, one of these is chosen (yielding a row i1 in the Simplex tableau). A negative
entry ai1j1 in row i1 is then chosen for pivoting, such that the ratio bi1/ai1j1 is smallest
with respect to the ratio bi/aij1 with bi, aij1 ≥ 0. Similarly, if all bi are (already) positive,
an ai1j1 > 0 in column j1 with −cj1 < 0 is chosen such that the ratio b1/ai1j1 is smallest.
Such rules in general help to increase computation efficiency.
6.6.2. Linear optimization applied to water-GHG patwhays
Objective functions and constraints
The goal of this work is to assess integrated water-GHG mitigation pathways. Admit-
tedly, this is a broad definition and still allows many different objective functions and
boundary conditions. There are however some concurrent properties: if ~x is the vector
of the potentials30 of our water/GHG mitigation options, two constraints for our linear
optimization problem should hold true in all cases,
xj > 0 ∀ j = 1 . . . n
xj ≤ xj,max ∀ j = 1 . . . n (6.15)
The nonnegativity constraints keep hold of the fact that the original mitigation potentials
shall not be negative, i.e., have an adverse impact, while the second equation restricts
each option to a maximum potential (as determined in [4] or [5]).
The other parameters besides the potential xj of a mitigation option j are its cost
(investment, operational cost, full cost in a given year, or integrated cost) and water and
carbon intensity31. Furthemore, global constraints such as a GHG abatement goal, water
availability goals, or a cost cap can be included32.
30Potentials in terms of incremental water availability (in million cubic meter) or reduced GHG emissions
(in t CO2e).
31Section 6.4 discussed how cross-dependencies are determined. In our linear model, each GHG mitigation
option now has a distinct water intensity (which can also be zero, in the case of no cross-dependency
within the boundaries of this effort) and a GHG-intensity of 1. Inversely, each water availability
option has a distinct GHG intensity and a water intensity of 1.
32These global constraints are linear combinations of the individual potentials xj , of the form a1x1 +
a2x2 +. . .+ anxn ≤ A, where the aj are for example the full cost of a mitigation option.
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Multiple optimization problems can now be defined, which however are similar in structure:
in each case, either a cost or intensity parameter aj factors into the objective function,
with the other parameters being part of the boundary conditions.
The following optimization problems were investigated in the course of this work:
1. Increase water availability and reduce GHG abatement to a given goal
at minimal integrated cost.
In this case, the integrated cost per measure cj,int build the objective function
together with the potentials xj,
min ~c Tint ~x ,
subject to the boundary conditions, in addition to those mentioned in (6.15),
~i TGHG ~x ≥ GGHG
IH2O ~x ≥ ~gH2O ,
where ~iGHG is the vector of the GHG-intensities of mitigation option j, and GGHG
the overall GHG emission reduction goal. IH2O is a m× j matrix, where each imj
is the water intensity of a mitigation option in the n-th river basin/WMA33 and
~gH2O the vector of the basin/WMA water availability goals
34. Following the orginal
reports [4] and [5], GGHG and ~gH2O could for example be the full GHG potentials
from the national cost curve subsets (9,143 Mt CO2e for China, 341 Mt CO2e for
South Africa), and the respective water gaps (201 km3 for China, 2.9 km3 for South
Africa).
2. Increase water availability and reduce GHG abatement to a given goal
at minimal investments or full cost in 2030.
Very similar to the preceding case; the only difference being the cost term in the
objective function, which either is ~cinvest (investments) or ~c2030 (full cost 2030)
instead of ~cint.
3. Maximize GHG emission reductions under the constraint of a water
availability target and fixed financial volume.
The GHG-intensities ij,GHG factor into the objective function, while the cost cj,...
35
become a part of the boundary condition:
max~i TGHG ~x ,
33The water intensities do not differ between basins in most cases, though.
34I.e., each g1...n is the water availability goal for one basin.
35Which can be either integrated, investment, operational or full cost for a given year.
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subject to
~c... ~x ≤ C...
IH2O ~x ≥ ~gH2O ,
where C... is the financial volume (in terms of investments, integrated cost or full
cost) available.
4. Maximize water availability under the constraint of a GHG emission
reduction target and fixed financial volume.
Similar to the preceding case. The water intensities ij,H2O move into the objective
function while the GHG intensities ~iGHG become part of the boundary conditions.
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Figure 6.3.: Concept of the isoinvestment curve. Left, 3d-graph with the position
of isoinvestment curves (x−axis: incremental water availability; y−axis: GHG
abatement; z−axis: (cumulative) investments. Right, cut parallel to the (x, y)
plane showing two isoinvestment curves.
The last two problems deal with the question of how returns, in terms of increased
water availability and/or reduced GHG emissions, can be maximized under financial
constraints.
Consider for example investments. Maximizing only one resource, one would expect that
total investments increase steadily and at accelerating rate until the given constraint is
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satisfied36. The left part of figure 6.3 shows this: investments (shown along z axis) grow
along the x and y axis in an accelerating way37.
It seems plausible that investments into combinations of two resources should grow at
comparable rates, pictured in the dotted red line in the left graph of figure 6.3. An
isoinvestment curve, i.e., a function z(x, y) = C that connects all optimal combinations
of water and GHG savings with the same total investment needs should therefore be
concave with respect to the origin of the (x, y) plane38.
The right part of figure 6.3 pictures two isoinvestment curves as functions of GHG
abatement and incremental water availability, and gives another reason for its concave
form: if the objective is for example to maximize water availability, the model chooses
mitigation options (mainly) according to their contribution to water availability per unit
of investment. At point A, a combination of low GHG emission reduction and high
incremental water availability, many and therefore on average expensive water availability
measures, but only few and therefore relatively “cheap” GHG mitigation options are
implemented. Reducing water availability at fixed investments, i.e., moving to the left on
an isoinvement line, will “buy” more GHG abatement than at a point B, where more
expensive GHG abatemet options are already implemented, and the cost of an additional
tonne of CO2e emission reduction is higher. If x is the incremental water availability and
y stands for GHG abatement it can therefore be said that
The gradient dy/dx of an isoinvestment curve y(x) is the marginal rate of substitution
between one cubic meter of increased water availability and one tonne of saved GHG
emissions.
The marginal rate of substitution can give information on appropriate price ratios between
water and GHG in order to achieve certain combinations of water/GHG savings and
investments.
36An optimization tool will always move from the cheapest measures (e.g., in terms of investments
needed per unit of water availability) to more expensive ones, making each additional unit of water
availability more expensive than the previous.
37The investment function is shown here as continuous. In reality, investments in many mitigation
options are in fact discrete, however (a nuclear power plant for example is either built or not), so
a close look at a “real” function would reveal a function that is made up of many small steps (of
differing sizes).
38Conceptually, isoinvestment lines can be considered as analog to isoquants in production theory.
Isoinvestment curves however have a concave curvature while isoquants are typically of convex
curvature, due to the fact that the second derivative of our investment functions I(water,GHG) is
positive while it is negative for typical functions that measure the output of a good with respect to
relevant input factors.
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6.6.3. Practical implementation
The linear optimization in this work was done with the solver lp solve39, a mixed integer
linear programming solver using the Simplex method. The solver was adressed through
an Excel add-in.
Figure 6.4.: Snapshot of the Excel link to the linear progamming solver.
In this environment, the coefficients of the objective function and the vector of variables
~x were given in spreadsheet columns, with each cell or line representing one mitigation
option. The boundary conditions consisted of two parts. First, one column each for
“global” restrictions on total cost C, total GHG reductions GGHG and incremental water
availability by basin gk,H2O, where k = 1 . . .m stands for the k-th basin
40. Second, a
n × n unit matrix that covered the second boundary condition in (6.15), xj ≤ xj,max.
Figure 6.4 shows a snapshot of the optimization mask. A detailed description of this
approach can be found in [153].
39For a description and download of the solver, see for example http://lpsolve.sourceforge.net/5.5/.
40The individual cells of each column then contain the respective values per measure j: cj,... in the case
of C, ij,GHG in the case of GGHG and ik,j,H2O in the case of gk,H2O.
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7. Interdependencies of water and
greenhouse gas pathways
7.1. Water intensity of GHG mitigation options
This chapter will first discuss the water intensities of GHG abatement options, energy
carriers and the Business-as-Usual electricity mixes in China and South Africa, which are
important inputs for determining the water intensity curves of the GHG abatement options.
The GHG impact of water availability options will then be described, and discussed
in more detail at the example of three particularly interesting options, desalination,
wastewater treatment and no-/reduced tillage in agriculture.
The second part of this chapter then discusses four intensity curves : for each of the two
countries, a water intensity curve of the GHG abatement options, and a GHG intensity
curve of water availability options.
7.1.1. Coal, gas, oil and biofuel provision - China
The preceding chapters mentioned that GHG abatement options can have an indirect
impact on water resources through fossil fuel or power demand savings, as both fossil
fuel extraction and power generation require considerable amounts of water1.
Table 7.1 gives the average water requirements for the provision of coal, natural gas, oil
and biofuels per unit of energy in China. It furthermore summarizes the percent split
of “production” activity by river basin, or, equivalently, by which extent the saving of
one unit of energy influences the water availability in a particular river basin: if one
Terajoule of coal is saved, the water availability across China increases on average by
9.4 m3 annually. Of these, 43% are accounted for in the Yangtze basin, 20% in the Hai
basin, and so forth2.
The following paragraphs explain how the water intensities and basin splits in table 7.1
come about.
1See section 5.2, page 66.
2The import–export balance for a certain fuel is already taken into consideration in table 7.1.
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Total/ Coal Gas Oil Biofuels
basin split m3/TJ m3/1,000 m3gas m
3/TJ m3/MWh
Total 9.4 0.16 39.5 119
Song 12% 7% 8% 27%
Liao 5% 7% 17% 0%
Hai 20% 6% 15% 6%
Huang/Yellow 42% 29% 5% 9%
Huai 4% 2% 11% 8%
Yangtze 10% 25% 13% 23%
Southeast 0% 2% 7% 2%
Pearl 1% 2% 11% 23%
Northwest 4% 21% 12% 2%
Southwest 0% 2% 0% 0%
Table 7.1.: China’s domestic water intensity of energy carriers: total demand
and percent split by basin (percent values might not add up to 100% due to
rounding).
China: coal mining
According to the IEA, China is expected to
Huang42
Hai
20
Song 12
Yangtze 10
Liao 5 4
Huai 4
Northwest
2
Other*
100% = 1,010 million m³
9.4 m³/TJ
* Pearl (1.5%), Southwest (0.5%), Southeast (0.1%)
Figure 7.1.: Water for coal mining.
produce about 3,300 Mt of coal equivalents
by 2030 [67]. Its 2030 demand is estimated
at between 3,400 Mtce3 [67] and 3,500 Mtce
[78] – imports thus account for less than 6%
of demand. The Water Resource Group [5]
estimates average water withdrawals for coal
mining in China at 9.4 m3/TJ4. Figure 7.1 gives
the total water withdrawals for coal mining and
the split by basin according to [5]. It can be
seen that three quarters of the coal are mined
in just three river basins, the Huang/Yellow,
3Mtce: million ton of coal equivalent.
4This is in good agreement with the literature data discussed in section 5.2: according to it, coal mining
requires 2–20 m3/TJ, with surface mining being at the lower, and underground mining at the upper
end of this range, 9.4 m3/TJ seems to be well in range, assumed that coal is mined both via the
surface and underground method. (Data on the split of mining methods in China was unfortunately
not obtainable from any of the consulted sources.)
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Hai and Song. All three are located in the
dry North of the country, and the Hai and Huang basins are expected to experience
particularly large water gaps by 20305 – this already gives a hint that a cutback in
coal demand might be a viable option to relieve water stress in relevant basins beyond
conventional options to increase water availability.
Given the low import ratio of coal, it is assumed here that one Terajoule of coal that
is saved directly increases China’s water availability by 9.4 m3, with the basin split as
given in figure 7.1.
China: oil extraction and refining
Southeast 9
Song
6
North-
west 9
Huai
13
Hai
13
Pearl14
Hai15
Yangtze
165
Huang
Refining
100% = 1,155 million m³
27
Liao
Northwest
27Hai
20
Song 19
Huang
7
Oil extraction
100% = 261 million m³
Figure 7.2.: Water withdrawals for oil refining and extraction in China in the
reference scenario, total and split by river basin.
China is one of the world’s largest oil consumers. It imports most of its oil, but has –
and is expected to remain so – enough refining capacity to cover domestic demand:
• Oil production in China is estimated to decline from 3.7 million barrel per day in
2007 to 3.5 million barrel per day in 2030 day, according to the IEA [144]; translated
into yearly figures, production in 2030 is expected to equal 174 Mtoe6 [144].
• Its refining capacity is expected to increase to about 790 Mtoe per year by 2030,
from 323 Mtoe in 2006 [144].
• Primary oil demand ist estimated to increase from 360 Mtoe in 2007 [78] to between
760 Mtoe [67] and 810 Mtoe [78]. To cover this demand, imports are expected to
reach 650 Mtoe until 2030 [67].
5See figure 3.3, page 34.
6Mtoe: million tons of oil equivalent.
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Based on these numbers, China’s oil import ratio lies at around 80% by 2030, up from
about 50% in 2006.
The left-hand side of figure 7.2 shows China’s water requirements for oil refining, as
expected for the Business-as-Usual scenario, based on water requirements of 33 m3/TJ,
which were again taken from the Water Resources Group report [5]. The split of refining
water needs shows an even distribution between basins, with a slight weight towards basin
with sea access. Taking a literature value for conventional oil extraction of 33 m3/TJ [2],
and considering China’s high share of imported oil, domestic water withdrawals per
Terajoule of oil are estimated at 6.5 m3/TJ. The special section on China in the IEA’s
2007 World Energy Outlook, and the information on the location of Chinese oil reserves
therein was used as a base for determining the regional split of water requirements as
shown on the right-hand side of figure 7.2.
It is thus assumed that one saved TJ of oil reduces water withdrawals in total by 39.5
m3/TJ, therefrom 33 m3 for refining, and 6.5 m3 for extraction, each split across basins
according to figure 7.27.
China: natural gas
The 2007 World Energy Outlook [67] states
6
7
7
21 25
29
Southwest
2
Pearl
2
Southeast
2
Huai
2Hai, LuanSong
Liao
Northwest Hai
Huang
100% = 43 million m³
0.16 m³/1,000 m³ of extracted gas
Figure 7.3.: Water for natural gas.
that natural gas imports were only 0.5 bcm8
in 2006, but will be 128 bcm by 2030. Over
the same time, demand is expected to increase
from 59 bcm to 242 bcm9, while production
is estimated to reach 111 bcm in 2030 (vs. 51
bcm in 2005) [67]. Thus, imports will grow
continuously, accounting for more about half
of China’s demand by 2030.
[5] estimates that natural gas extraction and
processing requires 9 m3/TJ. Figure 7.3 gives
the overall water requirements for natural gas
extraction and processing within China and
the split of water requirements by basin (in the
Business-as-Usual scenario), under the assumption that half the gas is banked in China.
Similar to coal, three drier Northern basins (Huang, Hai, Northwest) account for almost
three quarters of total water needs (or estimated gas extraction, respectively).
Overall gas withdrawals are however only about 4% of those for oil and coal, which is
consistent with the literature values given in section 5.2.
7The overview in table 7.1 in section 7.1.1 gives the sum and weighted distribution of basin oil extraction
and refining water requirements.
8bcm: billion cubic meter
9From the 2009 World Energy Outlook (WEO) [78].
7.1. WATER INTENSITY OF GHG MITIGATION OPTIONS 105
China: biofuels
Biofuels are mainly used as an alternative to oil-based fuels in transportation. They can
be subdivided into biodiesel and bioethanol. The “first” generation of biofuels is produced
from energy crops: bioethanol mainly from corn, wheat, sugarcane or sugarbeet, and
biodiesel from rapeseed or jatropha [134]. Both bioethanol and biodiesel could play a
role in China in the future, albeit with very different impacts on water availability.
The water intensities and basin allocations of bioethanol and biodiesel production were
derived from data on rainfed and irrigated yields per basin for all crops that are in principle
eligible for bioethanol or biodiesel production [5]10; this information was combined with
the water footprint for each crop, taken from literature [5] [134]11, with data on the
regional distribution of China’s current bioethanol and biodiesel production capacities,
and information on the crops that are actually planned to be converted into biofuels [154].
By reason of a lack of better data, it was assumed that this regional allocation will hold
true until 2030.
24
9
13
27
40
2
Southeast
1
NorthwestPearl
Hai
Huang
Huai
Song
Yangtze
100% = 119 m³/MWh
225 500
Song 1,310
Yangtze 1,10025200
150
Yangtze and Song bioethanol
capacity, 1,000 tons
Corn
Cassava
Sugar Cane
Other grains
Sweet potato
wheat
Figure 7.4.: Water intensity of biofuel production and processing in China, total
and split by river basin.
This allows to calculate the average water footprint for biofuels on a national level, and
the weighted average basin contribution, summarized in figure 7.412. According to it, the
10The list of relevant crops was taken from [134] and includes the following: for bioethanol, sugar
beet, potato, sugar cane, maize/corn, cassava, barley, rye, paddy rice, wheat, sorghum; for biodiesel,
soybean and rapeseed.
11The average water footprint depends on the crop share that is irrigated (versus rainfed). This
information was taken from [5].
12Weighted average basin contribution means that the water requirements for sourcing 1 TJ of biofuels
from one basin were weighted with the basin’s relative share of farmland dedicated to biofuels.
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Yangtze and Song basins contribute most to biofuels production, albeit with different
crop mixes: while a mixture of cassava, wheat and other crops are used in the Yangtze
basin, corn is the virtually only source (for bioethanol) in the Song basin13.
Total/ Coal Oil refining Biofuels
basin split m3/TJ m3/TJ m3/MWh
Total 14 33 146
Limpopo 10% 0% 44%
Luvuvhu/Letaba 0% 0% 7%
Crocodile West and Marico 0% 0% 20%
Olifants 46% 0% 1%
Inkomati 0% 0% 12%
Usutu to Mhlathuze 0% 0% 2%
Thukela 0% 0% 0%
Upper Vaal 41% 22% 1%
Middle Vaal 0% 0% 2%
Lower Vaal 0% 0% 2%
Myoti to Umzimkulu 3% 28% 2%
Mzimvubu to Keiskamma 0% 0% 5%
Upper Orange 0% 0% 0%
Lower Orange 0% 0% 1%
Fish to Tsitsikamma 0% 37% 1%
Gouritz 0% 4% 0%
Olifants/Doring 0% 0% 0%
Breede 0% 0% 0%
Berg 0% 9% 0%
Table 7.2.: Water intensity of important energy carriers in South Africa: total
demand and percent split by basin (percent values might not add up to 100% due
to rounding).
13Please note that this figure gives only relative withdrawals (in m3/MWh), but no indication on
absolute withdrawals (in terms of million m3) for a reference case (as for oil, coal and gas), due to
the fact that biofuels are part of the GHG mitigation solution mix – the extent to which this solution
is implemented depends on the contraints chosen in the model.
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7.1.2. Coal, gas, oil and biofuel provision - South Africa
Table 7.2 summarizes the water requirements for the provision of important energy
carriers, and how these split beween the 19 Water Management Areas (WMAs) in South
Africa, as did table 7.1 for China. It thereby also gives information on the overall extent
and the WMA where the avoided consumption of one unit of energy would increase water
availability.
South Africa: coal mining
The 276 Mt of coal that were mined in South Africa in 2009 required on average 0.33
m3/ton, or 14 m3/TJ [155]14 – the fact that domestic coal consumption was only 205
Mt [155] makes South Africa a net exporter of coal. Reduction in coal demand through
GHG abatement measures by one Terajoule is therefore assumed to reduce water demand
by the full 14 m3.
A comprehensive list of South Africa’s coal
Olifants
Other*
1
310
Upper Vaal
Myoti to Umzimkulu
Limpopo
46
41
100% = 91 million m³
for 276 Mt mined coal (2009), 14 m³/TJ
* Usutu to Mhlathuze (0.5%), Luvuvhu/Letaba,
Thukela (0.1% each)
Figure 7.5.: Water for coal.
mines [145], including the location of each mine,
allowed to allocate water withdrawals from
coal mining to WMAs; figure 7.5 gives the
regional distribution in the reference scenario.
Most of the coal is mined in just two WMAs
- interestingly (and again similar to the China
case), these are both located in parts of the
country that are forecasted to experience a
particularly large water gap by 203015.
Going forward, we assumed that the regional
split of coal mining and water requirements will
not change in the Business-as-Usual scenario
– i.e., saving a unit of coal in our model will increase water availability in the WMAs
according to the split given in figure 7.5.
South Africa: oil refining
South Africa consumed 194 million barrel of oil in 2009, and produced about 1 million
barrels [155]. It is unlikely that oil production will increase substantially in the foreseeable
14Water withdrawals from mining were determined based on the literature data discussed in section 5.2
and data from [5]. The value is in good agreement with data from literature [135], as a rough back-
of-the-envelope calculation shows: underground mining requires 12 m3/TJ, surface mining 4 m3/TJ
and coal washing again 4 m3/TJ. 60% of South Africa’s coal are mined in surface operations [145];
thus: 60%· 12 m3/TJ + 40%· 4 m3/TJ + 4 m3/TJ (most coal is washed) = 12.8 m3/TJ.
15See picture 3.8, page 42.
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future16 – South Africa can therefore be expected to import most of its oil in the future.
The country is however home the second largest refining capacity in Africa [155] and is
considered self-sufficient in terms refining capacity in some sources [155], or expected
to be so by 2015 [157]. Table 7.3 gives an overview of the main refineries (from [147]),
including estimated water withdrawals (based on water withdrawals of 33 m3/TJ, or 0.2
m3/bbl17).
This information led to the assumption that saving one unit of oil will increase water
availability due to lower refining requirements, and affect the WMAs in the proportion
as mentioned in table 7.318.
Refinery Basin 106 bbl 106 m3
Sapref Durban Mvoti to Umzimkulu 66 13.3
Petronas Durban Mvoti to Umzimkulu 46 9.2
Calex Capetown Berg 37 7.4
Natref Sasolburg Upper Vaal 34 6.8
Sasol I-III Upper Vaal 55 11.1
Petro SA Gouritz 16 3.3
Petro SA Mthombo Fish-Tsitsikamma 146 29.6
Table 7.3.: Annual production and water withdrawals for South African refineries
[147]. The Mthombo refinery (in italic)is not yet in operation, but planned to be
so by 2015.
South Africa: natural gas
Water requirements for natural gas extraction were not further considered in this work:
according to the EIA, South Africa consumed 3.6 billion cubic meters (bcm) in 2006 [155],
but only produced 1.0 bcm [155], i.e., it imports more than 70% of its gas. Taking the
China number for the water intensity of gas extraction (9 m3/TJ), and assuming that
GHG mititgation options reduced domestic gas production would impact total water
availability potential by less than 400,000 m3, or 0.01% of South Africa’s water gap.
16Proven reserves (in January 2012) were 15 million barrels, the amount Saudi Arabia produces in less
than two days [155] [156].
17According to section 5.2.
18Of course, this approach has its flaws: in reality, a long-term decline in oil demand will most likely
lead to the closure of some refineries, and not to a proportional production scale-down in all.
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South Africa: biofuels
Local sources [158] [159] indicate that biodiesel will likely play a smaller role than ethanol
in South Africa and be produced mainly from waste oils, i.e., putting little stress on
water resources. Bioethanol in contrast could become of higher importance with respect
to its water requirements, and is expected to originate mainly from two crops, sugarcane
and maize [160].
The calculation logic for the water intensity and regional distribution of bioethanol
production similar as in China. The Water Resources Group report [5] provides estimates
for rainfed and irrigated production of both crops by Water Management Area until 2030;
according to it, South African maize and sugarcane production could reach 53 million
tons (of which 85% irrigated) and 48 million tons (96% irrigated), respectively19, with
the highest yields expected in the north-eastern part of the country (WMAs Limpopo,
Luvuvhu/Letaba, Inkomati). Not all of this will be used for bioethanol production, but it
is assumed here that the maize and sugarcane used for bioethanol production will come
from the respective WMAs proportionally.
Translating tonnage yields into energy value [134], and combining this data with estimates
on water withdrawals for maize and sugarcane irrigation [134] yields the bioethanol water
requirements per MWh, per WMA, summarized in table 7.4.
WMA m3/MWh WMA m3/MWh
Limpopo 144 Mvoti to Umzimkulu 152
Luvuvhu/Letaba 134 Mzimvubu to Keiskamma 150
Crocodile W., Marico 159 Upper Orange 120
Olifants 120 Lower Orange 101
Inkomati 149 Fish to Tsitsikamma 149
Usutu to Mhlathuze 152 Gouritz -
Thukela - Olifants/Doring 57
Upper Vaal 107 Breede 92
Middle Vaal 150 Berg 101
Lower Vaal 153
Table 7.4.: Water requirements for bioethanol split by Water Management Area.
It can be seen that water requirements are higher in the dry inlands WMAs and
lower in the coastal WMAs of the Cape region that have a more humid climate
(see section 3.2).
19These numbers build on data from the International Food and Policy Research Institute.
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7.1.3. Avoided electricity power mixes - coal power
The preceding chapter mentioned that a large share of GHG mitigation options are
directly or indirectly linked to changes in, or reductions of, power production from the
Business-as-Usual power mix. This mix is dominated by fossil-fueled thermal plants that
typically withdraw considerable amounts of water20 – changes in power production will
therefore impact water resources. Coal power makes up the majority of that Business-
as-Usual (BAU) power mix, with 72% in China and 93% in South Africa21. It is thus
important to determine the water intensities of that generation fleet on a basin/WMA
level.
Figure 7.6 shows the regional distribution of coal power plant capacities, and the respective
water intensities22. It can be seen that China and South Africa differ substantially in
that respect:
• China. Given the size of the river basins, it is no surprise that generation capacities
are distributed across all basins and roughly follow patterns of economic activity
and population density. Average withdrawal differ between basins nevertheless: the
drier north of the country withdraws less than the south, but the lowest freshwater
withdrawal rates are found in the South-East and Pearl river basins, which have
long coastlines where power plants are predominantly cooled with seawater. Large
differences in water withdrawals also exist between the currently operating fleet,
the plants under construction, and those in planning, as the table 7.1.3 shows: the
existing fleet has a high share of open loop systems that withdraw large volumes of
freshwater, while new plants are predominantly built with closed cycle or air-cooled
systems if seawater cannot be put to use.
• South Africa. The smaller size of the country and the high number of Water
Management Areas provide more granular data than for China. The lower part of
figure 7.6 shows that most power plants are located in the north-eastern part of the
country, in proximity to the coal mines; these are also the regions with the highest
level of population, economic activity, but also water scarcity23. Furthermore,
20See page 67ff.
21See section 6.4.2, page 81.
22Water intensities were determined as discussed in section 6.4.2, page 81ff: based on the literature
values in table 6.1 (83), average regional water intensities were then determined based on the cooling
technology given in the Platts power plant database, supported by a single plant location search if
needed. Varying power plant efficiencies (specified in table 6.1) were taken into account as far as
noted in Platts. These were then mapped against river basins or Water Management Areas.
23See figure 7.14, page 137 for a map of South Africa that shows the regional distribution of economic
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Figure 7.6.: Coal power plant capacities in operation, planning and under con-
struction for China and South Africa, by river basin/water management area
and the respective intensity of water withdrawals.
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Capacity Withdrawals
GW m3/MWh
In operation 659 13.1
In construction 95 0.9
In planning 213 0.8
Table 7.5.: Freshwater withdrawal intensity for Chinese coal power plants of
different status. Based on the power plant database for China (see page 81).
average water withdrawals are much lower than in China, even though the power
plants are generally located inland and cannot use seawater (see figure 7.6): 43% of
considered coal plants24 are air cooled. Of those under construction or in planning,
virtually all will use this technology.
Table ?? shows condensed data on coal plant water withdrawals by operational status.
This could be broken down further to provincial level, as table 7.6 shows exemplarily for
China’s Shaanxi province25. It can be seen that average water withdrawals are close to
the Yellow river average, to which the province belongs, and are expected to decline in
the future as new and more efficient plants come online26
The BAU power mixes not only consist of coal power plants, but also include other units,
mostly gas-fired plants, local biomass and (in China) small hydro facilities. As described
in section 6.4.2, the water intensities of these technologies were taken from literature,
and allocated to the basins/WMAs on a pro-rata basis with respect to the coal-fired
capacities27.
Table 7.7 summarizes the water intensities of the BAU power mixes that are avoided
through the implementation of energy efficiency measures and alternative energy sources28
– a comparison with figure 7.6 (p. 111) shows that these water intensities follow the
activities.
24The summed capacity of all plants in operation, under construction and in planning.
25Located in central China, Shaanxi provinces belongs to the largest part to the Huang-He/Yellow river
basin (the southernmost corner is already part of the Yangtze basin). It is a major coal-producing
region.
26Similar data exist for all other basins or WMAs.
27Where appropriate, these numbers were amended with the water requirements for the provision of the
respective energy carrier.
28This differentiation needed to be made to be consistent with the underlying data source [4] – see
section 6.4.2 (81). However, and as table 7.7 shows, the water intensities of the two mixes differ only
slightly, particularly for South Africa.
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Operation Construction Planning
GW GW GW
Air-cooled 3.6 3.8
Cooling tower 10.3 2.4 -
Open cycle freshwater 0.3 - -
Not specified 4.0 1.9 5.6
- Classified air-cooled 1.0 -
5.6
- Classified wet-cooled 2.9 1.9
- Classified open cycle 0.1 - -
∅ withdrawals, m3/MWh 3.9 2.0 0.8
Table 7.6.: Coal power plant data on provincial level, example of Shaanxi, China:
capacity of coal power plant fleet split by status and cooling technology. The
data draws from 127 power plants, reaching from 3 MW to 1 GW. The cooling
type of those capacities that were not specified in the database was determined
pro-rata, based on the classified capacities per operational segment.
intensities of the coal power plant fleet.
7.1.4. Water intensities and regional distribution of alternative
power sources
The water impact of energy efficiency measures is directly given by the respective water
intensity of the avoided power plant mix (∆1 in table 7.7). Alternative power sources in
contrast can have their own water intensities: nuclear power plants generally require more
cooling water per unit of output than coal plants, while wind power requires negligible
amounts.
The following sections discuss quantity and regional distribution of water intensities for
the most relevant alternative power sources, wind, photovoltaics, solar thermal, nuclear
and hydro. The difference between the respective water intensity and the intensity of
the avoided conventional power mix ∆2 then determines the net water impact of a given
alternative power source.
Wind power
Wind farms themselves do not require water. Wind power can therefore be considered
much like energy efficiency measures – it reduces water withdrawals through reduced
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China ∆1 ∆2 South Africa ∆1 ∆2
Basin m3/MWh WMA m3/MWh
Song 4.6 5.9 Limpopo 0.3 0.3
Liao 2.0 2.5 Crocodile West, Marico 2.0 2.0
Hai 4.2 5.3 Olifants 1.5 1.5
Huang 3.0 3.8 Usutu to Mhlathuze 2.0 2.0
Huai 10.0 12.8 Upper Vaal 1.3 1.3
Yangtze 16.6 21.1 Myoti to Umzimkulu 2.0 2.0
Southeast 0.6 0.8 Mzimvubu to Keiskamma 1.0 1.0
Pearl 1.4 1.8 Upper Orange 2.0 2.0
Northwest 1.4 1.8 Lower Orange 2.0 2.0
Southwest 1.0 1.3 Other WMA n/a n/a
Table 7.7.: Water intensities (withdrawals) of the power plant mixes that are
avoided through increased energy efficiency (∆1) and alternative power sources
(∆2). “Other WMA, n/a” means that the remaining WMAs have negligible
generation capacities.
needs for fossil-thermal power generation. A differentiation however needs to be made in
terms of regionalization between China and South Africa:
Wind generation capacity buildup in China in one basin is assumed to reduce water
withdrawals in that same basin. This approach seems to make most sense, given the size
of the country and the (still) poorly interconnected transmission subgrids29.
Wind buildup on provincial basis until 2030 was sourced from China’s NDRC Energy
Research Institute [161]30 and mapped to the ten river basins. According to it, the Yellow,
Song, and South West basins receive almost two thirds of wind capacity. The sparsely
populated South West would, as the only basin, receive more wind power in this scenario
than it is expected to have capacity in the Business-as-Ususal scenario (56 GW) – half of
this capacity (28 GW) is therefore assumed to be transported to the neighboring Yangtze
and Pearl river basins, and reduce water withdrawals there. Figure 7.7 shows how wind
capacities might be distributed across the basins acording to [161], and contrasts this
with a wind speed map: wind capacities are low in the coastal eastern basins with little
wind potential and increase in north-western direction, which is well reflected in the
29See also section 6.4.2, page 85ff.
30The values given in [161] correspond well to the data underlying the China cost curve [4]: while [161]
gives a span of 220–400 GW installed capacity with a moderate case of 300 GW, [4] assumes 338
GW.
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Figure 7.7.: Left: Land-based wind resource potential of China (from [162]);
right: Distribution of potential 2030 wind capacities across river basins after
correcting for over-capacities in the South West (see text).
In contrast, the regional distribution of wind power plants in South Africa is assumed
to be of lesser importance – it is expected that the installation of wind power reduces
water demand from thermal power stations by the national average, independent of its
location. This approach should be justified by the fact that South Africa has a well
developed transmission grid that covers the whole country31.
Photovoltaics
Like wind, photovoltaic power require negligible amounts water32. A regional differentia-
tion between China and South Africa is again required, given the different structure of
the national transmission grids.
Photovoltaics in China reduce water withdrawals from thermal stations in those basins
where they are installed. The basin distribution of the photovoltaics capacities is assumed
31This approach implicitly assumes that South Africa will not run into a congestion of its transmission
grid that might arise from the transport of large amounts of wind power through the country.
Implemented to full extent, wind capacities of about 18 GW, or 18–24% of South Africa’s total
expected capacity by 2030 [117] are assumed here. If wind power is not located in one single region,
such a share of total capacity is likely manageable: Denmark for example already generates 25% of
its electricity from wind [163], and installed capacities as a share of the total are still higher (as wind
power typically has lower availabilities than conventional power sources).
32Some water is needed for washing of the panels. [135] gives a number of 0.055 m3/MWh, whereas [1]
considers the volume negligible.
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to follow the currently installed conventional generation capacity33.
The same argumentation as for wind is assumed to hold for South Africa: photovoltaic
power should have no impact on the water resources in a given WMA, and reduce
withdrawals by the national average water intensity of the avoided power mix.
Concentrating solar thermal power (CSP)
CSP plants require water, as their working principle is a steam cycle that requires a
heat sink or cooling element – which is normally provided through evaporating water. A
regional allocation of capacities is therefore necessary for both countries.
The regional distribution of the CSP capacity as prognosticated in [4] for China is done
on the basis of solar irradiation, shown in figure 7.8. Admittedly, this approach differs
from photovoltaics. However, photovoltaics is a distributed technique that can well exist
in urban areas and owned by individuals, while CSP is a large-scale generation technology
that ressembles more a coal power plant and will for this reason also be built based on
other criteria34.
CSP capacity allocation in South Africa follows the distribution pattern of the plants
announced so far, summarized in table 7.1.4 – due to the lack of better data, it was
assumed that the buildup of pilot plants can be considered as an indicator for the future
distribution of CSP plants.
Nuclear power
Nuclear power stations also use water, as the principle operating mechanism is the same
as in any coal-fired power plants.
Determination of the regional distribution across China followed the same logic as for
coal: the locations of existing nuclear power plants and those under construction and
in planning as well as their cooling types are given by the Platts power plant database.
33A point of critique to this approach is that it neglects solar irradiation data. This could be countered
German example (little sun, but high installed capacities) or the argument that roof-top installations
might predominate, which are rather linked to population density or economic wealth. If the latter
argument is followed, the distribution of conventional generation capacity can be used as well, being,
in the case of China most likely a good trade-off index between population density, levels of economic
activity and existing energy infrastructure.
34While both photovoltaics (PV) and CSP use sunlight, the conversion to electricity follows different
principles: PV translates sunlight directly into electric power, while CSP rather is a conventional
generation technology: sunlight is captured by mirrors that heat a fluid medium which in turn powers
a steam turbine (by means of a heat exchanger).
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Figure 7.8.: From [164]. Solar irradiation map for China.
Company Capacity, MW WMA
Eskom 100 Lower Orange
Concentrix 50 Olifants/Doring
Exxaro 220 Limpopo
Group Five & Sishen Iron Ore 450 Lower Orange/Lower Vaal
Lereko Metier, IDC & Solafrica 75 Lower Orange/Lower Vaal
Table 7.8.: Announced solar-thermal (pilot) power plants for South Africa.
Table 7.9 summarizes the results on national level: all plants in operation so far are sea-
cooled. Regarding the plants under construction and in planning, an inland move can be
observed that effectively increases water withdrawals, as freshwater cooling will increase
in importance35. Overall, currently operating plants require only 0.38 m3/MWh36, while
35Regarding overall capacities: the Platts database gives 106 GW of nuclear capacity in operation, under
construction or in planning. At a presumed runtime of 85% over one year (nuclear power stations
typically serve as baseload; 15% downtime reflects outages due to revision and maintenance), this
corresponds to 790 TWh, in good agreement with the 805 TWh mentioned in [4] for the abatement
case.
36The literature value from [135] for open-cycle-cooled boiling water/pressurized water reactors. This
value should also apply to sea-cooled types, as for example make-up water for the primary cycle or
for sanitation cannot be provided by seawater.
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this value increases to 2.0 m3/MWh for the plants that are under construction or in
planning.
Open loop sea Closed loop river Capacity, GW
Operating 100% 0% 10.2
In construction 86% 14% 32.3
In planning 68% 32% 64.0
Table 7.9.: From Platts power plant database: percentage shares of nuclear power
plant capacities by cooling type.
In the case of South Africa, it is assumed that the additional nuclear capacity assumed
in the abatement case will be installed in the Fish-Tsitsikamma WMA, where Thyspunt
is deemed a likely location for new nuclear capacities [165] [166]. As the location will be
close to the sea, it is assumed that it will be cooled primarily with sea water, keeping
water requirements at 0.38 m3/MWh37.
Hydro power
As discussed, water intensities can be significant especially for hydro dams, as they reduce
the water flow rate and therefore lead to increased evaporation. The amount of evaporated
water strongly depends on the climatic conditions: while effects are presumably small
in the cool climate of Norway, a water head of 6mm evaporates daily from Lake Nasser,
Egypt, summing up to about 4% of the country’s water withdrawals over the course of a
year [167].
[135] gives evaporative losses for California of up to 209 m3/MWh, [1] a range (also
for California) of 0.2–160 m3/MWh, depending mostly on the power station’s surface-to
volume ratio, with a median of 5.4 m3/MWh, and 14 m3/MWh for plants <25 MW.
As this is the only source found, these values were taken as a basis for determining
evaporative losses per river basin/WMA in China and South Africa. Specifically, the
value for smaller plants was considered, as the GHG mititgation option is explicitly called
“small hydro”.
In order to do so, evaporation rates for California were derived from [168]. The same
data was obtained for China’s river basins [169]38 and South Africa’s WMAs [170], and
37See last footnote.
38The source only allows to draw basin-specific information for the Yangtze, Yellow and Song river
basins. Evaporation rates of the other seven river basins were linked to these three data points: for
Liao, Hai, Song values were taken; the Huai and North-West basins were linked to the Yellow river
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put in relation to California’s evaporation rates. Using the data on median evaporation
rates per MWh for California as sketched out above allowed to estimate those values for
China’s river basins and South Africa’s WMAs that are summarized in table 7.10.
Interestingly, evaporation rates are lower in both China and South Africa than in
California: the Yangtze basin for example reaches only 53% of the Californian value (70
cm vs. 130 cm p.a.39). The highest value achieved in South Africa is in the Myoti to
Umzimkulu WMA, with 70% of the Californian rate.
South African WMA m3/MWh China river basin m3/MWh
Limpopo 6.4 Song 5.4
Luvuvhu/Letaba 7.6 Liao 5.4
Crocodile W., Marico 6.2 Hai 5.6
Olifants 7.6 Huang 5.8
Inkomati 8.9 Huai 6.6
Usutu to Mhlathuze 9.5 Yangtz 7.5
Thukela 8.7 Southeast 7.5
Upper Vaal 8.1 Pearl 7.5
Middle Vaal 6.5 Northwest 5.8
Lower Vaal 5.2 Southwest 7.5
Mvoti to Umzimkulu 9.8
Mzimvubu to Keisk. 8.9
Upper Orange 5.4
Lower Orange 2.7
Fish to Tsitsikamma 4.9
Gouritz 3.3
Olifants/Doring 2.7
Breede 6.0
Berg 5.4
Table 7.10.: Evaporation rates for hydropower in China and South Africa.
basin, and the South-West, Pearl and South-East basins to the Yangtze.
39Evaporation rates for California refer to the more humid north of the state, as it was assumed that
most of hydro dam capacities is actually installed there.
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7.1.5. Waste, agriculture and forestry
Waste
Two mitigation options in the waste sector have an impact on water resources. First,
the direct use of gas from landfills, i.e., the capturing and processing to further use of
methane that would otherwise enter the atmosphere and contribute to the greenhouse
effect. This offsets natural gas requirements from fossil sources – its relative water impact
is therefore determined by the water intensity of natural gas extraction.
The second option is direct electricity generation from landfill gas, which not only avoids
(fossil) natural gas extraction but also power generation from the Business-as-Usual
power mix, which can be regarded as another alternative form of power generation; as
the electricity will likely be obtained from gas-fired powered plants, the water intensity of
CCGT plants, minus the water intensity of avoided gas extraction, was assumed for this
option. The regional distribution across basins/WMAs followed the population density,
as it was assumed that landfills correlate with this metric.
Agriculture
As mentioned in section 6.2 (p. 77), this work neglects the changes in hydrological cycles
from changes in land-cover. Water impacts of measures that affect agronomy practices,
land management or degraded land restoration were therefore not considered.
Measures that affect livestocks, antimethanogen vaccine and feed supplements, were
considered to have negligible impacts on water resources.
One measure, however, no-/reduced tillage sticks out within the boundaries of this
research, and is described in more detail in section 7.2.3.
Forestry
Forestry measures in both South Africa and China include afforestation, degraded forest
reforestation and improved forest management. Similar to the agriculture measures,
their water impact was not further considered here, as a proper evaluation would require
hydrological modeling an a regional basis, a task beyond the scope of this work.
7.2. GHG impact of water availability options
Much as GHG mitigation options have a water impact, the implementation of water
availability options can influence GHG emission levels. As these options were fewer
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in number, and as the differing nature of the mitigation options barred a systematic
breakdown to few specific drivers (of GHG emissions), the cost and potential of water
availability options were determined on the basis of local case studies and interviews, and
so were their GHG intensities.
The case study data in most cases include energy cost or savings, which was translated
into a GHG impact in dependence on the implied fuel. The following general observation
were made along the sector boundaries:
• Industrial and agricultural measures. Water savings either go in hand with
energy savings (often in the case of energy efficiency gains) or require additional
energy. The GHG impact is determined based on the GHG intensity of the energy
source saved. As the majority of energy savings are in fact electricity savings, the
GHG intensity is determined by the intensity of the avoided power mix in the same
way as discussed in the last section (7.1).
• Municipal measures. Efficient toilets or reduced leakage rates reduce energy
demand as less water needs to be purified and pumped; their energy savings were
taken from literature (see figure 5.3, page 71) and translated into GHG savings
by using again the GHG intensity of the avoided power mix. A special case is
wastewater treatment, which was considered from a technologically more optimistic
standpoint as a net energy producer. This is explained in more detail in section
7.2.1.
• Supply measures. Specific literature values were used in order to determine the
impact on GHG emissions of concrete infrastructure projects such as the South-
North water transfer project in China; more general literature values were used for
energy intensities of supply options such as desalination or groundwater pumping.
A special case are hydro dams. For these, we first estimated the dam size from the
water availability potential (in million m3). It was then checked whether the dam
size stood in a plausible relation to the hydro power capacity as given in the GHG
abatement options “small hydro”; as that was the case for both countries, the two
measures were combined into one – implying that hydro dams not only store water
for dry periods but also produce energy when they release the water.
As each water measure is the result of distinct case studies, interviews, academic publica-
tions and technical reports, an in-depth discussion of the GHG intensity of all measures
would be beyond the scope of this work. At this point we refer to the appendix of the
Water Resources Group report [5] (p.147ff.) that contains an explanation for each option
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and to appendix D of this work that contains a comprehensive list of GHG intensities for
each water availability option, including comments and references to data and sources
that were used for determining it.
The following sections give more detail on three particularly interesting measures, mu-
nicipal wastewater treatment, reduced tillage, and seawater desalination. Each stands
representatively for one sector, and has strong water–GHG interlinkages; in two cases,
wastewater treatment and reduced tillage, these create a “win-win-situation”, i.e., they
reduce GHG emissions and increase water availability, while seawater desalination trades
water availability for increased GHG emissions.
7.2.1. Municipal: domestic wastewater treatment
Virtually all wastewater in the developed world is treated today, while developing
countries still discharge large parts of their waste streams into the environment in
untreated condition [25] (p. 241ff, 254).
Wastewater treatment is energy-intensive – it for example requires 1% of all electricity
produced in England and Wales [171]. Disposal of the sludge, an end-product of the
treatment process, can also take up high costs and pose a problem in densely populated
areas.
This section will discuss the various teatment steps and show that wastewater can for
example be considered as an energy carrier.
The wastewater treatment chain
A modern wastewater treatment plant typically has four subsequent treatment steps40.
• Pretreatment. The influent first flows through screens that sort out large parts such
as leaves, cans, wood etc. After that, it passes through a grit chamber or some sort
of finer screens where larger particles settle down or are filtered out and removed.
Modern plants often have a flow equalization stage that allows to effectively store
parts of the wastewater stream during peak periods.
• Primary treatment. The pretreated wastewater flows into larger basins, primary
clarifiers. Here, fat and grease accumulate at the surface and are skimmed off, while
sludge, which is made up of previously dissolved matter, settles at the bottom and
is separated from the water.
40The steps described there are the most typical found in modern plants. However, alternative steps of
equal effectiveness exist – for example, wetlands can assume the role of secondary treatment.
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• Secondary treatment. After these physical steps, the wastewater is mixed with
activated sludge and passed through an aerator. Activitated sludge contains a mix
of bacteria that, with the help of oxygen, consume the dissolved organic matter in
the wastewater and bind (parts of) the inorganic matter. From the aerator, the
mixture is pumped into a secondary clarifier after a certain retention time, where
the sludge settles to the ground and is seperated from the water. The sludge is now
called activated, as it contains enough bacteria to start the digestion process in the
aeration tank – parts are therefore reused as described above. The remainder is
pumped into a tank together with the sludge from primary treatment.
• Tertiary treatment. Effluent water quality can be further enhanced through certain
final treatment steps: it can be passed through sand or coal filters for mechanical,
or wetlands for biological filtration. Nutients such as nitrogen or phosphorus can be
removed in order to avoid algae blooming in the effluent water bodies. It can also
passed through a chlorine contact basin to kill any remaining bacteria. Tertiary
treatment can enhance quality to drinking water standards – as done in Singapore ,
where the effluent is called NEWater and sold as bottled water [172].
• Sludge treatment. The sludge from primary a secondary treatment is first dewatered,
e.g. in a centrifuge. Its load is then further reduced, which is most commonly done
through aerobic or anaerobic digestion by bacteria or incineration. Under aerobic
conditions, bacteria consume the organic matter of the sludge and produce CO2.
In an anarobic environment, bacteria digest the biomass under the exclusion of
oxygen and produce biogas.
From an energy standpoint, aeration of the wastewater in the secondary treatment
typically is the most intensive step, requiring about 50% of the total energy needs [173].
Typical literature values give an overall energy intensity of wastewater treatment of
0.6–0.7 kWh/m3(e.g., [1] [2] [135]). On the other hand, the energy content of sludge
figures at about 12–16 GJ/t of dry solids [174] – about half the energy content of coal,
which is on the order of 32 GJ/metric ton [175].
Wastewater to energy
The usefulness of sewage sludge as a source of energy, basic resources such as phophorus,
fertilizer pellets, or as a building material has received increasing attention in the last
years (see [176], [177]).
The conversion of sludge to energy as one option can take multiple pathways: it can be
digested by bacteria in anaerobic conditions to produce biogas as mentioned above, it
124 CHAPTER 7. INTERDEPENDENCIES OF WATER AND GREENHOUSE GAS PATHWAYS
can be incinerated in dry form, electricity can be produced directly in microbial fuel cells,
or it can be the starting point for the production of syngas41. In the following, we focus
on anaerobic digestion and subsequent biogas usage, being currently the most widely
spread form of energy recovery.
A 2004 article [174] put the sludge energy content in relation to the energy requirements
of a large municipal wastewater treatment plant and found that the potential energy in
the sludge exceeds energy requirements by more than a factor of nine. Obviously, not
all the energy can be transformed into usable form, but it is estimated that the energy
content of the produced biogas should still exceed energy needs by a factor of 3.5 – energy
self-sufficient treatment plants should therefore be possible after all. However, biogas is
still often flared and thus left unused in treatment plants [178].
A recent contribution describes how operational improvements combined with on-site
heat and power produciton from biogas can indeed make wastewater treatment plants
self-sufficient [173]. It discusses two Austrian plants that produced more electricity over
the course of a year than they consumed – one of the plants for example produced 214
kWh of electrical power per person over the course of one year; while the majority was
used on-site, overall 1.5 kWh were fed into the external grid.
Put in relation to the amount of treated wastewater, we estimated that the two plants
produced on average 0.27 kWh/m3, of which they required in 0.25 kWh/m3 internally.
The overall energy balance is thus a surplus of 0.02 kWh/m3.
If operated well and equipped with biogas recovery (or potentially some other form of
energy recovery), wastewater treatment plants should therefore not require the high
energy amounts mentioned at the outset of this section. To establish an optimistic point
of reference, we used the value of 0.02 kWh/m3 for the respective lever in China’s water
availability cost curve42.
7.2.2. Supply: seawater desalination
All data and information in this section, if not otherwise stated, are taken from the
Master thesis of Stefanos Angelousis [138] that was supervised in the context of this work.
The desalination industry is growing fast across the world, in particular in regions that
41A good overview of the different processes is for example given in [177].
42Please note that the value was not used for the industrial wastewater measure. The composition
of industrial wastewater can differ strongly from domestic wastewater, and has in general a lower
concentration of organic matter that defines the energy content, we assumed that industrial wastewater
treatment will require energy in the order of the literature values mentioned before (e.g., in [1], [2], [135])
if not otherwise stated in the respective case studies.
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have limited access to other water resources. The global desalination capacity increased
from close to zero around 1950 to more than 30 million m3 of freshwater per day, or 11
km3 annually in 2008 [179].
Desalination technologies
Three main technologies account for the bulk of the desalination market. Two of these
are based on thermal principles, i.e., the distilling of seawater to freshwater, while one is
based on the principle of reverse osmosis:
• Multi Stage Flash Distillation (MSF) works in a counter-current principle. Seawater
is pumped through a pipe that runs through compartments with increasing ambient
temperature. A final amount of heat is added to the seawater in the so-called brine
heater after all compartants have been passed. The flow direction then reverses,
and the sewater is pumped subsequently through the compartments thenselves43.
The compartments have pressures such that each temperature lies above the boiling
point of the seawater that passes through, which allows part of it to evaporate (or
“flash”) and condense on the (cooler) pipe that transports the incoming seawater.
The freshwater is then collected at the bottom of each compartment.
• Multi Effect Distillation (MED). Hot steam is piped through multiple compartments
that each have a seawater inflow. The seawater is sprayed into the compartments
where parts of it evaporate and condense on the hot steam pipes. The steam itself
looses part of its heat energy. Typical temperatures for the entering steam are
70◦C and 30–40◦C after the final stage.
Both thermal processes are robust, require little seawater pretreatment, and can be
coupled with facilities that produce surplus steam44, such as thermal power plants. In
this case, seawater desalination plants act as a heat sink and effectively cool the power
plant.
• Reverse Osmosis (RO). If two solutions with differing concentrations of the same
solvent are separated by a semipermeable membrane, water flows from the low-
concentration part to the high-concentration part until the concentrations are
43I.e., the first compartment is the hottest, but the still cooler than the entering seawater, due to the
presence of the final brine heater stage.
44Demands on steam “quality” are low: neither very high pressures nor temperatures are required –
MED for example works with steam temperatures of 70◦C, as mentioned above.
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levelled out. The resulting difference in pressure between the two parts is referred
to as osmotic pressure.
This process can be reversed if an external pressure larger than the osmotic pressure
is applied. Translated to desalination; this means that seawater is pressed at around
60 bar through special filters that retain the salt and thus produce freshwater.
Reverse Osmosis requires less energy than thermal processes and can react more
flexibly to demand changes. Material deterioration from corrosion and limescale
is smaller. On the negative side, it requires more extensive pretreatment of water
and cannot eliminate 100% of solvents – in contrast to thermal processes, where
the end product is (by definition) distilled water.
Energy requirements
Table 7.2.2 summarizes typical energy requirements for all three desalination processes.
For both MSF and MED, a stand-alone and co-location value is given, describing in the
first case the isolated operation of the desalination plant, and in the second the operation
in combination with a supplier of residual heat such as a thermal power plant. As reverse
osmosis only requires electrical power, a co-location will not be beneficial in energetic
terms.
Electrical Thermal
Technology kWhe/m
3 kWhth/m
3
MSF 4.3 76 46
MED 2.0 51 28
RO 4.5 0 0
Table 7.11.: Typical energy requirements for desalination processes. From [138]
for MSF and MED, [2] for RO.
7.2.3. Agriculture: no/reduced tillage
Reduced or no-tillage agriculture figures into both low-GHG and increased water avail-
ability pathways.
Essentially, reduced tillage means less intense ploughing of the ground and residual
biomass kept on the fields. As the name suggests, no tillage agriculture means that
planting takes place without disturbing the soil at all45.
45The information used in this section can for example be found in [180].
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Reduced/no tillage has multiple benefits. It reduces erosion, avoids the compaction of
soil through heavy tractors that plough the field, and retains higher amounts of water
and soil carbon in the ground – the latter is decomposed much faster in the case of
conventional tillage agriculture and released to the atmosphere as CO2. N2O emissions
can also be reduced, in the case of no-till agriculture by over 40% [181].
No-/reduced tillage requires equipment that allows to plant seeds through crop residue
or into undisturbed soil. Herbicide use increases in most cases and if not combined
with diversfied crop rotations or plant associations, as weeds growth is not controlled
mechanically through ploughing [182]. As evaporation rates decrease, drainage systems
might be needed to avoid in-field backwater in wetter climates.
[4] gives a 2030 GHG mitigation potential of up to 12.1 Mt CO2e for China from better
tillage management; [5] states a potential for increased water availability of 9,620 million
m3 (by 2030), i.e., the water–GHG intensity of tillage measures could be quantified at
almost 800 m3/tCO2e. In South Africa, potential GHG savings of 2.2 Mt CO2e face an
increase of water availability of 943 million m3, resulting in a water–GHG intensity of 430
m3/tCO2e
46. The two measures were integrated into one for both countries in this work,
as the underlying drivers such as the affected cultivated area correlated well between the
two sources.
7.3. GHG intensity curves of the water availability
options
This section summarizes the considerations on energy and greenhouse gas intensities of
the water availability options in GHG intensity curves.
These curves resemble in many ways the water availability cost curves of the previous
chapters (figures 4.1 and 4.3), but differ insofar as the they depict the GHG intensity of
a given measure instead of its full cost.
GHG intensity curve of China’s water availability options
Figure 7.9 shows the GHG intensity curve of the water availability options for China.
The x-axis gives the national cumulative water availability, as in the case of the original
cost curves, and the y-axis the GHG intensity – a negative intensity means that the
46The difference in water intensities can be driven by several factors. Crop mixes differ between the two
countries, and so does the split between irrigation and rain-fed agriculture.
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option effectively reduces GHG emissions with respect to the Business-as-Usual case.
The curve is sorted from lowest to highest GHG intensity.
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Figure 7.9.: GHG intensity curve of China’s water availability options.
The structure of the curve does not seem much different than than the original cost curve
(figure 4.1, p. 50) at first sight: it contains a mix of measures with negative and positive
GHG intensities. Looking more closely, it can be seen that municipal and agricultural
options are found in the left part, industrial options spread across the whole curve, and
supply-side options only on the right side of the curve.
Integrating the GHG intensity curve as represented in figure 7.9 gives a net savings
of greenhouse gases of 238 Mt CO2e, which means that the water mitigation options
discussed in [5] for China have in sum a reductive effect on GHG emissions47.
It is therefore clear that measures with negative GHG-intensity dominate: adding the
emissions from all GHG-reducing measures gives 298 Mt CO2e, versus 60 Mt CO2e from
the GHG-emitting measures.
The cost curve investigated in [5] is based on an ordering according to full mitigation
cost. If this ordering is followed here, and only the measures up to an incremental water
47Only to mention it again: our approach only considers GHG emissions from the operation of water
implementation options; potential emissions from the manufacturing, installation or “disposal” of a
measure are neglected here.
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availability of 201 km3 are considered48, integrated GHG savings are slightly higher, at
268 Mt CO2e. The fact that this number is higher than the savings of the whole curve
indicate that the more expensive measures (which were not required to close the national
gap in [5]) also tend to have a positive (i.e., an increasing) impact on GHG emissions.
All Least-cost closing
in Mt CO2e measures of water gap
Total 238 268
- Power + industry 217 245
- Municipal 19 14
- Agriculture 16 16
- Supply -14 -7
BAU emissions 16,700
Abatement case emissions 7,500
Table 7.12.: Total and sectoral split of the GHG impact of China’s water availabil-
ity options. Projected Business-as-Usual and Abatement Case GHG emissions
for 2030 are shown as reference.
Table 7.12 summarizes the GHG impacts for both cases and provides a sectoral split which
shows that the industry and power sector account for the majority of the GHG impact,
while municipal and agricultural measures account for only 5-7% and 6%, respectively;
supply measures in contrast have an in sum small elevating effect on GHG emissions.
The combined GHG impact of all measures to close the water gap makes up 1.6% of the
BAU and 3.6% of the abatement case, about the same order as a larger mitigation option
from the GHG abatement cost curve.
GHG intensity curve of South Africa’s water availability options
The GHG intensity curve for South Africa’s water availability options is shown in figure
7.10. The curve shows the same overall structure as its Chinese counterpart: a mixture
of industrial, agricultural and municipal measures dominates the left part, while the right
part is filled predominantly with supply measures.
One difference is the lack of industrial measures in the right part, and the overall lower
share of options with an elevating impact on GHG emissions, mainly driven by the fact
that industrial water reuse options and dry cooling, all part of China’s water availability
48See figure 4.1: 201 km3 are required to close China’s water gap in 2030, according to [5].
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options, play no role in South Africa according to [5]49.
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Figure 7.10.: GHG intensity curve of South Africa’s water availability options.
Options with an elevating effect on GHG emissions produce in sum 0.2 Mt CO2e of
additional GHG emissions annually, while GHG-savings measure have a reductive impact
of 5.1 Mt CO2e. The sum of all South African water availability options therefore reduces
GHG emissions by 4.9 Mt COee
Figure 4.3 (p. 53) indicated that the implementation of all measures is required in order
to close the water gap. Therefore, the numbers just mentioned also represent the GHG
impact for the original water availability cost curve – i.e., the implementation of the
proposed water availability pathway for South Africa, according to [5], would also save
GHG emissions.
Table 7.13 gives again the sectoral split of the GHG impact of the water availability
options, and puts it in perspective to the projected GHG emissions for South Africa’s
Business-as-Usual and Abatement Case, which shows that the GHG impact of its water
availability options is slightly smaller than in the China case, making up 0.6–1.1% of its
2030 GHG emissions.
49Dry cooling for example is already assumed to be part of South Africa’s Business-as-Usual case (see
table 7.7 that showed the water intensities of the avoided Business-as-Usual power mixes and the
discussion in section 7.1.3, page 110ff.).
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in Mt CO2e All measures
Total 4.9
- Power + industry 4.1
- Municipal 0.1
- Agriculture 0.9
- Supply -0.1
BAU emissions 789
Abatement case emissions 448
Table 7.13.: Total and sectoral split of the GHG impact of South Africa’s water
availability options, set in persective to its GHG emission BAU and Abatement
Case as reference.
Considerations
Figure 7.11.: Correlation between cost per water availability option and GHG
intensity.
Tables 7.12 and 7.13 showed that the largest GHG impact is exerted by water availability
options from power and industry50.
Many of these options have negative full cost, as the original water curves show. As
no intrinsic water price was considered in developing these curves, negative cost can
only arise from other operational savings, which are often related to energy – a water
50This is to some part of course related to the boundary conditions of this research, which neglect GHG
emissions from production and the “disposal” of abatement options, as well as more indirect effects
that might arise from the introduction of certain agronomy practices.
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availability option with negative full cost might therefore have the tendency to also reduce
GHG emissions.
Figure 7.11 plots full cost (as reported in [5]51) against the GHG intensity of the water
availability options from both countries. Even though far from perfect, a tendency
towards a correlation between low-cost and GHG savings can be observed52.
7.4. Water intensity curves of the GHG abatement
options
This section discusses the impact on water availability of GHG abatement options. The
local nature of water requires a more detailed approach: the water impact needs to be
broken down to the ten river basins and 19 Water Management Areas, which was based
on the findings discussed in section 7.1 (p. 101 ff.).
Water intensity curve of China’s abatement options
The left part of figure 7.12 shows the water intensity curve53 of China’s GHG abatement
options. The x-axis gives the cumulative GHG abatement potential54 as for the GHG
abatement cost curve (figure 4.6, page 59.), while the y-axis now shows the water intensity
for each option instead of the full cost – a negative value means that the particular
measure reduces water withdrawals with respect to the Business-as-Usual case, whereas
positive values indicate an increase in water requirements.
It can be seen that industrial mitigation options are found at the extremes of the water
intensity curve in figure 7.12, while all municipal options have a negative water intensity.
The middle of the curve is dominated by power-related options which see a particularly
interesting tranformation: while they mostly have a net full cost (i.e., they are more
51To be consistent with the original publication, we used the full cost as reported in [5] here and in the
rest of this chapter even though it assumes different cost of capital for the four sectors.
52Some “outlier” measures with very high/low GHG intensities were neglected for the sake of clear
arrangement. However, these typically fit into the general picture of figure 7.11, i.e., low cost correlate
with GHG savings and vice versa.
53In terms of withdrawals.
54The data underlying figure 7.12 lacks about 180 Mt CO2e abatement potential from the original GHG
cost curve, which gave 9.1 Gt CO2e (see figures 4.5, p. 58, and 4.6, p. 59’). This is due to the fact
that the data for our analysis was derived from [77], the latest update to [4], which only includes
measures with a cost of less than 100 EUR/CO2e; two measures, biomass co-firing in thermal power
plants and the equipment of gas-fired power plants with CCS, lie above this threshhold. This also
holds true for the South African case, reducing the abatement potential by 10 Mt CO2e there.
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Figure 7.12.: Water intensity curve of China’s GHG abatement options.
costly than the reference case), they have a negative water intensity and should thus
become more attractive if water intensities are taken into consideration – putting a price
on water would for example make these options relatively cheaper.
The right part of the curve is populated by biofuels55 and carbon capture and sequestration
(CCS) technologies. Interestingly, both technologies are occasionally mentioned as priority
options for reducing GHG emissions across the world.
Small hydro plants are at the very left of the water intensity curve, as we credited the
water availability gains from the hydro dam option against it – i.e., small hydro plants
are assumed to be built in dams, yielding a very high water availability per ton of CO2e
saved, which offsets the evaporative losses that were equally considered.
Integrating the curve shows that the implementation of all GHG abatement options
increases water availability in China by about 41 km3, 20% of the national gap.
Table 7.14 gives an overview how these water availability increases split between sectors:
the power sector contributes the majority, 34 km3, followed by energy efficiency measures
that indirectly save water through the reduced consumption of electric power in industry,
55Water requirements for irrigation are included in biofuel water intensities – see section 7.1, page 101ff.
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transportation and the municipal sector. The agriculture + forestry sector in contrast is
a net user of water, driven mainly by the water requirements for biofuels.
in km3 All measures
- Power 34
- Industry 17
- Municipal 5
- Agriculture + Forestry -22
- Transport 7
Total 41
Water gap 201
Table 7.14.: Total and sectoral split of the water availability impact of China’s
GHG abatement options (positive numbers: net increase in water availability).
The national water gap as stated in [5] is given as reference.
The right part of figure 7.12 shows how the overall savings are split across the ten
river basins: the water balance in all but the South East basin would benefit from the
implementation of all GHG measures, with the by far strongest benefits in the Yangtze
basin, for two reasons: first, the Yangtze basin is the largest in terms of population and
size56; second, the water intensity of the avoided power mixes is highest there, as table 7.7
(page 114) showed – any GHG abatement option that reduces power production from the
conventional power mix therefore reduces water withdrawals more than in other basins.
The sectoral split of table 7.14 generally holds true for most basins: with the exception
of the South East and South West, power accounts for the bulk, or 48–73% of savings,
and seems to correlate strongest with the water intensity of the avoided power mix. It
is followed by the buildings sector, which accounts for 4–15% of savings, depending on
the share of population in a basin, and industry, with 3–35% of water savings, which
depends on the size and sectoral composition of the industrial base in a basin57.
China’s South East basin has two particularities: first, the fact that many coal fired
plants are (or planned to be) sea cooled results in a low water intensity of the avoided
power mix – power measures make up only 10% here, and the water availability increases
56The Yangtze basin is home to 34% of China’s population and has 24% of the arable land [93] (2010).
57Water withdrawals per basin were taken from [5] for the industry sectors distinguished in the GHG
abatement options (petro & oil, chemicals, steel, cement and the accumulative GHG abatement
option “other industry”) – water savings from GHG measures in these sectors were distributed across
basins on this basis.
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from energy efficiency measures are therefore also smaller than in other basins. Second,
the basin might become a major producer of energy crops for biofuels according to the
sources studied here, pushing the water balance to the negative.
Power measures in contrast make up 99% of the sparsely populated, mountaineous South
West basin58 – driven by a large potential for hydro power that has, as discussed, the
double-benefit of offsetting coal-fired plants and increasing water availability through the
concurrent building of hydro dams59.
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Figure 7.13.: Water intensity of South Africa’s GHG abatement cost curve.
Water intensity curve of South Africa’s GHG abatement options
The left part of figure 7.13 gives the water intensities of South Africa’s GHG abatement
options. The overall picture is similar to the China case: the left and right ends of
58According to the FAO [93] (2010), the South West is home to less than 2% of the population and has
less than 2% of the arable land.
59A map of China’s planned hydropower dams, for example provided by [183], also confirms a large
concentration in the South West basin.
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the curve are populated by hydro power on the one and biofuels (CCS plays a smaller
role than in China) on the other side. Power measures – from wind over photovoltaics
to nuclear – account for most of the savings between 30 Mt CO2e and 170 Mt CO2e.
Concentrationg solar power (CSP) is an exception here and is indeed one of the most
water intensive of GHG abatement options60.
The implementation of all GHG abatement option would increase water availability in
South Africa by 1,128 million m3, 38% of the national water gap, comparable to the
China case.
Table 7.15 shows how these savings split across sectors: savings from power account for
the largest part, followed by municipal, industry and transport measures, much as in the
case of China. Agriculture & forestry again exerts a negative effect on water availability,
driven by the planting of energy crops.
in million m3 All measures
- Power 1,989
- Industry 59
- Municipal 79
- Transport 531
- Agriculture + Forestry -1,532
Total 1,128
Water gap 2,970
Table 7.15.: Total and sectoral split of the water impact of South Africa’s GHG
abatement options (positive numbers: net increase of water availability). The
national water gap is given as reference.
It was already mentioned that the regional granularity provided by 19 Water Management
Areas (WMAs) in South Africa is higher than for China, where most of the ten river
basin are larger in terms of population, GDP and land area than the whole of South
Africa. This fine segmentation should therefore yield more information on the impact of
structural differences between WMAs.
The right part of figure 7.13 shows how the 1,128 million m3 of increased water availability
split across the 19 Water Management Areas (WMAs), which already highlights larger
difference between WMAs than between the ten Chinese river basins (compare to the
right part of figure 7.12).
60The avoided power plant mix, which includes a large share of air-cooled coal power plants, has a lower
water intensity than CSP that is assumed to be wet-cooled (air-cooling would inflict considerable
efficiency penalties). See also tables 6.2 (page 85) and 7.7 (page 114).
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Figure 7.14.: Distribution of industrial activities across South Africa.
The distribution of industrial activities across South Africa is given in figure 7.14: it can
be seen that a high share of the power generation and mining activity is concentrated in
the north-eastern WMAs of Olifants, Upper Vaal, i.e., around the Johannesburg-Pretoria
area, and stretches towards the Indian Ocean. Manufacturing activity can be found there,
in the Durban area (WMA Thukela), and further along the coast, around Port Elizabeth
(WMA Fish-Tsitsikamma) and Cape Town (WMA Berg). This activity, in combination
with the assumption that population densities and commerce can be expected to reach
equally high levels in these WMAs, might be an explanation for the fact that they figure
among those with the highest projected water gaps for 2030, as figure 7.14 also shows.
The water impact of options that reduce power demand is linked to areas with power plant
capacities or industrial activity. An implementation of GHG abatement options should
therefore increase water availability particularly in WMAs that will likely experience a
large water gap by 2030 – which links back to the right part of figure 7.13:
• WMAs with high industrial activities figure among those with the highest water
savings from GHG abatement options, among them Olifants, Upper Vaal, Thukela.
• High water savings were also found in the mountaineous WMAs along the coast,
Myoti to Umzimkulu, Mzimvubu-Keiskamma or Olifants/Doring. These WMAs
have a high potential for new or upgraded hydro dams61.
61The small hydro power (GHG curve) and hydro dam (water availability curve) options were merged
into one option for South Africa, as was already the case for China.
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three of South Africa’s Water Management Areas.
Figure 7.15 shows the sectoral split of the water availability impact of GHG abatement
options at the example of three WMAs. The water balance of the WMA Olifants, which
is home to a large share of South Africa’s conventional power plant fleet and also covers a
large part of the Johannesburg-Pretoria region, benefits from increased efforts in energy
efficiency and a shift towards alternative power sources across South Africa – reflected in
the high savings from the power, industry and buildings/domestic sectors.
In contrast, the Limpopo WMA might become one of the main growing areas for energy
crops, resulting in an overally negative impact on water resources62.
The impact on water balance in the third WMA, Fish-Tsitsikamma, is again dominated
by power, albeit in different ways than the Olifants WMA: being the potential site of a
new nuclear power plant, this negative impact (-21 million m3) competes with increased
availability from hydro dams installed in the coastal ridge.
7.5. Considerations towards an integrated approach
The last two sections showed that both GHG abatement and water availability options
have in sum a positive impact on the other resource. This is already an indication
that costs should indeed decrease in an integrated approach towards water and GHG
mitigation.
62The positive effect of transportation arises from the same logic: transportation measures build on
increased motor efficiency. Their implementation reduces gasoline, but also biofuel demand, reliefing
again stress in the Limpopo region.
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Figure 7.16 shows a matrix with GHG abatement/water availability options that have
the strongest impact on the other “resource” at the example of South Africa. Of the six
measures in the upper-right corner, i.e., that save both water and GHG emissions, all but
wind and solar PV have negative cost. Furthermore, figure 7.11 indicated a correlation
between full cost63 and GHG emissions for water availability options: those that result
in higher emissions more often than not also have above-average full cost, and should
therefore be among the first ones to become obsolete in a cost-minimization approach, if
GHG abatement options already close part of the water gap.
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Figure 7.16.: GHG abatement and water availability options with largest positive
or negative impact on the other “resource” (in t CO22e/m
3 or m3/t CO22e).
63We refer here to the full cost as given in equation (6.1). The argument also holds true for integrated
cost, which is basically the discounted sum of the full cost.
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8. Integrated modeling of water and
greenhouse gas mitigation pathways
This chapter finally integrates all mitigation options into one model. It will eventually
show that an integrated view does indeed save resources – or achieve higher mitigation
targets with the same resources.
The chapter chapter sets out with a description of the considered scenarios. It then
discusses those scenarios whose objective was to minimize cost at given water and
GHG abatement targets, to afterwards discuss those where the goal was to maximize
water/GHG savings at given investment levels.
8.1. Overview of scenarios
While a multitude of potential scenarios could be studied, this work focused on two
principle optimization problems:
Minimization of cost. Following the two original reports, it was first investigated how a
GHG abatement and water availability target can be achieved at minimal cost. Considered
cost terms were full cost, the main focus of [4] and [5]1, and integrated cost2.
The benefits of an integrated approach can come from a “simple” cross-accounting of
water and GHG benefits and the omission of the most expensive mitigation options while
maintaining the merit order of the original cost curves, and from a real integrated view;
the considered scenarios help to assess both effects:
• Scenario 1 adds up the water and GHG curves in terms of cost3, increased water
availability and GHG abatement. It assumes that each curve fulfills its target
independently.
1Please refer to equation (6.1) for a definition of full cost.
2I.e., integrated cost 2010–2030, discounted to 2030. See section 6.5.2 (page 89) and appendix E for
definitions.
3The cost of capital in both original sources [4] [5] were harmonized beforehand.
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• Scenario 2 takes a two-tier approach. It assumes that the water impacts from those
GHG abatement options implemented to achieve the emission abatement target
are accounted for in the water pathway. This allows to assess the cross-accounting
effect mentioned above: assumed that the GHG options increase water availability
in sum, less water availability options will be needed. Water and GHG options are
however still optimized independently.
• Scenarios 3 finally integrates water and GHG options and optimizes the solution
mix under consideration of both cost and cross-intensities for each option. The
(cost) delta to scenario 2 allows to assess the benefit of an integrated approach
(versus cross-accounting).
Maximization of water/GHG savings. Policies and development pathways are often
constrained by budgets. A second class of scenarios therefore has the objective to
maximize GHG emissions savings or water availability under the constraint of fixed
investments. We chose integrated investments 2010-2030 as a boundary condition here,
for it can serve as a proxy for the financial requirements a society has to raise4.
Scenario China South Africa
1 Achieve water and GHG targets independently and add up cost
2 As 1 + water impact of GHG options accounted for in water pathway
3a Linear optimization: minimize integrated cost
3b Lin. opt.: as 3a, but minimize full cost in 2030
4 Minimize integrated cost without
agriculture & forestry
5 Maximize water/GHG savings under fixed investments
Table 8.1.: Scenarios considered in this chapter. See chapter 6 for a definition
of the cost parameters.
8.1.1. GHG and water availability targets in the scenarios
Chapters 3 and 4 discussed possible “Business-as-Usual” projections for GHG emissions
and water demand in China and South Africa as well as respective Abatement Cases.
4Integrated cost or full cost in contrast also include operational savings that might only materialize
after the measure has been implemented. An in these terms beneficial measure can still require, and
might be impeded by, large upfront investment needs.
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It was shown in this context that the water/GHG targets implied by the cost curves
(from [4] and [5]) are consistent with other data sources.
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Figure 8.1.: GHG abatement and water availability targets used in this chapter.
The water gaps proposed in [5] were therefore adopted without change for scenarios 1–4,
but some adjustments were made to the GHG abatement targets:
• For China, we chose a 2030 abatement target of 8.0 Gt CO2e with respect to the
reference case, i.e., 1.1 Gt CO2e lower than the maximum potential of the cost
curve, and closer to the abatement potentials in other reports [20] [116] [127].
• For South Africa, an abatement target of 325 Mt CO2e was used, slightly lower
than the maximum potential of 341 Mt CO2e. This adjustment was primarily made
to give the linear model more flexibility in chosing the optimal mix and therefore
increase stability and reliability of the solution5.
5This avoids that “extreme” measures (in terms of cost or cross-intensities) need to be included in the
solution mix.
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8.2. Scenarios 1–4: integrating water and GHG at
minimal cost
8.2.1. Scenario 1. Water and GHG added up
This scenario is in principle just the sum of the water availability and GHG abatement
cost curves given the targets from figure 8.1. Some adjustments have however been made
to the mitigation options, notably a split of the 2010–2030 potentials (and cost) into two
decades (2010–2020 and 2020–2030), and a harmonization of the cost of capital to 4%.
Furthermore, the key metric are the integrated cost 2010–2030, a different solution mix
than in the original reports can therefore be expected.
Water availability increases and GHG emission reductions can be summarized as follows:
GHG emissions. The GHG abatement targets were overachieved in both China and
South Africa. This comes at little surprise, as the two curves were optimized independently,
requiring the GHG options to reach their target stand-alone; the (reductive) GHG impact
of the water availability options is then added to the already fulfilled target. Table 8.2
summarizes the GHG abatement: both China and South Africa overshoot their GHG
abatement target by about 2%.
China South Africa
Mt CO2e Mt CO2e
- Water measures 185 8
- GHG measures 8,000 325
Total 8,186 333
Target 8,000 325
Table 8.2.: GHG savings in scenario 1.
Water availability. The water intensity curves of the GHG abatement options (figures
7.12, p.133 and 7.13, p.135.) in the last chapter showed that the water impact of GHG
measures on basin/WMA level can either be positive or negative. Some basins will
therefore overachieve their water target in that setting, while others, where the sum of
the available water availability options just sufficed to close the projected water gap and
the water availability from the GHG measures is negative might come to the point that
the gap cannot be closed at all.
Figure 8.2 shows that the sum of water savings from water and GHG mitigation options
indeed leads to an overachieving in some basins/WMAs, while the gap cannot be closed
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ability of water and GHG abatement options realized under given constraints.
Basins/WMAs with a remaining gap are marked in red.
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in others, particularly in those with a negative water impact from GHG options6.
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Figure 8.3.: Scenario 1: water impact of all measures in China’s Yangtze basin
and South Africa’s Luvuvhu/Letaba WMA. As GHG measures that also save
water predominate in the Yangtze basin, the water availability target is over-
achieved. In the Luvuvhu/Letaba WMA, energy crops for biofuel production lead
to a widening of the water gap – the available water availability options cannot
compensate for this.
These considerations lead to one key outcome of this scenario:
Implementing the water availability and GHG abatement pathways independently leads
to an overachievement of GHG targets, but does not resolve water availability shortages
in all basins/WMAs.
6However, not all basins/WMAs with a negative water impact from GHG options have a remaining
water gap in this scenario: in South Africa’s Crocodile West/Marico, Middle and Lower Vaal WMAs
for example, the negative impact of GHG options is (over-)compensated by the fact that more water
availavility options than necessary for closing the gap were implemented in the first place. This
happened because they all had negative integrated cost, i.e., the integrated operational savings
exceeded investments, and were therefore chosen by the optimization tool despite no remaining water
gap.
146
CHAPTER 8. INTEGRATED MODELING OF WATER AND GREENHOUSE GAS MITIGATION
PATHWAYS
The discrepancies between basins that overachieve their water target and those with
a remaining water gap are illustrated at two examples in figure 8.3. The water avail-
ability options at hand suffice to close the gaps in both the Yangtze basin and the
Luvuvhu/Letaba WMA. Additional water savings arise in both regions from the power
sector, industry and domestic sector. The difference stems from agriculture: the Yangtze
basin has less (relative) potential for irrigated energy crops than the Luvuvhu/Letaba
WMA, where the implementation of all measures leads to a residual water gap.
Int. cost Investments Cost in 2030
USD billion USD billion USD billion
China 1,269 3,637 -5
- Water measures -4 212 -9
- GHG measures 1,273 3,425 4
South Africa 64.2 184.9 -7.4
- Water measures -5.1 2.9 -0.7
- GHG measures 69.2 182.0 -6.7
Table 8.3.: Cost figures from scenario 1.
Table 8.3 summarizes the financial implications of the first scenario:
The GHG abatement options require the larger part of investments and integrated cost in
both countries – they for example account for 94% of investments in China, and 98% in
South Africa. One explanation for this might be differing solution mixes: the GHG part
generally involves technologically more advanced measures that require high investments,
while increased water availability relies to a larger part on less investment-intensive
agricultural or domestic measures7.
To put these cost numbers into perspective: China’s cumulated GDP 2010–2030 is
projected to be about USD 170,000 billion, and USD 9,500 billion for South Africa8 [108].
The integrated cost/investments according to table 8.3 therefore make up 0.7%/2.1% of
China’s and 0.7%/1.9% of South Africa’s cumulated GDP.
Looking more specifically at investments, China’s cumulated 2011–2030 investments
are estimated at USD 82,000 billion, and South Africa’s gross domestic investment at
USD 2.200 billion according to the same source9 – investments in water–GHG pathways
7As indicated in the original cost curves; see figures 4.1 (p. 50), 4.3 (p. 53) for the water availability
curves and figures 4.6 (p. 59), 4.8 (p. 61) for the GHG curves as given in [5] and [4] [77].
8Figures 3.2 (page 31), and 3.7 (page 40) gave 2010 and 2030 real GDP for both countries. Cumulated
GDP is the 2011–2030 sum of the yearly real GDP forecasts from [108].
9In real 2005 terms.
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according to table 8.3 therefore make up between 4% (China) and 8% (South Africa) of
overall investments over that period.
8.2.2. Scenario 2. Cross-accounting of water savings from GHG
measures
The GHG solution mix of this scenario is the same as in scenario 1 given the still
independent modeling approach. The water availability options solution mix is however
different, as the initial basin/WMA water gaps were adjusted so that they reflect the
water impact of the GHG solution mix.
The overall GHG savings, shown in table 8.4, differ little from scenario 1, as the
(unchanged) GHG abatement option mix already achieves the abatement target, and
the GHG impact of the realized water availability options adds further savings which
however differ from table 8.2
China South Africa
Mt CO2e Mt CO2e
- Water measures 188 7
- GHG measures 8,000 325
Total 8,188 332
Target 8,000 325
Table 8.4.: GHG savings in scenario 2.
Figure 8.4 contrasts the original water gaps with the new gaps after accounting for the
impact of the GHG measures. The blue bars, which represent the increase in water
availability from the water options only, show that the cross-accounting allows for a more
precise closing of the water gaps. Still, not all water gaps are closed, as the basin/WMAs
marked in red show: the negative water impact of the GHG measures was in particular
too large in those basins with high energy crop potential to be compensated by the
available water options.
The benefits of the cross-accounting can best be studied at the example of a basin/WMA
that experienced a strong overfulfillment of the water gap in scenario 1, such as South
Africa’s Olifants WMA (figure 8.5):
• In scenario 1, the sum of all water measures would have closed the water gap of
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Figure 8.4.: Scenario 2: basin/WMA water gaps after accounting for the water
impact of GHG measures, contrasted with the increase in water availability from
the water availability options. Basins/WMAs with a remaining gap are marked
in red.
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Scenario 1 Scenario 2
Figure 8.5.: Scenario 1 and 2 in comparison at the example of South Africa’s
Olifants WMA: summing up of all water availability increases results in an
overachievement (left part). Accounting for water savings from GHG options
before closing the remaining water gap (right part) avoids this.
541 million m3 alone, but GHG abatement options increased water availability by
further 258 million m3.
• In scenario 2, the effective water gap for the water measures was reduced to 283
million m3 (541 less 258), under the assumption that the GHG measures cover the
remaining 258 million m3. The sum of all measures now matches the water gap.
Cost parameters for scenario 2 are shown in table 8.5. Integrated cost decreased by 10%
in China and 1% (South Africa) compared to scenario 1. As it was not the objective
of the optimization, the decrease in investments is lower, 1.4% for China and 0.5% for
South Africa10.
The difference in cost decrease can be explained by the fact that GHG measures have a
positive impact on water balances in all but one of China’s basins – less potential from
10The cost figures for the GHG abatement solution mix has not changed with respect to scenario 1.
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Integrated cost Investments Cost in 2030
USD billion USD billion USD billion
China 1,137 3,586 -12
- Water measures -136 161 -16
- GHG measures 1,273 3,425 4
South Africa 63.6 184.1 -7.4
- Water measures -5.6 2.0 -0.7
- GHG measures 69.2 182.0 -6.7
Table 8.5.: Integrated cost, investments and full cost of scenario 2.
water availability options is therefore required in scenario 2 (compared to scenario 1);
only China’s South East basin has the adverse impact. However, the water measure
potential in the basin was already exhausted in scenario 1, so that no further is left to
close the (now larger) water gap in scenario 2.
In South Africa, four out of 19 WMAs experience a negative impact on water balances
from GHG mititgation options (see figure 8.2, page 144). In all, the water savings
potential from water availability options could indeed be increased between the two
scenarios (compare figures 8.2 and 8.4). This closes the water gap in two them, but
offsets cost reductions in other WMAs, leading in sum to smaller savings than in the
China case.
8.2.3. Scenario 3. Integrated approach
These scenarios finally integrate all GHG and water mitigation options into one model
and optimize the solution mix according to the logic described in section 6.6 (p.92 ff.);
scenario 3a minimizes for integrated cost, while scenario 3b minimizes the full cost in
2030.
3a. Minimization of integrated cost
The GHG savings in table 8.6 shows that abatement targets are now exactly hit by
the combination of water and GHG mititgation options11.
A similar picture can be drawn for water availability. Figure 8.6 shows that the
integration of water and GHG mititgation options allows to close the water gaps in all
11See for comparison tables 8.3 (scenario 1) and 8.5 (scenario 2): the GHG target is achieved by the
GHG measures alone, with water measures adding further emission reductions on top.
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Figure 8.6.: Scenario 3: again the original basin/WMA water gaps, contrasted
with the water impact of both water availability and GHG abatement options in
an integrated approach.
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China South Africa
Mt CO2e Mt CO2e
- Water measures 190 7
- GHG measures 7,810 318
Total 8,000 325
Target 8,000 325
Table 8.6.: GHG savings in scenario 3a.
basins/WMAs, and overachievings are at first glance smaller. All basins/WMAs that
still overfullfill their water gap do so “on purpose”, as the integrated water potential of
all cost-negative options is larger than the water gap12.
Unit China S. Africa
Water savings from GHG options
- total million m3 58,897 1,209
- of which power-related million m3 36,335 147
- power related in percent % 62% 12%
GHG savings from water options
- total Mt CO2e 190 7
- of which power-related Mt CO2e 176 3
- power related in percent % 93% 48%
Table 8.7.: Contribution of power-related measures to the water impact of GHG
measures and the GHG impact of water measures, respectively.
The role of the power sector
A hypothesis from the last chapter was that the strength of the water-GHG interdepen-
dencies is largely influenced by the power sector and the fact that most GHG or water
mitigation options with a positive impact on the other resource were related to energy
efficiency or renewable power generation.
Table 8.7 gives the water (GHG) impact of GHG (water) mitigation options and shows
the share of the impact that is directly related to power generation in scenario 313.
12Cost-negative options in terms of integrated cost – as the objective function is to minimize integrated
cost, these measures will be implemented by the model no matter what the actual water target is.
13This includes the water impact from all alternative power generation technologies such as wind, solar,
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The majority of cross-intensities in China can indeed be attributed to power related
measures, while the share is markedly lower for South Africa. An explanation for this
can be found with a look back to table 7.7 (page 114) that gives the water intensities for
avoided power mixes: these are higher in China’s largest basins (such as the Yangtze,
Hai, or Song) than in South Africa’s main WMAs (Limpopo, Olifants, Upper Vaal) – an
energy efficiency measure will therefore have a proportionately stronger impact on water
resources in China.
Omission of options between scenarios 2 and 3 – China example
The high-cost “end” of China’s water availability cost curve is dominated by supply and
municipal options (see figure 4.1, page 50). Of these, supply-side options mostly have
negligible GHG impacts (within the boundaries of this work), while options from the
municipal sphere do have a positive GHG impact, but their resource savings come at
comparatively high cost: a new toilet requires integrated cost of USD 15, and saves 0.8
kg CO2e (in the case of China) per cubic meter of incremental water availability. Dry
quenching of coke, an industrial process, saves in contrast USD 30 and 2.7 kg CO2e per
cubic meter.
In the case of China’s GHG abatement cost curve, CCS-related options dominate the
high-cost end (see figure 4.6, page 59), which have to the most part a negative impact on
water balances.
These options are reduced the most from scenario 2 to scenario 3: omission of CCS
abatement options leads to a drop in the integrated cost 2010–2030 for industrial GHG
measures drop from USD 12 billion in scenario 2 to USD -110 billion in scenario 3. Similar
reduction can be observed for municipal (USD -2 bn → USD -9 bn) and supply (USD
124 bn → USD 115 bn) water availability options. Changes in most other sectors are
negligible in comparison: integrated cost in power, agriculture and transport decreased
by a combined USD 37 billion across both water and GHG measures.
Table 8.8 summarizes the cost parameters for scenario 3: integrated cost are in sum 14%
(China) and 3.4% (South Africa) lower than in scenario 2 (and 23%/4.3% lower than in
scenario 1), while investments decrease by 6% (China) and 5% (South Africa).
3b. Minimization of cost in 2030
As the original curves studied the full cost in 2030, it might be worthwhile to investigate
how the integrated solution mix changes if optimized along this parameter.
biomass, plus that share of water savings from energy efficiency measures that can be attributed to
reduced power consumption. Conversely, for water availability options, it includes the share of GHG
savings that can attributed to power savings or cleaner, alternative forms of power generation.
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Integrated cost Investments Cost in 2030
USD billion USD billion USD billion
China 975 3,385 -8
- Water measures -153 155 -17
- GHG measures 1,128 3,230 10
South Africa 61.4 175.3 -7.0
- Water measures -5.2 1.7 -0.6
- GHG measures 66.7 173.7 -6.4
Table 8.8.: Integrated cost, investments and full cost in scenario 3a.
China South Africa
Mt CO2e Mt CO2e
- Water measures 130 7
- GHG measures 7,870 318
Total 8,000 325
Target 8,000 325
Table 8.9.: GHG savings in scenario 3b (minimization for full cost in 2030).
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To summarize, all boundary conditions are met in this scenario, i.e., all water gaps can
be closed, and the GHG abatement targets are met in the same way as was the case for
scenario 3a (see table 8.6).
Integrated cost Investments Cost in 2030
USD billion USD billion USD billion
China 2,839 5,126 -31
- Water measures 174 243 0
- GHG measures 2,665 4,883 -31
South Africa 78 199 -8
- Water measures -4 2 -1
- GHG measures 78 197 -7
Table 8.10.: Integrated cost, investments and full cost of scenario 3b, minimiza-
tion for cost in 2030.
The differing objective function can be expected to lead to a change in the cost figures
compared to scenario 3a. Table 8.10 shows that the integrated cost for both China and
South Africa are higher than in the preceeding scenario, whereas cost in 2030 are – not
suprisingly – lowest.
An interesting difference between scenarios 3a and 3b is that the minimization of integrated
cost 2010–2030, versus cost in 2030, leads to a push of measures from the first to the
second decade: it can be cheaper from an integrated cost standpoint to avoid the
implementation of technologies with cost above the reference case in the first decade, as
they would need to be financed over two decades, and instead build a larger share of
more expensive technologies (such as CCS) in the second decade that need to be paid for
only in one decade14.
Table 8.11 shows the GHG emission reduction and water availability increases after one
decade at the example of China – as expected, both values are lower if the optimization
is for integrated cost than for cost in 2030.
In particular, the realized potential of expensive CCS technologies increased by more
than 700 Mt CO2e (all built after 2020) between scenario 3b and 3a, while for example
the potential of photovoltaic before 2020 droped by more than 100 Mt CO2e.
This cost consideration is of course only one aspect of a wider problem:
14This argumentation builds on the assumption that it is impossible to scale up the two-decade potential
of a measure in one decade.
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GHG savings Incr. water av.
Mt CO2e km
3
3a Min. for integrated cost 2,500 104.9
3b Min. for cost in 2030 2,960 107.5
Table 8.11.: Comparison of 2020 GHG and water savings in scenarios 3a and
3b.
While it makes sense to optimize an implementation process such that targets are hit in
time and not much in advance, stakeholders need to realize that the later they start, the
more they need to rely on measures that are then more expensive, riskier, or less easy to
implement.
8.2.4. Scenario 4. Integrated approach (infrastructure only)
The scenarios discussed so far assumed that the whole set of mitigation options is at
disposal.
A variety of factors might however lead to the situation that certain options face in fact
high barriers to implementation. These are for example those options that cannot be
decided upon easily by a small group of stakeholders, but rather require the rethinking
of millions of people and their access to adequate financing.
Most agricultural mitigation options certainly fall into this category. It seemed therefore
interesting to study a scenario into which all agriculture and forestry measures are
excluded. The analysis was perfomred at the example of China, and the objective was
again to minimize integrated cost.
The GHG abatement target of 8 Gt CO2e can be achieved in this configuration – this is
plausible, as agricultural measures make up less than 0.7 Gt CO2e of the total potential
from all GHG options of 9.1 Gt CO2e.
Agriculture and forestry options however account for 28% of the water availability
potential. Figure 8.7 contrasts the realized increases in basin water availability with the
respective water gaps and shows that, by excluding agriculture and forestry options, the
potential of the remaining water and GHG mitigation options does not suffice to close
the water gap in four out of eight basins with a projected deficit (in 2030).
Moreover, the achieved water and GHG savings are more costly than in previous scenarios.
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Figure 8.7.: Scenario 4 – excluding agriculture & forestry options: basin water
gaps and the water impact of both water availability and GHG abatement options
under an integrated modeling approach. Basins whose water gap could not be
closed are marked in red.
Table 8.12 shows that all cost paramaters are higher than in scenarios 1–315, with
investments for example being 36% higher than in scenario 3a.
The lessons from this scenario are perhaps as follows: it is important for a decsision
maker such as a government to get all relevant stakeholders involved and committed, and
align on the cheapest or most practical solution mix. An integrated pathway can then
further reduce cost or stress on resources, but can hardly outweigh the “loss” of important
mitigation options.
8.2.5. Summary of scenarios 1–4
Figure 8.8 summarizes all cost parameters and gives the average water/CO2e cost on a
per cubic meter/ton basis for scenarios 1–416.
15With the exception of scenario 3b, which however had a different objective function (minimization of
full in 2030 cost, instead of integrated cost).
16The water (CO2e) cost were calculated by dividing the integrated cost 2010–2030 of the implemented
water (GHG abatement) options by the integrated water (GHG) savings of all measures. This method
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Integrated cost Investments Cost in 2030
USD billion USD billion USD billion
China 2,382 4,610 15
- Water measures 15 200 -7
- GHG measures 2,367 4,411 22
Table 8.12.: Integrated cost, investments and full cost of scenario 4.
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Figure 8.8.: Comparison of integrated cost, investments, and associated mitiga-
tion cost for water and CO2e for scenarios 1–4.
As can be seen, the cost figures clearly decrease from scenario 1 to scenario 3 – integrated
cost in scenario 3 are for example a full 23% lower for China, and 4% for South Africa.
It can furthermore be expected that the cost in figure 8.8 are in line with those mentioned
in the original reports [4] [5]:
• The cost figures for water measures in China (South Africa), between -7 and -17
has the drawback of using once a subset (cost) and once all measures (resource savings) for the
calculation. Alternatives are the division of integrated cost of all measures by total water/GHG
savings, which however results in making GHG measures relatively cheaper at the expense of water
measures. As disscussed before, the original reports [4] [5] follow a third logic and divide the full cost
of one year by the water/GHG savings (of that year). This gives a snapshot, but does not say what
cost are in other years.
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USD billion (-0.6 to -0.7 USD bn. for South Africa), are in the same order as
the -21 (-0.2) USD billion reported in [5]17. The remaining difference arise from
the discussed change in cost of capital and a different approach to basins with a
projected surplus in 203018.
• Cost for GHG measures in China (South Africa) of 4 – 22 (-6.4 to -6.7) USD
billion in figure 8.8 compare to 62 (3) USD bn. in [4] [77]; the lower values in our
analysis are related to changes in GHG abatement targets (remember that China’s
USD 62 billion corresponded to GHG savings of 9.1 Gt CO2e, compared to our
target of 8.0 Gt CO2e).
Costs set in perspective
Unit China S. Africa
Cumulated GDP 2010 – ’30 USD billion 170,000 9,500
Integrated cost USD billion 975 – 2,380 62 – 64
in % of GDP 0.6 – 1.4% 0.7%
Investments USD billion 3,390 – 4,610 175 – 185
in % of GDP 2.0 – 2.7% 1.8 – 1.9%
Table 8.13.: 2010–2030 integrated investments, integrated cost and GDP in per-
spective. Numbers for China cover scenarios 1–4, for South Africa scenarios
1–3.
As the informative value of unrelated cost figures is rather small, table 8.13 puts cumulated
investments and integrated cost in perspective to GDP projections for China and South
Africa. In both countries, integrated cost19 are on the order of 1%, and investments
about 2–3% of GDP, with the bulk of these cost related to GHG abatement options (see
figure 8.8). The following paragraphs therefore mainly aim to set the cost of the GHG
abatement options in perspective.
An alternative GHG abatement cost curve for China [127] estimates investments for a
low carbon pathway at 3,000 – 4,000 USD billion between 2010 and 2030. For 2030, the
17See figures 4.1, page 50, and 4.3, page 53.
18Our linear optimization model implements all options with negative cost, independent of an existing
water gap; integrated cost and cost in 2030 are thus lower than in [5], which implemented only those
options necessary to close the gaps.
19Please note (yet again) that all cost figures are incremental to the reference case - i.e., the cost in
figure 8.8 are on top of what is required in a Business-as-Usual scenario.
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report states that this represents 1.5–2.5% of China’s GDP20, in good agreement with
our data.
According to the 2010 World Energy Outlook [20], China accounts for 30% of the global
GHG emissions reduction potential towards atmospheric CO2 concentrations of 450
ppm21. This scenario is estimated to require global investments of USD 11.4 trillion
between 2010 and 2030 – China would then need to invest USD 3.4 trillion if these were
split on a pro-rata basis, in good agreement with table 8.1322.
Lastly, South Africa’s Long Term Mitigation Scenario report [110] gives total cost (which
can best be compared to our integrated cost) for low-carbon pathways as a percentage
of GDP: the Scale-Up scenario achieves 2030 GHG savings of about 300 Mt CO2e
and requires incremental cost of 0.77% of GDP23, while the Use the Market scenario,
mitigating about 400 Mt CO2e until 2030, increases cost by 0.11% of GDP
24. These
numbers again agree with our data from table 8.13.
IPCC China S. Africa
Baseline emissions, Gt CO2e 68 16.7 0.8
Economic pot. @ USD 100/tonne, Gt CO2e 16 – 31 7.0 0.3
- % of baseline emissions 23 – 46% 42% 35%
Table 8.14.: Abatement potential of GHG mitigation options with full cost of less
than USD 100/tonne according to the IPCC report [184] and the solution mixes
of scenario 3a for China and South Africa.
Lastly, table 8.14 shows that the economic potentials of all measures with a marginal
20Under comparable conditions: the integrated curve in [127] yields GHG emission savings of 6.7 Gt
CO2e, slightly lower than our target of 8.0 Gt CO2e. However, the reference case is also lower, at
14.5 Gt CO2e.
21Based on global and China emission deltas between the Current Policies and 450 [ppm] scenarios (see
pages 621 and 673 in [20]).
22Even though the WEO only focuses on energy-related measures, the data are comparable, as non-
energy investments are small: in scenario 3, investments in agriculture and forestry (accounting for
most of the non-energy part) accounted for less than 1% of investments in China.
23See pages 119-120 of [110]. From the report, it is not fully clear which period the cost figures refer
to, but likely the period 2003–2050. Moreover, the reference scenario in [110] (Growth Without
Constraints) assumes a steep increase in GHG emissions, reaching about 950 Mt CO2e in 2030; the
comparison should thus be seen as an order-of-magnitude check only.
24The LTMS scenarios were not derived from GHG abatement targets, but abatement targets are rather
the result of a package of potential regulatory measures. This can lead to cost numbers that are at
first sight counterintuitive with respect to the achieved GHG savings.
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cost of less than USD 100/tonne CO2e from our modeling are in the same order as the
numbers stated in the IPCC report [79]25.
A look back at figure 8.8 at the beginning of this section shows that the average CO2 cost
in scenarios 3 are about 20 USD/tonne, which again shows that some options come at a
negative cost while others cost up to (or even more) than 100 USD/tonne – an indication
on how important it will be for decision makers to devise well-functioning redistribution
schemes. This argumentation also holds true for water availability measures: while the
average cost, in terms of USD/m3 of incremental water availability, is in fact negative
(see fig. 8.8), mitigation options can have much higher specific cost, as a look at the
original water cost curves26 confirms.
To conclude, two main results seem to come out of this section:
1. An integrated view on water and GHG mitigation options reduces cost and helps to
achieve targets. The comparison between scenarios 1 and 2 showed how a cross-
accounting of savings from one pathway (GHG abatement) in the other (increased
water availability) already enables synergies and thereby reduces cost and helps to
meet targets. The shift from scenario 2 to 3 then demonstrated how an integrated
modeling optimizes the solution mix further, beyond what is possible through
“manual” cross accounting.
2. Considering all options is important to fulfilling targets in an optimal way. Scenario
4 finally showed what can happen if a certain sector, in this case agriculture, is
ignored.
In order to achieve a goal in an optimal way, it is therefore important to convince
all stakeholders first – the most holistic and integrated planning will not bear full
fruit if decision makers focus on conventional mitigation options such as increased
supply, modern power plants or increased industrial efficiency only, and leave out
options that need to be anchored deeper in the public.
The findings presented here should however not be considered as the final results on the
matter of water–GHG interdependencies, but rather as a first proof of our considerations.
The results are sensitive to underlying assumptions on economic growth, reference case
development of water and GHG emissions and the assumed potential of the different
mitigation options. In particular, assumptions on biofuels growth have a sizeable impact
on whether water gaps can be closed in some basins/WMAs. Lastly, the“frozen technology”
25Unfortunately, no country-specific data was available to our knowledge.
26See pages 49 – 54
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approach neglects the benefits of potential new technologies that are not yet feasible
today, but might well be so by 2030.
Therefore, these results should not be considered as exact predictions for a China or South
Africa of 2030. They are rather sensitivities on the general development direction towards
more sustainable water management and reduced GHG emissions that was sketched out
independently in [5] and [4]+ [77]. Within this general direction, the sensitivities represent
boundaries: it is neither very likely that a country focused on sustainable development
neglects all (water/GHG) interactions (scenario 1), nor that such a tight planning process
can be established that considers all cross-dependencies in detail (scenario 3).
8.3. Scenario 5: maximizing water/GHG savings
The implementation of water availability and GHG abatement options is often constrained
by investments. No public or private stakeholder can borrow indefinitely to finance
mitigation options which eventually pay back later. Even if paybacks are larger than
investments, it is not always the case that the investor can line his pockets with them27.
It might therfore be interesting to study scenarios that maximize water/GHG savings
under fixed investments.
Isoinvestment curves
Section 6.6.2 (page 98 f) discussed the concept of isoinvestment curves. In short, these
connect all optimal combinations of water and GHG savings under fixed investments28; if
the incremental water availability was plotted in a graph along the x-axis, and incremental
GHG abatement along the y-axis, isoinvestment curves are concave with respect to the
origin, and the gradient dy/dx gives the marginal rate of substitution between one cubic
meter of incremental water availability and one tonne of GHG abatement. This can
give information on appropriate price ratios between water and GHG in order to achieve
certain combinations of water/GHG savings and investments.
27Consider for example energy efficient retrofits of appartment buildings: the owner invests in insulation
and thereby reduces heating costs for the tenants. As these are normally paid to a different stakeholder
(a utility), and given that the rent can often only be increased by small amounts per year, it is
difficult for the owner to recoup the investments, even though the measures comes at a net economic
benefit. Therefore, owners might only retrofit their appartment buildings if financial incentives are
created, which however increases stress on the governmental budget.
28Optimal hereby means that it is not possible to further increase water availability or GHG abatement
at given investments without reducing savings of the other resource.
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Figure 8.9.: Isoinvestment curves for China.
To construct a set of isoinvestment curves for both China and South Africa, we ran the
integrated model for seven fixed investment levels per country, with three or four model
runs per level. These runs differed in objective function and boundary conditions:
• Run 1 maximized GHG abatement under the constraint that the water gaps are to
be closed in all basins/WMAs.
• Run 2 maximized GHG abatement without constraints on water availability
• Run 3 maximized water availability without constraints on GHG abatement
• Run 4 maximized GHG abatement under the constraint that a fixed percentage of
the water gaps are closed
Investment levels were between 400 – 3,400 USD billion for China, and 8 – 153 USD
billion for South Africa29.
Figures 8.9 and 8.10 give the resulting isoinvestment curves. As expected, they are
concave with respect to the origin, do not intersect, and increase (in terms of investments)
by moving away from the origin.
29The maximum level was chosen under consideration of the investment levels from scenario 3: there,
China required 3,400 USD billion and South Africa 175 USD billion to fulfill both the water and GHG
target (see figure 8.8, page 158). As runs 2 and 3 maximize only one resource, higher investment
than needed in scenario 3 might have led to the case that the model runs out of measures.
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China
x 75,000 150,000 200,000 250,000
dy/dx (max) ≈ 0 ≈ 0 - 0.004 - 0.016
dy/dx (min) - 0.005 0.010 - 0.021 - 0.038
South Africa
x 1,500 3,000 5,000 7,000
dy/dx (max) ≈ 0 - 0.001 - 0.003 - 0.005
dy/dx (min) - 0.010 - 0.012 - 0.019 - 0.027
CO2 cost Water price, USD/m
3
USD/tCO2 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.75 1 2
10 0.010 0.030 0.050 0.075 0.100 0.200
20 0.005 0.015 0.025 0.038 0.050 0.100
30 0.003 0.010 0.017 0.025 0.033 0.067
40 0.003 0.008 0.013 0.019 0.025 0.050
50 0.002 0.006 0.010 0.015 0.020 0.040
60 0.002 0.005 0.008 0.013 0.017 0.033
70 0.001 0.004 0.007 0.011 0.014 0.029
80 0.001 0.004 0.006 0.009 0.013 0.025
Table 8.15.: Upper part: evaluation of the marginal rate of substitution dy/dx
for several values of x, i.e., incremental water availability. Maximal and minimal
values reflect the set of seven isoinvestment curves which were fitted by (slightly)
different functions. Lower part: matrix of the quotients of water and CO2e price
for selected values.
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Figure 8.10.: Isoinvestment curves for South Africa.
Fitting of the isoinvestment curves. Marginal rate of substitution dy/dx
The isoinvestment curves were fitted with simple polynoms in order to create functions
y(x) which allow to determine the marginal rate of substitution dy/dx (appendix F shows
the formulas for all functions). The top part of table 8.15 now evaluates the marginal
rate of substituion for different values of x, i.e., the incremental water availability, while
the lower part of the table shows a matrix with values for the quotient of different water
and CO2e prices.
Matching the values for dy/dx from the upper part of table 8.15 with the lower table
allows to determine price ratios between water and CO2e at a given combination of
investments, incremental water availability and GHG emission reduction. To give an
example: assume that China is able to invest 3,380 USD billion in water and GHG savings
(isoinvestment curve 7 in figure 8.9). If the target combination agreed upon is to close the
basin water gaps and invest the remaining budget in GHG abatement, the government
should ensure that point C on the isoinvestment curve (in figure 8.9) is achieved. One
option to do this is the definition of incremental prices for water availability and GHG
abatement: if done so, a price ratio of 0.021 would match the marginal rate of substition
at point C30; in contratst, price ratio < 0.021 would lead to a drain of investments from
water to GHG (and vice versa).
30In absolute terms. The marginal rate of substitution is negative by calculation given the curvature of
the isoinvestment lines.
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Investment functions I(water,GHG)
It is difficult to see in figures 8.9 and
Figure 8.11.: Investments vs. GHG savings.
8.10 how investments increase between
isoinvestment curves. Section 6.6.2 and
in particular figure 6.3 (page 98) specu-
lated that the increase must be accelerat-
ing with increasing water/GHG savings.
This is highlighted in figure 8.11, which
plots investments against GHG savings for
all runs 2 of South Africa31. The curve
is now fitted with a polynom, which gives
I = 1.6y2g − 146yg + 9359, where I are the
investments and yg the realized GHG abatement.
The increase in investments along arbitrary combinations of water/GHG savings is
plotted for the South African case in figure 8.12, which essentially is a three-dimensional
representation of figure 8.10. The data points, where each represents one scenario run,
can best be fitted with a fourth-order polynom32. If I is again the investment, y(g) the
incremental GHG abatement (in Mt CO2e) and x(w) the incremental water availability
(in million m3), the fit function is given by
I(x, y) = 2.1 · 10−12x4 + 8.2 · 10−6y4 + 1.3 · 10−9xy4 + ...
...+ 2.2 · 10−8x2y2 + 2.5 · 10−15x2y − 2.2 · 10−4xy2 + ...
...+ 1.9 · 10−2xy + 1.3x+ 2.0 · 10−2y − 1.5 · 104 . (8.1)
This now allows to assess parameters for arbitrary combinations of x and y: linear
combinations of the directional derivatives ∂I/∂x and ∂I/∂y allow to determine the
marginal investment required for a combination of incremental water availability and
GHG savings (x, y), and the marginal rate of substitution between incremental water
availability and GHG abatement is the exact differential of I(x, y),
31I.e., the water gap is closed in all WMAs. These are the data points at an incremental water availability
of about 3,500 million m3 in figure 8.10.
32We used a fitting tool (available online under www.zunzun.com) that tested potential function classes
(polynoms, power, exponential, fractional function) on the least-error fit of the provided data points
and concluded that a fourth-order polynom provides the closest fit to the data. The fitting target
was the lowest sum of squared absolute error (the lowest/final value was 2.802 ·108).
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Figure 8.12.: Plot of investments (z-axis) against GHG abatement (y-axis) and
water availability (x-axis) for South Africa. Original data points are shown as
small white-blue squares.
dI =
∂I
∂x
dx+
∂I
∂y
dy
set to zero.
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9. Integration of water and greenhouse
gas mitigation pathways in other
geographies
The last chapter showed at the example of China and South Africa that an integrated
assessment of water and GHG mitigation measures can reduce overall cost. The question
remains, though, whether such an approach reaps similar benefits in other geographies.
The first part of this chapter abstracts from our case studies to other regions and develops
three prototype regions that are expected to differ in strength and nature of their water-
GHG interdependencies. The second part discusses one further – albeit shorter and more
qualitative – case study, on Egypt, a country with quite different characteristics than
China and South Africa.
9.1. The power sector as a deciding factors in
integrated approaches
The intensity curves for China and South Africa in chapter 7 and the discussion of the
integrated modeling results in chapter 8 showed that changes in power generation and
consumption are responsible for a large part of the water-GHG interdependencies1. This
is again sumarized in table 9.1 for the results from scenario 3.
It was discussed that the differing importance of power-related measures between China
and South Africa originates from China’s higher water intensity of the avoided power
mixes: it was seen that the same power-related mitigation option, e.g., an energy efficiency
option, induces on average higher water savings in China than in South Africa2.
This can be confirmed by using the basin water savings from GHG abatement measures
1Of course and again within the boundaries of our study, which excludes the impact of measures on
hydrological cycles that would, if included, likely reduce the relative importance of power measures.
2See the analysis of scenario 3, section 8.2.3, page 150 f.
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Unit China S. Africa
Aggregated water savings million m3 206,400 4,000
Water savings of GHG options million m3 58,900 1,200
- of which power-related million m3 36,300 150
- power related as % of GHG options % 62% 12%
GHG abatement goal in models Mt CO2e 8000 325
GHG savings of water options Mt CO2e 190 7
- of which power-related Mt CO2e 176 3
- power related as % of water options % 93% 48%
Table 9.1.: Adapted from table 8.7: contribution of power-related measures to
the water impact of GHG measures and the GHG impact of water measures,
respectively.
as an expression for the strength of interdependencies, and assessing its correlation with
various factors.
Figure 9.1 puts the incremental water availabilities for China’s ten river basins in relation
to the basin population, water intensity of the avoided power mix, share of GDP, and
basin area. This indicates that the water intensity of a Business-as-Usual power mix is
likely one of the factors that influence the strength of water–GHG interdependencies the
strongest.
The situation is different in the case of
Figure 9.2.: The South Africa case.
South Africa. Figure 9.2 shows the corre-
lation between South Africa’s water man-
agement areas and the water intensities
of the avoided power mix, which is lower
than in China. A first reason is the fact
discussed above, i.e., that the water inten-
sity of the avoided power mix is generally
lower in South Africa than in China. Sec-
ondly, South Africa can be considered as a
country with a well-integrated power grid
where conventional power plants are located only in some WMAs; WMAs with negligible
conventional generation capacity thus have no power-related water savings; other savings
dominate and therefore distort the picture. Conventional generation capacity can be
found mainly in the Olifants and Upper Vaal WMAs, marked red in figure 9.2.
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Figure 9.1.: Incremental water availability from GHG mitigation options in
China’s ten river basins, in dependence of basin population, water intensity of
the avoided power mix, GDP and land area.
The left part of figure 9.3 now sets the water intensities of the avoided power mixes
in perspective to the basin/WMA water gaps as projected for 2030. The regions with
high water intensity levels, such as the Yangtze, Huai and Hai basins in China or South
Africa’s Olifants WMA are those where the water impact of GHG mitigation options
was the largest3. The WMAs which are marked in green in figure 9.3, i.e., with little
conventional generation capacity, in contrast experienced little to no water impacts from
power-related GHG abatement options.
From this, three different prototypes of regions, sketched out schematically in the right
part of figure 9.3, can be identified, with each having a different characteristic with
respect to the interdependencies of water and GHG abatement options:
• Case I - no (physical) water gap by 2030, such as China’s Song or Southwest
river basins. Efforts to increase water availability are less important – the fo-
cus might therefore be on the implementation of GHG abatement options. The
3See the discussion of the water intensity of GHG abatement options in section 7.4, page 132ff, and the
results from the integrated modeling, see section 8.2, page 143ff.
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Figure 9.3.: Left: water intensities of avoided power mixes in relation to 2030
the water gap for China’s river basins (red) and South African WMAs with
conventional generation capacity >1 GW (blue), and a selection of WMAs with
little or no conventional generation capacity (green). Right: the three prototype
regions with respect to the nature of their water–GHG intepdendencies.
optimal pathway is then determined by the GHG abatement cost curve alone,
insofar as the implementation of those measures does not increase water demand
disproportionately and thereby create a water gap.
Regions that likely also fall in this category are Canada, Japan, New Zealand, or
most parts of Northern Europe and Russia – all developed economies with high
GHG emissions but no foreseeable physical water scarcity by 2030.
• Case II - water gap by 2030 & high water intensity of the conventional power mix
in Business-as-Usual scenarios, such as China’s Yangtze, Huai or Hai river basins,
and – to a lesser extent – South Africa’s Olifants and Upper Vaal WMAs. These
regions have strong interconnections of water and GHG mitigation options. The
results from our case studies apply here: an integrated assessment of water and
GHG mitigation options will create synergies, thereby reducing cost and easing the
handling of non-economic challenges.
Other regions in this group likely involve the Southwestern parts of the USA,
Australia, or the Middle East – all developed economies with high per capita power
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consumption and GHG emissions, and a risk of water stress4.
• Case III - water gap by 2030, but low water intensity in power generation, such as
in South Africa’s Middle Vaal or Inkomati WMAs. The water and GHG mitigation
measures investigated in this study are less correlated than in case II. This can
have three reasons. First, a region is powered by neighboring region and water
savings from increased power efficiency measures bring no local benefit, as is indeed
the case in the South African WMAs. Second, a region is economically developed
and powered by renewable power sources. And third, a region is still developing
and has few thermal power capacities installed.
9.2. The case of Egypt
Many developing regions and countries in dry parts of the world will fall in the third
category described above, and one main concern will be to secure water availability over
the next decades. Egypt is one example of this last prototype. It is furthermore one of
Africa’s largest countries in terms of population and economy – the following pages will
therefore study this country in more detail and highlight on what basis water availability
and GHG emissions interlink there.
The largest part of water-GHG interdependencies in China and South Africa are triggered
by power-related measures, while agricultural measures did not play a large role there,
with the notable exception of no-till agriculture.
In contrast, plans exist to transform large areas of currently unused land into farmland in
Egypt. If done so and conventionally, this will likely put additional stress on the country’s
already tight water situation. One supply-side option, the constructing of large-scale
seawater desalination facilities, is most likely too expensive, while another, the use of
fossil aquifers, is not sustainable in the long term.
If the farmland extension was however aligned with water efficiency and conservation
measures in other sectors, it might well be possible to gain farmland without additional
stress on national water resources. Furthermore, the new farmland could act as a carbon
sink, installing agriculture as a win-win sector with respect to water and GHG .
4See the water stress for world map on page 8.
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9.2.1. Short country profile
In 2010, Egypt had a population of 81 million, which is projected to increase to 95 million
until 2030 [30]5. Over the same period, its per capita GDP is estimated to grow from
USD 1,600 to USD 2,200 [40]6. Of its current GDP, 46% is earned in services, 40% in
industry and 14% in agriculture [185], which is a more important sector than in China
(10% of GDP [109]) or South Africa (3%, [109]).
The majority of Egypt’s population and economic activity is concentrated in the Nile
valley and delta. This area however constitutes only 4% of the country’s surface [186];
the rest of the country is mostly desert, with the exception of few oasis. Mean rainfall
is low, and ranges from 200 mm along the Mediterranean coast to virtually zero in the
south of the country [186].
Egypt’s water situation today
An exception in this respect, Egypt is a country that can be regarded as one basin. The
Nile directly provided for 79% of the country’s water supply of 70 km3 in 2008 [32], while
further 9% come from groundwater, about 2% are captured rainwater and another 10%
are return flows from wastewater treatment or agriculture. According to the same source,
demand already reached 72 km3 in 2008 – of this, agriculture acounted for 83%, or 60
km3 [32].
The Food and Agricultural Organization of the U.N. estimates total renewable water
resources at 57 km3; including reuses of wastewater, desalinated water, drainage water
and treated wastewater, total available water resources are set at 72 km3 [186]7.
The Nile water volume of 56 km3 that is allocated to Egypt is based on a 1959 treaty
between Sudan and Egypt that divides most of the Nile’s waters between these two
countries [187]. It forbids upstream riparian countries (the most important being Ethiopia
and Uganda8) to extract water in excess of their fixed lots without permission from
Egypt and Sudan. The treaty is contested, and increasingly so as the economic output
and population rises in the upstream countries. A 2010 effort to find a new agreement
between all riperian countries however stalled, as their historical quotas are not subject
to negotiation, according to Egypt and Sudan [188] [189] [190]. The fact that South
5According to the medium scenario; the range given by the UN numbers spans 100–113 million.
6In real 2005 USD. In purchasing power parity and 2010 USD, [185] estimates this number at 6,500
USD.
7 [186] also includes 0.8 km3 of water from fossil aquifers that is excluded here under the argument
that such withdrawals are not sustainable in the long term.
8The other countries being Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania [188].
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Sudan seceded from the North in 2011 and relations between the two states are tense
will likely not ease the long-term securing of Egypt’s Nile water lot [189].
The secession will also not increase the chances that the Jonglei canal on the territory of
South Sudan will be finished soon. The canal, started in 1980 and built until 1983 to
within 100 km of completion (out of 360 km), would drain the swamps of Sudd, where
large volumes of water evaporate, and thereby increase water availability downstream by
an estimated 4.8 km3 annually, to be distributed between Sudan and Egypt [191]9. Two
other projects in the region could increase Egypt’s water availability by an additional 5
km3.
Lastly, ongoing climate change likely has adverse consequences for Egypt’s water balance.
It likely leads to higher temperatures over Egypt and Eastern Africa, the Nile’s headwater,
resulting in higher evaporative losses. Rising sea levels will furthermore increase the
chances of saltwater intrusion and loss of land in the Nile delta [192]; a sea-level rise of
0.5 m in the Mediterranean for would destroy 1,800 km2 of arable land and directly affect
a population of 3.8 million (based on today’s population) [193].
Egypt’s Business-as-Usual water demand 2020
Looking forward, an extrapolation of domestic per capita water withdrawals in line
with the population increase would result in a domestic water demand of 10.7 km3 by
202010; assuming that per capita industrial water demand stays constant as well results
in additional withdrawals 0.3 km3 11.
The additional water demand from agrciulture was determined under investigation of
Egypt’s planned famrland extension, as described in the following section.
Egypt’s agricultural extension, and its impact on water resources
Egypt’s area of cultivated land today is 3.4 million ha (34,000 km2) [186], almost all of it
concentrated in the Nile valley and its delta. Major crops under cultivation are wheat,
rice, cotton, maize. Given the very low rainfall levels, 99.8% of the cropland is irrigated,
of which 88% use surface irrigation schemes [186].
Going forward, Egypt plans to increase its cultivated land through reclamation projects
across the country; on the Sinai peninsula alone, a further 0.5 million hectars are planned
9The completion of the canal would however impact the swamps; [191] estimates that total swamp size
will decline by 15–25%.
10Under the assumption that per capita annual municipal demand of 113 m3 (based on a 2008 population
of 75 million and a demand of 8.5 km3 [32]) stays constant until 2020.
11Based on the same logic and sources.
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to be added [186] until 2017, and the total reclaimed land area is projected to increase to
1.4 million hectars by then [194].
The addtional water demand from this extension can be estimated at at least 11 km3,
based on the following assumptions:
• The crop mix on the new farmland is the same as on the currently cultivated area,
with wheat, rice, cotton and maize as the dominant crops. Furthermore, the same
annual crop sequence applies – which means that the additional cultivated area of
1.38 million ha equals an irrigated area of 1.97 million ha [195]
• Is is assumed that the new farmland is irrigated to 50% by sprinkler irrigation and
50% drip irrigation, as legislation forbids surface irrigation in those areas.
• Egypt’s average water demand for drip and sprinkler irrigation was determined based
on the average water duty per hectar on the existing farmland (8,400 m3/ha) [195],
the current split between surface, sprinkler and drip irrigation (88.5%, 5.0% and
6.5%, respectively [186]), and the delta in water requirements between the different
irrigation technologies from the water availability cost curve data for China (see
appendix D)12.
To sum up, Egypt will likely be confronted with a water supply-demand gap in the
foreseeable future. Its water demand could reach about 86 km3 by 2020 (see figure 9.4)
in a Business-as-Usual scenario, which contrasts with a supply situation that can at best
be assumed to stay constant at about 72 km3 [186].
Egypt’s power sector and GHG emissions
Egypt produced 123 TWh of electricity in 2008 [196], of which 88% came from conventional
power plants, almost all of which powered by gas, and 11% from hydro power, almost all
from the Aswan dam. The remaing percent was contributed by wind power [196].
Depending on the technology, the water intensity (in terms of withdrawals) of gas-fired
plants is between 0.7 and 2.0 m3/MWh13, which would yield total water withdrawals
related to thermal power generation of about 0.1–0.2 km3 annually, less than 1% the
nation’s water demand. The water intensity of the hydro part from the Aswan dam is
12It has to be noted that the water duty of 8,400 m3/ha is lower than the water demand estimated
“top-down” from total water withdrawals for agriculture of 60 km3(2008) and the irrigated area of
5.12 million hectars, which is 11,700 m3/ha. This is most likely due to losses through canal seepage,
leaks, evaporation and suboptimal irrigation scheduling, which can also be considered as a potential
set of efficiency improvement measures (see text below).
13See section 6.4.2, page 81 ff.
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Figure 9.4.: Estimates on Egypt’s potential 2020 water gap.
a different matter, but certainly a question of definition. A head of water of 6.0 mm
evaporates daily from Lake Nasser14 – over the whole surface, this sums up to evaporative
losses of 3 km3 annually [167]. If all these losses were allocated to the hydro plant, the
water intensity would reach 200 m3/MWh, a hundred times higher than a wet-cooled
thermal power plant15. Of course, the Aswan dam fulfills other purposes than power
generation, such as flood control or water storage; a replacement of the dam for the
purpose of increased water availability seems – above all – very unrealistic.
A low CO2 intensity in the power sector due to the mix of gas and hydro plants contributes
to Egypt’s comparatively low per capita GHG emission, which are given at 3.2 t of CO2e
for 2005 (234 Mt CO2e in total) by the World Resources Institute [69].
Forecasts to 2030 are more difficult to obtain; however, there is no evidence that emission
levels will rise substantially over the next two decades. Given that a per capita emission
level of about 2 t CO2e is considered sustainable in the long term
16, it can be assumed
14Lake Nasser is the artificial lake behind the Aswan dam.
15However, 200 m3/MWh compares well to the high end of water losses mentioned by Gleick [1], 160
m3/MWh which were given for Californian hydro facilities. Assuming that evaporation rates in
Egypt are higher than in California, and that the Aswan dam was presumably not optimized for
hydro power generation, it seems plausible that water losses are higher in that case.
16See section 2.3.4: total anthropogenic emissions of 20 Gt CO2e are determined; at a world population
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Figure 9.5.: Physical and road map of Egypt. From [90]
that the challenges in reducing GHG emission fall back behind the looming water
supply-demand gap.
Given the low water intensity of its power sector, small industrial base and relatively
low per capita power consumption, little potential to increase water availability through
increases in energy efficiency seems to exist, and water-GHG interdependencies as
discussed for China and South Africa will therefore play a smaller role17.
9.2.2. Increasing Egypt’s water availability in a sustainable way
Conventional methods of increasing water supply will likely not provide for the required
amounts of water in an economic way:
• As seen above, the Nile’s waters are already fully divided between riparian countries
– the question will rather be whether Egypt can sustain its current lot than extend
it. Even if the Jonglei canal was finished, the increase of water supply by 4.8 km3
of about 9 billion, this amounts to 2.2 t CO2e per capita.
17Looking back at figure 9.3, Egypt can thus be considered as a Case III country.
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would not all reach Egypt. The other dam projects in the Sudd valley (providing
further 5 km3) are even more speculative today.
• Additional dams along the Nile will not increase seasonal supply, as the Egypt’s
storage volume of 169 km3 [186] is already more than three times its lot of Nile
water, and more than the double of current annual demand.
• Deep groundwater pumping from fossil aquifers. Estimates on aquifer yield under
some of the agricultural extension areas give potentials of 0.6–3.8 km3 annually [194].
Tapping into these can mitigate water stress for some years, but will not provide
for a sustainable solution in the long term.
Furthermore, the power demand for such pumping schemes would be high: for
depths of 50 m, our China case studies assumed 0.14 kWh/m3, and 0.53 kWh/m3
for 135 m – pumping an additional 11 km3 for irrigation (a hypothetical case,
though) would require 1.6–5.9 TWh, or up to 5% of Egypt’s power demand (2008).
• Seawater desalination is likely a too expensive way to supply water, as already
seen in the water availability cost curves for China and South Africa, where it
figured along the high cost end. Furthermore, desalination of 11 km3 annually
would require at least 20 TWh of power, or 16% of Egypt’s total demand, and more
than the power generated by the Aswan dam annually18.
Furthermore, the options of enforced desalination or groundwater pumping would result
in increased GHG emissions levels.
On the other side, given that most of the land is still irrigated with surface schemes,
large operational improvement potentials exist, and are already addressed: [194] argues
that Egypt’s water strategy includes increased efficiency in water use, reduced losses
through improved water transportation schemes, and increased levels of water reuse. The
same source also gives a list of concrete measures and initiative that are finished, under
implementation, or in planning.
Such efficiency improvements and the considerations on supply-side options above already
sketch out a prioritization list of water availability measures that would in its structure
very likely resemble the China and South Africa cost curves discussed in section 4.1.
The development of a detailed Egypt cost curve and its GHG intensity would require a
more thorough assessment than can be performed here. However, it might be interesting
18If thermal desalination facilities were co-located with thermal power plants. With reverse osmosis
systems, power demand would increase to almost 50 TWh.
9.2. THE CASE OF EGYPT 179
to have a first look into whether efficiency and conservation measures can help to sustain
Egypt’s water balance in the light of a land reclamation project of 1.4 million hectars,
and what impact they have on the country’s GHG emission balance19.
Irrigation efficiency improvements in the Nile valley and delta
Egypt requires on average 11,700 m3 of water per hectar of irrigated farmland20. However,
the average water duty for the typical crop mix is given at only 8,400 km3, about 3,000
m3 per hectar less than stated above. It therefore seems plausible that considerable water
resources are lost to evaporation in canals, canal seepage or ill-timed irrigation scheduling
– closing only half of that delta in per-hectar water requirements could already increase
water availability by 8.6 km3.
89% of the cultivated are in the Nile valley and delta are surface-irrigated. In China,
drip and sprinkler irrigation options reduced water needs by 38% and 32% with respect
to the reference case of surface irrigation21. If those techniques could be extended to part
of the Nile valley and delta22, 37% of the surface-irrigated farmland would need to be
converted to drip or sprinkler irrigation in order to increase water availability by 14 km3,
and thus close the water gap.
The impact on power demand of these efforts is likely negative: drip and sprinkler systems
are more energy-intensive than the alternative of surface irrigation in Egypt, as surface
water is just diverted from the Nile to the fields, requiring little to no pumping, but
general numbers are hard to obtain23. By taking the data from the China case example
for sprinkler irrigation, 0.33 kWh/m3, and using the same number for drip irrigation24,
power demand would increase by about 4.4 TWh, resulting in GHG emissions of about
19Please note that the following considerations presented here should in all cases be regarded as rough
back-of-the-envelope calculations and to not claim to be exact to the digit. Neither are they mutually
exclusive insofar as the potentials can be added.
20Based on 2008 agriculture withdrawals of 60 km3 [32] and an cultivated area of effectively 5.1 million
hectars [195].
21See also for example [197], which gives water savings for sprinkler irrigation: for wheat, cotton and
maize, three of Egypt’s main crops, these are on average 35%, 36% and 41%; however, the same
source says that irrigation efficiencies are lower in desert climates, indicating that a 32% efficiency
gain seems an estimate in the right order.
22We assume a 50/50 split between both irrigation techniques. The current plit is close to this, with
6.5% (drip) and 5.0% (sprinkler irrigation).
23 [198] for example discusses a large variety of sprinkler and drip irrigation systems in detail, but
only indicates energy demand qualitatively, presumably due to large discrepancies between sub-
technologies.
24This is clearly an upper boundary – drip irrigation systems typically require less water than sprinkler
irrigation [198].
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2.0 Mt CO2e if the power was produced in gas-fired power stations.
Municipal wastewater treatment
A look at the 2008 data indicates that not all of Egypt’s domestic wastewater is treated:
according to Egypt’s State Information Service, treated wastewater accounted for 1.3
km3 in 2007, about 20% of the 6.5 km3 of domestic water demand [32].
Domestic demand is estimated to increase to 11 km3 according to figure 9.4; water
availability would increase by 9.4 km3 if all this treated by 2020 – about 70% of the
total gap, or 84% of the additional water needs in agriculture. If on top of this the
energy stored in the wastewater sludge could be recovered with a similar efficiency as
assumed for the China case example, the additional treatment plants could operate with
a slight power surplus and produce up to 0.2 TWh. The remaining sludge from the
biogas digesters can be used as a fertilizer in agriculture, which reduces cost and GHG
emissions, as the alternative, synthetic fertilizers, accelerate the decomposition of soil
organic matter, and thereby produce CO2 [199].
Conservation and organic agriculture
Agricultural soils are a potential carbon sink and therefore one option to mitigate GHG
emissions [200] [201]. Reclaimed desert soils should be no exception, and it can be
expected that Egypt’s land reclamation project should have a positive impact on GHG
emissions. The exact amount of the soil GHG storage potential will depend on the
agronomy practices employed; we looked into two reports that assessed this.
Conservation agriculture, which implies minimal to no mechanic soil disturbance, a
permanent organic soil cover and diversified crop rotations or plant associations [182] can
on average sequester about 0.5 tons of carbon per hectar and year, which corresponds to
1.8 t CO2e per hectar and year
25.
A report specifically on the carbon sequestration potential of organic agriculture on
reclaimed desert lands in Egypt states that 0.9 t of carbon, per hectar and year, or 3.2 t
CO2e/ha/year, can be sequesterted in reclaimed desert land by this method [199] – if
this number was applied to all new reclaimed land, GHG sequestration could reach 4.4
Mt CO2e annually, almost 2% of Egypt’s 2005 total emissions.
For comparison, simply (and only indicatively, given different climatic conditions) taking
the GHG mitigation potentials and affected areas from no-till agriculture from China
25The amount of carbon, C, stored is transformed into the corresponding amount of CO2 extracted
from the atmosphere by the ratio of its molecular weights, (44/12.
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and South Africa yields a sequestration potential of 0.9 t CO2e/ha/year, slightly lower
than the numbers given above.
As no-till agriculture also reduces water demand with respect to more conventional
approaches, it can furthermore be expected that the above-mentioned techniques could
also play a part in reducing the water gap.
Summary of Egypt’s options
To sum up this short section, enough potential likely exists to increase water availability
in Egypt to the extent that the rising water demand from growing population and an
ambitious land reclamation project could be satisfied. As in the China and South Africa
cases, the most effective measures are not those that increase supply – these are very
likely either unsustainable, very costly, or energy-intensive – but rather measures that
increase water efficiency and reuse rates. Beyond simply closing the water gap, such
measures could furthermore make the land reclamation project a net carbon sink, improve
water quality and increase power production from renewable energy sources. All this
comes on top of the obvious benefit of increased food security and therefore provides
an example where (even) three resources, food, GHG emissions, or energy, and water
interact positively.
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10. Conclusions
Starting from a discussion of global water supply and demand, and the likely consequences
of water scarcity and rising greenhouse gas emission, this work first demonstrated that
many options to mitigate either of these issues are actually interlinked, i.e. that increasing
the water availability or reducing greenhouse gas emissions through a certain measure
often has an effect on the balance of the other resource. As this work only considers
resource savings from the time of implementation onwards, it is likely that further
interdependencies exist under full life cycles considerations, or if the impact of certain
mitigation options on ecosystems or hydrological cycles was included.
Given this, it was found that the majority of interdependencies are related to the nexus of
energy provision and water – water is needed to extract energy carriers from the ground,
and to turn them into electric power, where the cooling of steam turbines can again
require large quantities of water. On the other hand, energy or electric power is required
to pump and distribute freshwater or treat wastewater.
The study of mitigation options in China and South Africa showed that interdependencies
are overall positive, i.e., addressing water scarcity or unsustainable levels of greenhouse
gas emissions yields in sum savings of the other resource. A more detailed look then
showed that in particular those options that promote efficient uses of one resource are
among those with the strongest savings on the other resource.
A linear optimization model helped to prove that an integrated consideration of all water
availability and greenhouse gas abatement options allows to better achieve overall mitiga-
tion goals, in particular with regards to local water availability, and reduce mitigation
cost by up to 23% compared to an independent assessment.
The integrated modeling further allowed to study isoinvestment curves and investment
functions, which relate investments to arbitrary combinations of water and greenhouse
gas savings. These considerations showed interesting parallels to microeconomics, as the
example of the marginal rate of substitution between water and greenhouse gas savings
demonstrated.
The last chapter brought forward the hypothesis that interdependencies as investigated
for China and South Africa are likely also observable in other geographies that are both
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water-stressed and dependant on thermal power generation, while countries with little
such generation capacities will likely experience less or different interdependencies.
A more qualitative case study on Egypt demonstrated that water–greenhouse gas interde-
pendencies along the energy link are of lesser importance there, but that interdependencies
in agriculture might play a role in the future, as reclaimed desert land can act as a sizeable
carbon sink. Combined with water conservation efforts and sourcing from secondary
sources, such as treated wastewater, the irrigation of reclaimed land could therefore
develop into a positive exemplar along the nexus of water, GHG emissions, and food
production.
Criticality
Given the positive interlinkages, policy makers should consider the interdependencies
between resources, cost, but also societal parameters more when devising mitigation
pathways.
Cost certainly are an important aspect, but not necessarily the deciding one, as it often
is, for example, of equal importance to convince a multitude of scattered stakeholders.
Table 10.1 summarizes various aspects that in our opinion require consideration before a
certain set of mitigation options, or more generally, actions, can be judged.
Economic cost
(Potentially) differentiated by different cost
parameters, e.g., investments and operational cost
Art of use of a resource
Quality in which a resource is needed
(e.g., freshwater vs. wastewater)
Impacts on ecosystems – Stress on (other) critical resources
and other resources – Considerations of external cost
Feasibility
– Political and legal boundary conditions
– Advantage of central vs. local implementation
– Implementation possible under current practices
vs. requirements for new processes
Dynamics Time frame to implementation
Table 10.1.: Aspects of criticality.
How these dimensions are exactly weighted against each other depends on local bound-
ary conditions – an over-populated, cash-constrained region might come to a different
conclusion than a region with enough (monetary) resources at hand.
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Policy makers should ensure that those options are prioritized that score high along
most dimensions. In this work, efficiency measures were mentioned at several occasions
as “win-win” options, as they generally increase both water availability, reduce GHG
emissions and often save more money than they cost in the first place. It would remain
the subject of further research to assess to what extent other criticality parameters
can be fulfilled for these options – some technologies for example might require rare or
increasingly expensive resources. Furthermore, being the sum of many small efforts and
changes in mindsets, the dynamics and feasibility to achieve a given overall target might
be lower for these options than in other areas.
In the end, such an assessment could result in a multi-dimensional merit order of options,
where each dimension represents one criticality parameter and the different dimensions
are interlinked through intensity curves such as the water–GHG curves discussed in this
work.
Outlook
The interdependencies of water and greenhouse gases are thus only one example of a
resource interlinkage, and the study of other resources and their interdependencies with
water or GHG mitigation options, such as metals, rare earths, available land, or food,
will be of equal importance.
First research has been devoted to this task. A recent publication, Materials critical to
the energy industry [202] investigated an important aspect that was neglected in this
work, namely the dependency of energy sources on special materials. The results show
that for example photovoltaics and wind power, both interesting mitigation options that
increase water availability and reduce GHG emissions simultaneously, require Cadmium,
Chromium (solar PV) and rare earth elements (wind power) – all materials with a critical
supply situation, as figure 10.1 highlights.
Such considerations will become more important in a resource-constrained world. Decision
makers that have the choice between multiple (mitigation) options will therefore need to
start considering not only the cost of a particular solution, but also the other parameters
mentioned in table 10.1 if the practicability of a chosen pathway shall be ensured.
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Figure 10.1.: From [202] (excerpt of graph): Exposure of energy pathways to
selected materials and their risks of supply constraints (L = Low, M = Medium,
H = High). Such constraints, as well as other criticality dimensions, should
be taken into account in addition to the water–GHG interdependencies before
deciding on a pathway.
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A. Glossary
Abatement case A scenario that achieves a greenhouse gas
reduction target that is more ambitious than the reference case
BAU Business as Usual (scenario); also referred to as
reference case
BCM, bcm Billion cubic meter, equivalent to km3
CH4 Methane. Both a greenhouse gas and the main component
of natural gas
CO2 Carbon dioxide, a greenhouse gas
CO2e Carbon dioxide equivalents, a unit for comparing different
greenhouse gases on the basis of their contribution to global
warming
Consumption Water consumption, i.e., the amount of water that is taken
from a water body and cannot be returned locally
DWAF South Africa’s Department of Water Affairs and Forestry
EIA United States Energy Information Administration
EPA United States Environmental Protection Agency
EUR Euro
FAO Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations
Full cost [year] The sum of the annuity of the required investment plus oper–
ational cost/savings in a given year for a mitigation option,
incremental to the reference case solution. Investments are
discounted over the lifetime of the mitigation option.
GHG Greenhouse gas
GJ Gigajoules, 109 Joules
Gt Gigatonnes, 109 tonnes
GW Gigawatt, 109 Watt
GWh Gigawatt hour, 109 Watt hours
Halocarbons An umrella term for organic compounds that contain
halogens such as fluroine, chloride or bromide; many
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halocarbons are greenhouse gases
IEA International Energy Agency
Integrated cost The sum of all investments and operational cost/savings of
a mitigation option that incur between 2010 and 2030, discounted
to 2030 and incremental to the reference case solution
IWMI International Water Management Institute
kW Kilowatt, 103 Watt
kWh Kilowatt hour, 103 Watt hours
LTMS Long Term Mitigation Scenarios, a set of GHG emissions
scenarios for South Africa
MCM, mcm Million cubic meter
Mitigation measure/ A technology, method or process that reduces GHG emissions
option or increases water availability with respect to the BAU alternative
MJ Megajoules, 106 Joules
Mt Megatonnes, 106 tonnes
Mtoe Megatonnes of oil equivalents, a unit of energy content
MW Megawatt, 106 Watt
MWh Megawatt hour, 106 Watt hours
N2O Nitrous oxide, a greenhouse gas
PJ Petajoules, 1015 Joules
TJ Terajoules, 1012 Joules
USD United States Dollar
W Watt, the unit of power
Water gap The delta between the projected water supply
and demand [in a given year]
Withdrawals Water withdrawals, i.e., the amount of water taken from a river body;
parts or all of it can be returned locally
WRG Water Resources Group
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B. South Africa’s GHG emissions
Sections 3.2.3 and 6.1 mentioned that South Africa’s GHG emission projections for 2030
(and the pathway 2005–2030) needeed adjustement based on the comparison of the main
data source employed ( [4]) and external data. This chapter explains how this adjustment
was performed.
Figure B.1 gives an overview of the projected 2030 ”Business-as-Usual” emissions from
various sources, showing that [4] gives considerably lower values than the other sources1.
In particular, energy-related BAU emissions in figure B.1 seem to be lower than in other
reports, and this is also where corrective action was undertaken. The energy sector can
again be split up in emissions from power generation and a remainder, mostly associated
to industry and households.
Adjusted power-related emissions
Looking into the data underlying the 2030 BAU power sector for South Africa already
suggests that emissions should actually be higher than presented in [4] and [77]. Even
with the assumed power mix, emissions should rather be 460 Mt, instead of 297 Mt CO2e.
A total production of 873 TWh seems however too high, compared with other sources:
• Eskom’s Integrated Resource Plan projects 2030 emissions of about 640 TWh in a
high-case scenario with no efficiency gains. If these savings are presumed, power
demand is forecasted to be around 450 TWh by 2030 [117].
• The Long Term Mitigation Scenarios assume a installed capacity of about 70 GW
in 2030 [110] (p. 51), mostly from fossil fuels. Based on this, power generation
can be estimated at 500–550 TWh by 2030. This is confirmed by a Greenpeace
report on “green” jobs for South Africa, which cites about 520 TWh from the LTMS
report [203] (p. 1).
• The Water Resources Group [5] used a power demand of 607 TWh for South Africa.
1The reason for this is likely related to the global level of investigation in [4] [77], where South Africa
wasonly one of the 21 world regions, as opposed to the other reports that explicitly focus on this
country.
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Figure B.1.: 2030 Business-as-Usual GHG emissions from different sources.
Based on this data, South Africa’s BAU power mix was adjusted to generate 550 TWh
in 2030 – a value close to the high end of [117] was chosen to reflect little improvements
in energy efficiency or sustainability. In particular, the amount of gas-fired power was
reduced and unclassified generation was eliminated; the adjusted generation mix builds
mainly on 410 TWh of coal, 70 TWh gas, 30 TWh nuclear and about 40 TWh of
renewables. Power-related GHG emissions then amount to 410 Mt CO2(e).
Adjusted emissions from industry
According to [4] [77], direct emissions from the industry and domestic sectors grow by
a factor of 1.7 between 2005 and 2030, from 73 to 122 Mt CO2e. According to the
LTMS base-case scenario Growth Without Constraints, energy demand in the industrial,
commercial and residential sectors (including power) was estimated to grow by a factor
of 2.1, from about 800 PJ2 to 1,700 PJ [110] (p. 50). Adjusting emission growth with
this factor results in respective 2030 BAU emissions of additional 135 Mt CO2e, giving a
total of 256 Mt CO2e.
2PJ: Petajoule = 1015 Joule.
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Adjusted overall emissions for South Africa
Thus, total South African emissions for the Business-as-Usual scenario are as follows:
• Adjustments in power generation add 113 Mt CO2e (297 → 410 Mt CO2e).
• Adjustments to the industrial, commerical and sector add further 135 Mt CO2e
(225 → 360 Mt CO2e).
Overall emissions are then, in Mt CO2e: 541 + 113 + 135 = 789. This is also a value
that is in better accordance with the other sources, as the rightmost bar in figure B.1
shows.
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C. List of water mitigation options
The following tables list all water availability options, first for China, then for South
Africa. All options from the original report Chartering Our Water Future [5] (and the
underlying data sets) were considered.
Further infomation on the specific options and underlying assumptions can be found in
the appendix of [5], page 147 ff.
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N
S
Sector Measure GHG intensity GHG intensity: source and approach
kg CO2e/m
3
Gravity transfers - No direct energy needs
Rainwater harvesting - No direct energy needs
– domestic
Pumped transfers 0.03 Energy requirements for pumping (see e.g. [2])
Artificial recharge 0.48 Energy requirements for pumping:
first into reservoir, then extraction (see e.g. [2])
Desalination 4.01 Assumes energy intensity of reverse osmosis
[2], [138]
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D. List of GHG mitigation options
The following gives a list of all GHG mitigation options used in the GHG abatement cost
curves for China and/or South Africa in the report Pathways to a low-carbon economy [4]
and the associated online tool and database Climate Desk [77]
Sector Mitigation measure China S. Africa
Agriculture Tillage and residue management practices x x
Agriculture Cropland nutrient management x
Agriculture Grassland nutrient management x x
Agriculture Rice management - nutrient management x x
Agriculture Rice management - shallow flooding x
Agriculture Grassland management x x
Agriculture Organic soils restoration x
Agriculture Agronomy practices x x
Agriculture Degraded land restoration x x
Agriculture Livestock feed supplements x x
Agriculture Livestock - antimethanogen vaccine x x
Buildings Water heating - replacement of gas - res. x x
Buildings Water heating - replacement of gas - com. x x
Buildings Lighting - switch incandescents to LEDs - res. x x
Buildings Lighting - switch incandescents to LEDs - com. x x
Buildings Lighting - new build controls - com. x x
Buildings Lighting - switch CFLs to LEDs - res. x x
Buildings Electronics consumer - residential x x
Buildings Electronics office - commercial x x
Buildings Lighting - switch CFLs to LEDs - commercial x x
Buildings Appliances - residential x x
Buildings Appliances - refrigerators - commercial x x
Buildings Retrofit - building envelope - commercial x x
Buildings Retrofit HVAC - controls - commercial x x
Buildings HVAC retrofit to heat pump (residential) x x
Buildings Water heating - replacement of electric - com. x x
Buildings Lighting - T12 to T8/T5 - commercial x x
Buildings Efficiency package - new build, commercial x x
Buildings Retrofit HVAC - gas/oil heating - residential x x
Buildings Water heating - replacement of electric - res. x x
Buildings Lighting - retrofit controls - commercial x x
Continued on the following page
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Sector Mitigation measure China S. Africa
Buildings Retrofit HVAC - maintenance - residential x x
Buildings Retrofit HVAC - air conditioning - res. x
Buildings Retrofit HVAC - commercial x x
Buildings Efficiency package - new build, res. x x
Buildings Retrofit - building envelope - res. x x
Cement Waste heat recovery x x
Cement Clinker substitution by fly ash x x
Cement Alternative fuels - bio x x
Cement Clinker substitution by slag x x
Cement Alternative fuels - waste x x
Cement Post combustion CCS- retrofit x x
Cement Post combustion CCS - new capacity x
Chemicals Motor systems - new build x x
Chemicals Motor systems - retrofit x x
Chemicals Catalyst optimization - energy - level 1 x x
Chemicals Process intensification - energy - level 1 x x
Chemicals CHP - new build x x
Chemicals CHP - retrofit x x
Chemicals Catalyst optimization - energy - level 2 x x
Chemicals Process intensification - process - level 1 x x
Chemicals Catalyst optimization - process - level 1 x x
Chemicals N2O decomposition of adipic acid x
Chemicals N2O decomposition of nitric acid x
Chemicals Process intensification - energy - level 3 x x
Chemicals Catalyst optimization - energy - level 3 x x
Chemicals Ethylene cracking - new build x x
Chemicals N2O decomposition of nitric acid - retrofit x
Chemicals Ethylene cracking - retrofit x x
Chemicals Process intensification - energy - level 2 x x
Chemicals Catalyst optimization - process - level 2 x x
Chemicals Process intensification - process - level 2 x x
Chemicals Fuel shift coal to biomass - new build x
Chemicals Fuel shift coal to biomass - retrofit x
Chemicals Catalyst optimization - process - level 3 x x
Chemicals Process intensification - process - level 3 x x
Chemicals CCS direct energy - new build x x
Chemicals CCS ammonia - new build x x
Chemicals CCS ammonia - retrofit x x
Chemicals CCS direct energy - retrofit x x
Forestry Degraded forest reforestation x x
Forestry Forest management x x
Forestry Pastureland afforestation x
Continued on the following page
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Sector Mitigation measure China S. Africa
Iron & Steel Co-generation - retrofit x x
Iron & Steel Co-generation - new build x x
Iron & Steel Direct casting - new build x x
Iron & Steel Smelt reduction - retrofit x x
Iron & Steel Smelt reduction - new build x x
Iron & Steel Energy efficiency general x x
Iron & Steel Coke substitution - new build x x
Iron & Steel Coke substitution - retrofit x x
Iron & Steel CCS - new build x x
Iron & Steel CCS - retrofit x x
Other industry Bundled energy efficiency x x
Oil & Gas Planning x
Oil & Gas ”Behavioral” changes in upstream oil and gas x
Oil & Gas ”Behavioral” - procedural changes x x
Oil & Gas Improved maintenance & process control x x
Oil & Gas Energy efficiency at process unit level x x
Oil & Gas Energy efficient new builds in upstream x
Oil & Gas Energy efficiency projects [...] upstream x
Oil & Gas Energy efficiency projects at plant level (co-gen) x x
Oil & Gas Reduced flaring x x
Oil & Gas Replace seals x
Oil & Gas Maintain compressors x
Oil & Gas Distribution maintenance x
Oil & Gas CCS in downstream operations x x
Power Small hydro x x
Power Geothermal x
Power Nuclear x x
Power Wind - low penetration x x
Power Shift of coal to increased gas utilization x
Power Solar PV x x
Power Wind - high penetration x x
Power Coal CCS - new build with EOR x x
Power Solar concentrated (CSP) x x
Power Gas CCS - new build with EOR x x
Power Coal CCS - new build x x
Power Coal CCS - retrofit x x
Power Gas CCS - retrofit x x
Power Biomass CCS - new build x x
Power Gas CCS - new build x
Power Biomass - co-firing x
Transport LDV - gasoline bundle x x
Transport LDV - diesel bundle x x
Continued on the following page
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Sector Mitigation measure China S. Africa
Transport MDV - gasoline bundle x x
Transport HDV - diesel bundle x x
Transport 1st generation bio-fuels x x
Transport 2nd generation bio-fuels x x
Transport MDV - diesel bundle x x
Transport LDV - diesel full hybrids x x
Transport LDV - gasoline plug-in hybrids x
Transport LDV - gasoline full hybrids x x
Transport LDV - diesel plug-in hybrids x x
Transport LDV - electric vehicles x
Waste Landfill gas direct use x x
Waste Landfill gas electricity generation x x
Waste Composting new waste x x
Waste Recycling new waste x
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E. Integrated cost formulas
Section 6.5 discussed the different cost terms used in this work. Amongst other, it
discussed at one example how integrated cost, discounted to 2030 can be derived in
dependence on the lifetime and ”decade” of the mitigation option (see equations (6.4) –
(6.8)). This appendix chapter derives the formulas for the four cases that were not yet
discussed in section 6.5.
Again, let C be the investment needs for a given mitigation option (relative to the
reference case), O be the associated operational cost/ savings (relative to the reference),
and i the cost of capital.
Case 2: l > 10, implementation 2020–2030
Discounted investments
In this case, no replacement investments are required in the period under consideration.
Investments are again spread equally over the decade, i.e., C/10 per year. The future
value in 2030 is then equivalent to the 2020 future value in case 1, as the implementation
occurs a decade later here,
FVC(2030)=
C
10
10∑
k=1
(1 + i)k =
i=4%
1.25 C . (E.1)
Discounted operational cost
Again, the future value of all operational cost/savings in 2030 is the same as the 2020
future value in case 1,
FVO(2030) =
O
10
(1 + i)10+
2 ·O
10
(1 + i)9+. . .+
10 ·O
10
(1 + i)
=
O
10
10∑
k=1
(11− k)(1 + i)k =
i=4%
6.46O . (E.2)
204 APPENDIX E. INTEGRATED COST FORMULAS
Case 3: l < 10, implementation 2020–2030
Discounted investments
As mentioned in 6.5, it is assumed that the implementation of mitigation options with
l < 10 is spread equally of l years and assumed to be finished by the end of the decade;
i.e., implementation starts in the year 2030−l and finishes in 2030 here. For this reason,
no replacement investments incur. The 2030 value of the investments can then be derived
as follows
FVC(2030)=
C
l
l∑
k=1
(1 + i)k . (E.3)
Discounted operational cost
As the investments only start in the year 2030−l, operational cost/savings only have an
effect from then on. Discounted to 2030 and summed up over the l years, this gives
FVO(2030) =
O
l
(1 + i)l+
2 ·O
l
(1 + i)l−1+. . .+
l ·O
l
(1 + i)
=
O
l
l∑
k=1
(l + 1− k)(1 + i)k . (E.4)
Case 4: l < 10, implementation 2010–2020
Discounted investments
First, the same assumptions as in case 3 apply here (investments were spread equally
over l years, full potential achieved by the end of the decade, i.e., 2020 in this case).
The 2020 future value of the investments in this case follows the same logic as the 2030
value from case 3. For the decade 2020–2030, replacement investments become however
necessary to maintain the mitigation potential. Replacements need to occur over the full
decade 2020–2030: when the last investment tranche of C/l is finished at the beginning
of 2020, the earliest already reaches the end of its lifetime, requiring replacement at the
beginning of 2021, and so forth.
Let FVC(2020) and FVC1(2030) be the 2020 and 2030 values of the original investments,
respectively, and FVC2(2030) the 2030 value of the replacement investments between
2020 and 2030.
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FVC1(2020) =
C
l
l∑
k=1
(1 + i)k
FVC1(2030) = (1 + i)
10 FVC1(2020) (E.5)
FVC2(2030) =
C
l
10∑
k=1
(1 + i)k (E.6)
FVC(2030) = FVO1(2030) + FVO2(2030)
=
C
l
(
(1 + i)10
l∑
k=1
(1 + i)k +
10∑
k=1
(1 + i)k
)
. (E.7)
Discounted operational cost
Operational cost/savings follow the same logic as in case 3: they only take effect from a
point within the decades onwards and increase to the end of the decade to full potential.
In contrast to case 3, they incur (at full potential) over the whole second decade. The
2020 value FVO(2020) thus is the same as the 2030 value in equation (E.4),
FVO(2020) =
O
l
l∑
k=1
(l + 1− k)(1 + i)k . (E.8)
The 2030 value is composed again of two parts, the value from equation (E.8) discounted
to 2030 (FVO1(2030)) and the operational cost/savings incurred between 2020 and 2030
(FVO1(2020)),
FVO1(2030) = (1 + i)
10 FVO1(2020) (E.9)
FVO2(2030) = O
(
(1 + i)10 + (1 + i)9 + . . .+ (1 + i)
)
(E.10)
FVO(2030) = FVO1(2030) + FVO2(2030)
=
O
l
(1 + i)10
l∑
k=1
(l + 1− k)(1 + i)k + O
10∑
k=1
(1 + i)k . (E.11)
Case 5: 10 < l < 20, implementation 2010–2020
Discounted investments
Given the longer lifetime of the asset, replacement investments are only required during
a part of the second decade, in contrast to the preceding case. Other than that, this case
follows the same logic; if investments are distributed equally over 10 years again, the
integrated, discounted 2030 value FVC(2030) is given as follows:
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FVC1(2020) =
C
10
10∑
k=1
(1 + i)k
FVC1(2030) = (1 + i)
10 FVC1(2020) (E.12)
FVC2(2030) =
C
10
20−l∑
k=1
(1 + i)k (E.13)
FVC(2030) = FVO1(2030) + FVO2(2030)
=
C
10
(
(1 + i)10
10∑
k=1
(1 + i)k +
20−l∑
k=1
(1 + i)k
)
. (E.14)
Discounted operational cost
As operational cost/savings incur from 2020 on, increase to full potential by 2020 and
stay at this level through 2030, this case is the same as case 1. The integrated operational
cost, discounted to 2030 are given by equation (6.8),
FVO(2030) =
O
10
(
(1 + i)10
10∑
k=1
(11− k)(1 + i)k
)
+O
10∑
k=1
(1 + i)k . (E.15)
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F. Fit functions for isoinvestment
curves
Section 8.3 (page 162 f.) discussed isoinvestment curves, i.e., curves that connect points
of varying incremental water availability and GHG abatement, but constant investments.
The gradient of these curves can be regarded as the marginal rate of substitution between
water availability and GHG abatement.
The isoinvestment curves were fitted with polynoms. If y stands for the GHG abatement
and x for water availability, the fits to the isoinvestment curves are as given below. The
marginal rate of substitution is then given by dy/dx.
China
We fitted the isoinvestment curves 1, 3, 5, 7 in figure 8.9.
1. y(x) = −4 · 10−13x3 + 9 · 10−8x2 − 0.0034x+ 3124.4
3. y(x) = −3 · 10−13x3 + 7 · 10−8x2 − 0.0043x+ 5065.5
5. y(x) = −3 · 10−13x3 + 7 · 10−8x2 − 0.0063x+ 7197.6
7. y(x) = −4 · 10−13x3 + 1 · 10−7x2 − 0.0131x+ 8968.3
(F.1)
South Africa
We fitted all isoinvestment curves in figure 8.10.
1. y(x) = −7 · 10−7x2 − 0.0077x+ 110.23
2. y(x) = −1 · 10−6x2 − 0.0035x+ 142.74
3. y(x) = −1 · 10−6x2 − 0.0012x+ 166.82
4. y(x) = −2 · 10−6x2 + 0.0014x+ 206.52
5. y(x) = −2 · 10−6x2 + 0.0023x+ 244.22
6. y(x) = −1 · 10−6x2 + 0.0018x+ 285.41
7. y(x) = −2 · 10−6x2 + 0.0055x+ 317.12
(F.2)
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